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The Politics of War

A STUDY OF WAR

By Admiral Sir Reginald Custance
G.C.B. K.C.M.G. etc.

WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF
NATIONAL POLICY

and its Renunciation in the Pact of Paris

By James Shotwell. *With an Introduction*
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The Culmination of Modern History

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of History

By E. H. Goddard and P. A. Gibbons
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THE DRAGON'S TEETH

A Study of War and Peace

BY

MAJOR-GENERAL

J. F. C. FULLER, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.

AUTHOR OF "INDIA IN REVOLT."

*"We grope for the wall like the blind, and
we grope as if we had no eyes; we stumble
at noon day as in the night; we are in
desolate places as dead men."*

ISAIAH

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PREFACE

"It is not the part of a wise physician to croon incantations over a disease that needs the knife."—SOPHOCLES.

IN February 1932 the much-advertised Disarmament Conference will assemble, at which some wisdom and much inconsequence will be talked. Thus far each attempt to establish peace has resulted in a definite increase in armaments, and if this Conference fails one thing would seem certain—namely, another war; not because the abolition or restriction of armaments will in itself prevent war, but because armaments are the outward and visible sign of inward discontent. As discontent rises and falls, so do armaments increase and diminish; consequently, if this Conference restricts its arguments to scholastic discussions on the eruptions on the skin of humanity, and fails to diagnose the causes of these cutaneous diseases, its labours will be in vain.

It is because I think that this is likely to happen that I have written this book, in which an attempt is made to examine rationally, and not emotionally, the peace and war problems which to-day face us; for as emotion will not help a surgeon in removing a cancer from the human body, neither will it help the statesman to remove from the social body the tumours which beget wars.

Rational examination demands frankness, the lack of which has all but ruined us in the present age. Private and public words seldom coincide. Politicians and statesmen between themselves will agree that a situation is almost hopeless, and yet in public they will proclaim that there is nothing to be anxious about, and so coerce or delude the people into believing that

all is well. They act thus because they are moral cowards ; they distrust the people because they are afraid of them ; consequently, they are afraid of telling them the truth.

Since the close of the War the people have been living in an atmosphere of political lies. There is no policy, because without courage there can be no principles. Each party when out of power has simply anathematized the party in power, not to improve government, but to oust government. In the words of Isaiah :

“ His watchmen are blind, they are all ignorant, they are all dumb dogs, they cannot bark ; sleeping, lying down, loving to slumber.

“ Yea, they are greedy dogs which can never have enough, and they are shepherds that cannot understand ; they all look to their own way, every one for his gain from his quarter.

“ Come ye, say they, I will fetch wine, and we will fill ourselves with strong drink ; and tomorrow shall be as this day, and much more abundant.”

We have had enough of these people, with their quack medicines and infallible cure-alls, and I think it is about time we ceased to delude ourselves into believing that any world settlement can be arrived at until the public takes an intelligent interest in world problems ; and such interest demands knowledge.

In this book, which is in fact three books in one book, I have attempted to show where the present causes of war lie, that war and peace are closely related—for it is peace which creates war—and how eventually war may be eliminated ; but only by re-creating peace—that is, by drastically changing our social order. I

have not attempted to be pleasant or unpleasant, but instead to be truthful. My quarrel with France is not with her people, but with her politicians, whose fearfulness, vindictiveness and selfishness are precipitating another war. My admiration for Russia is not engendered by her Oriental despotism, but by the energy she is showing, which puts most other nations to the blush. If I decry professional soldiers, it is not for personal dislike of an honest and modest body of men, but because their work is fatuous ; they are not preparing for the next war but for the last war but one, and are consequently a danger rather than a security.¹ If my dislikes are pronounced, it nevertheless will be found that one and all are based on a principle : I cannot tolerate cowardice, untruthfulness and sentimentality. I do not believe that life is the most precious thing in this world, and when it is considered so, I do believe that a civilization is definitely in its decline. I believe that personal convictions, faith, courage and heroism are far nobler than mere living, and that without them life is no more than a rudderless ship. Every animal seeks to live, yet even a wolf-bitch will sacrifice her life for her young. When a nation or a civilization falls below the level of self-sacrifice for an ideal or a principle, then it is finished, and it will inevitably be replaced by a more heroic one.

War faces us to-day just as grimly as ever, and it is not going to be abolished by peace pacts and disarmament conferences. You cannot prevent two men

¹ What can one think when one reads of such tactical training as the following : " A spectacular cavalry charge was one of the incidents of the Army manœuvres on Salisbury Plain yesterday. The charge took place in the bright sunshine of a perfect autumn morning and in the face of ' devastating ' machine-gun fire. It was witnessed by military attachés of fourteen countries . . ." (*The Sunday Times*, September 20, 1931) ? It may be remembered that such tactics failed against bows and arrows at the Battle of Crecy in 1346.

from fighting by compelling them to sign an agreement not to fight, or by removing the umbrellas with which they fight, or even by doubling the police force ; but if you can discover the cause of their quarrel, and remove it, you may be certain fighting will cease until another cause arises. What the civilized world requires to-day is not a disarmament conference, but a conference to decide what are the outstanding causes of war. To those who are interested in this subject I offer this book, in which, over a period of three thousand years, war, its causes and its influences are examined, and from this examination its future tendencies are predicted.

I am indebted to the Editor of *The Round Table* and to Messrs. Macmillan & Co. for permission to quote extracts from that Review.

J. F. C. F.

November 20, 1931.

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
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PROLOGUE

ALEXANDER'S DREAM

"The world is not intended to be disposed in evil order ;
'In a multitude of rulers there is evil, therefore let
there be one prince'."—ARISTOTLE.

Alexander the Great

SOMEWHERE in Milton it may be read, "That truth comes to us first in hideous mien." A moment's thought will tell us that this, more often than not, is inevitable ; for Truth itself, as the Absolute Reality, is beyond human thought, and any new manifestation of it, mirrored as it must be on the finite mind of man, when reflected upon the opinions of the multitudes is apt to become in form hideous or totally unreal. Every new idea is born in a minority of one, and single-handed has to struggle against a phalanx, or mob, of old ideas. Sometimes it is submerged, more often it wins through, to change what we call civilization, and to be changed in its changing until, sterile and bent with age, some new manifestation overthrows it.

To the multitudes, thinking is torment ; consequently new thoughts are of Satan, the Prince of Lies. A new thought is a lie to them because they cannot understand it, or are too indolent to do so. Bound fast by the lecheries and conventionalities of everyday life, each new idea opens an abyss which they dare not explore ; consequently, to rid themselves of it, they resort to exorcism and anathema.

A hundred and one years ago Macaulay asked this question : "On what principle is it, that, when we see nothing but improvement behind us, we are to expect

nothing but deterioration before us?" The answer is obvious: because the masses dislike improvement; improvement means personal endeavour, activity of mind, plunging into the dark, invoking chasms and learning how to bridge them. It demands moral courage as well as physical courage, and reliance on self more so than reliance upon others. Such things terrify the people, and to shut them out from their lives they predict a gloomy future; a deterrent to those who would sail uncharted seas in search of disturbing Utopias and Eldorados.

Such a man was Macaulay. In 1830 he wrote: "The present moment is one of great distress. . . . A war, compared to which all other wars sink into insignificance; taxation, such as the most heavily taxed people of former times could not have conceived; a debt larger than all the public debts that ever existed in the world added together; the food of the people studiously rendered dear. . . ." Is he depressed? No, for Macaulay was a great man. The prevailing gloom in no way dims his foresight; he continues: "If we were to prophesy, that in the year 1930 a population of fifty millions, better fed, clad and lodged than the English of our time, will cover these islands . . . that machines, constructed on principles yet undiscovered, will be in every house . . . that our debt, vast as it seems to us, will appear to our great grand-children a trifling encumbrance, which might easily be paid off in a year or two, many people would think us insane. . . ." Undoubtedly they would, and though his optimism has been fulfilled, were he to stand before us to-day and prophesy in similar terms concerning 2030, would he be believed in, and would his optimism mean anything to the pessimism and defeatism which crowd the world, a world dismally devoid of great men? The answer is "No."

Two thousand one hundred and fifty years before Macaulay glimpsed into the future, the most extraordinary man that this world has seen, Alexander the Great, returning to Babylon from the East, dreamed a

dream of stupendous magnitude, a dream that, had he lived a thousand years in place of thirty-two, would have remained but a dream ; for his dream was the federation of the world.

In modern symbols this vision may be explained as follows :

The physiologists tell us that the body of man is composed of a mass of cells derived from one cell, a cell so minute that it can be seen only under a microscope. A tiny speck of living jelly, which by fission duplicates itself, incessantly adding to itself until a countless federated mass of cells is formed. Accepting this process of growth as a fact, then is not a similar process to be discovered in human society ? The cell here is represented by man, and fission by accretion. First the family appears—the man, the woman and the child—next the herd of families which evolves into the tribe ; then the group of tribes which develops into a people or a nation ; and ultimately, surely it is logical to suppose, a group of nations which, growing greater and greater, will eventually embrace all the races of the world.

Is this an idle dream ? I do not think so. Rather to me it would seem to be the unconscious urge which has directed man's course through the blindness of past ages, and is still directing it through the jungle of the present day. It is like a tiny lamp the flame of which cannot be extinguished, but which at times may, by the breath of genius, be made to flash from out of its invisible blueness into a dazzling tongue of light. This is what happened when Alexander returned from the desert of Gedrosia, having seen many peoples, having worshipped in many temples, and having found men one, and the gods of men one also.

His dream was to overcome the differences of race, to weld together the East and the West, and to produce a homogeneous family of men by intermarriage and the exchange of populations. He built cities not only for the purpose of strategy and trade, but so that they might become Hellenizing centres from which a common

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culture might spread. He established, in face of fierce opposition, equal rights and privileges between Greeks and Orientals, so that laws common to all would amalgamate all. Towards the end of his tremendous career he worked out schemes to colonize the lands of the Persian Gulf and of the Black Sea, and Diodorus tells us that at the time of his death, Craterus, one of his generals, who was then homeward bound from Babylon, "had with him a paper of written instructions, among which were projects . . . for the transportation of the people from Europe into Asia and from Asia into Europe."¹ His wars were not the ferocious incursions of a military genius, but the meditated acts of a world genius, who understood war as a means, and who had an end in view—a strong, contented and federated world.

Though no sooner was he dead than his empire fell to pieces, his dream lived on, and was partially realized in the *Pax Romana* of the soulless Roman Empire. Then this empire went down because it was soulless, its soullessness stifled it, yet the dream was not obliterated. Passing out of this eclipse, it emanated like a ghost in the shadowy form of the Holy Roman Empire, a political corpse embalmed by the mystical doctrines of the Catholic Church, until it was finally laid at rest by Alexander's spiritual successor—Napoleon the Great. Yet its odour lives on, in the Holy Alliance, in the Concert of Europe, and is to-day perfuming the international breezes through the League of Nations.

How curiously does history repeat itself! Take ancient Greece, the intellectual home of modern Europe. Greece is but a small peninsula jutting into the Mediterranean, a tongue of land split by mountains into many valleys, in each of which dwelt a city, a jealous little social unit, which, when not warring with its neighbours, more often than not was at war with itself. Take Europe, a peninsula of Asia, turn the map round so that Portugal points to the south and Poland northwards, and we see Greece and Macedonia in

¹ Diodorus, XVIII, 4.

enlarged form. Europe is also split up by mountain ranges ; true, wider apart, but nevertheless creating just as individual peoples as the Grecian mountains created individual cities. On one side of Greece lay rising Rome, on the other barbaric Scythia ; on one side of Europe lies rising America, on the other Bolshevik Russia. Greece would not federate, and went down before Rome. Is Europe going to experience a similar fate ? Look at her history since Papal spiritual federation was shattered, and even a brief examination of it will show that during the last five hundred years two war problems, foreign wars and internal revolutions, have scarred her face. The Renaissance, the Reformation, the rise of nationalism, wars, turmoils, brawls and, lastly, Europe of to-day ; a house of violent vendettas, in which each nation lives in its own room, bolts its door and shuts its windows, arming itself to the teeth in case it may be compelled to sally forth into the blood-stained corridors of this mansion of strife. Is there any hope ? None for those of little heart ; but to an Alexander it is a world to conquer and a world worth the conquering.

Lieut.-Commander J. M. Kenworthy

I am no Plutarch, and if from Alexander I turn to a member of the British Labour Party of the year 1931, it is not by way of comparing Poplicola with Solon, or Aristides with Marcus Cato ; it is simply because the gallant Commander has written a book entitled *Will Civilization Crash ?* and I want to point out that civilization will not, though civilizations are always crashing, and the sooner Western civilization crashes, or anyhow divests itself of its fears and greeds, the better will it be for civilization.

This writer I believe to be an honest man ; yet the importance of his book does not lie so much in its facts, as in the fact that it largely expresses popular opinion, which, unfortunately, is always wrong. It will be an interesting book to read a hundred years hence.

His thesis is, that another war will cause civilization to crash ; will remove the lid from off society ; that all which is cherished and cherishable by a middle-class world will be suffocated by the stench of barbarism ; and that once again Europe will be plunged into anarchy and darkness, as she was when Rome went down not before the sword but before her own soullessness and mediocrity.

He is not alone in this conception, as the following quotations, drawn from respectable books, and written by respectable men, will clearly show :

"Unless peace can be preserved, our civilization will perish. . . . The Thirty Years War was perhaps more brutally waged and more destructive of life than any war till the European War of 1914."—Sir Geoffrey Butler in *A Handbook of the League of Nations*.

"At the present day most nations realize that another first-class war would be the end of civilization."—Prof. Gilbert Murray in his introduction to Shotwell's *War as an Instrument of National Policy*.

"I believe it also to be self-evident that war in future cannot be waged without destroying civilization."—G. Lowes Dickinson in *The International Anarchy*.

"Who in Europe does not know that one more war in the West, and the civilization of the ages will fall with as great a shock as that of Rome."—Stanley Baldwin, January 8, 1927.

"War . . . an evil so deadly as to menace the very existence of civilized society. . . . War, indeed, is ultimately and fundamentally incompatible not only with law, but with civilization itself. . . . To try to build up a system of law with the institution of war embedded in it is like putting T.N.T. into your tooth powder and expecting to get a nice shiny polish if you only rub hard enough. Talking about laws of war is about as sensible as preaching the chastity of

prostitution."—C. Howard-Ellis in *The Origin, Structure and Working of the League of Nations*.

Here are five educated men who agree with Commander Kenworthy. There are many like them, and of the uneducated—legions. All are for sitting on the lid, and not letting war out. Kenworthy goes so far as to anathematize tattoos, war films and tournaments. "The Naval and Military Tournament," he says, "gives no representation of gas warfare, and a forward field dressing-station is conspicuously absent. No military doctor is shown at work. . . . There is no smell of burning human flesh shrivelled by the flame-throwers, we see no man still living with the lower parts of his body blown away by high explosives. . . . There was no representation of the *maison tolérée* in France. . . ." ¹ etc.

I admit that without a return to Chaka and his Zulus it would be difficult to present such realism to the public. Even if it were possible, would it be appreciated any more than "The Ideal Home Exhibition" would be, were it to include a row of French railway lavatories and a block or two of slum dwellings? Would the public really like to see a Manchester slum mother sew up her small children in rags in October, and watch her cut them free from them in the following April?

All this is hysteria, and no interdict, exorcism, or anathema will abolish war or poverty. When the slum goes, the probabilities are that the battlefield will go with it. When slum mothers cease sewing up their children, flame-throwers are likely to lose their utility. I shall return to these things later on; all I will say here is, that a perfect peace can beget no war. Even if the whole world sits on the lid of present-day civilization, there will nevertheless be an explosion unless the drains under the lid are well scoured out. The more it is sat upon the greater will the explosion be; consequently all that such men as Commander Kenworthy

¹ *Will Civilization Crash?* pp. 179, 180.

are doing is diligently to prepare civilization for a titanic crash, after which perhaps the world will be a fitter place for heroes to live in ; it certainly is not so to-day, seeing that in Great Britain alone there are over two and a half million unemployed. No, present-day civilization will not do ; it has got to crash or decay away before the Empire of Alexander can be founded.

The Dark Ages

Though man is by nature a discontented animal—hence his inventiveness, which has raised him to lordship over the animal world—it always flatters him to suppose that the days in which he lives are the most perfect which have ever been, because in his own estimation were his surroundings indifferent his presumptions might be doubted. When confronted by the future, he will declare the past golden, and will hanker after it ; but when considering the present, he will proclaim what has been as leaden and unprogressive, and eschew it if he can. He is not rational, but emotional and self-interested ; he wants a background which will throw *him* into relief, but he dreads a foreground which might possibly obliterate him. When at any particular moment he casts his eye upon the civilization in which he lives, it appears to him to be, if not perfection, far more perfect than any which preceded it. He cannot see that each epoch in history is but a stepping-stone in the river of life, upon one bank of which capers the ape, and upon the other, we hope, gambols the angel.

The average man—and it is the average man, the creator of that vague miasma called public opinion, whom I am considering here—believes in his heart that all ages except his own were exceedingly gloomy. To the primitive Christian the glory of Rome was a midnight, and to the primitive Rationalist the glory of the Dark Ages was but one o'clock in the morning. Yet both were glorious in their own way, a fabric of

gold and jet, of clouds and sunbeams. The one gave man hope, the other power ; the one crippled the body, the other crippled the soul. So to-day we cripple and we create, and a thousand years hence this age in which we live will by some be considered an aureole and by others a dismal dungeon. Yet, like every other age, it is in fact a witch's cauldron, and out of its bubbling broth strange forms for ever rise.

If present-day civilization does not crash, we must camp on one a.m. ; two a.m. will be denied to us without a march, and, like ancient China, our culture will become mummified in the sepulchre of the night, until the awakened Goth within us shatters its crystalline coffin, and scatters its dusty corpse to the winds of another dawn. Better, far better, creep onwards, and if needs be crash our way towards the next great sunrise.

Western Civilization

Is Western civilization so perfect that we must embalm it, and, like Tutankhamen, mask it with gold? In the Dark Ages men lived in hovels and dreamed of God ; now many of them live in palatial mansions and dream of butchers' bills, whilst not a few rot godlessly in sunless slums. Are not we like bats and night-birds blinded by a great light, drawn towards it through our ignorance of its true nature only to be destroyed by its unseen flame? That our present civilization has attained to wonder and grandeur in the physical and material spheres cannot be gainsaid ; in these respects no former age has been so marvellous as our own. The hands of man now play upon innumerable engines which accomplish the biddings of his will. In themselves these are neither good nor evil, for they are far more inanimate than the nails upon the fingers which work them or set them in motion. Good and evil reside in the will, as they always must, and it is here that we touch the bedrock of every civilization.

It is not my object to picture the grandeur of the age in which we live, which has transformed man but as yet has not transfigured him. Rather, it is to show that this steel-bound, glittering cage is nothing more than a prison if the fingers of ignorance, of greed and of self-interest, continue to play, not upon the throttles of the machines, but upon the will and the imagination.

Here we are faced by two subjects which embrace the inner meaning of any civilization ; for will is the mainspring of power, and imagination of art.

I cannot in a few pages do more than touch the fringe of so immense a subject ; but, so far as I do touch it, I intend to show that unless we re-orient the will of to-day, and resuscitate imagination which is all but dead, Western civilization can meet no other end than that which terminated the frantic onrush of the Gadarene swine.

Whilst science is measuring the stars, probing the elements, dissecting the atom, releasing new forces and handing to man power beyond power dreamed of a few short years ago, the will of man remains so obtuse, so utterly selfish and gross that the bulk of this power is not being used for his own improvement, or for the improvement of his stock, but for his own personal amusements and his own destruction. The intellect of the few is, in fact, being exploited by the ignorance of the many, an ignorance controlled by a fundamental fallacy—the myth of Christian morality.

What is morality ? Morality is physical, intellectual and moral fitness, a healthy body, a healthy mind and a healthy soul ; above all, a joy in virility, wisdom and beauty. The Christian Church anathematized these three, basing its dogmas upon the doctrines expounded by Christ in *The Sermon upon the Mount* and by St Paul in his *Epistles*. Poverty is exalted, marriage decried, evil is not to be resisted, and no thought is to be taken for the morrow. Not only did these subversive doctrines go far towards wrecking the Roman Empire, but to-day, in their final forms of democracy, socialism and communism, they are likely to wreck

Western civilization more certainly than famine, plague and war. It is internal degeneracy, and not external cataclysms, which has hitherto littered the world with destroyed civilizations, and which to-day, as I will now show, is far advanced in all lands in which democracy in its several forms holds sway.

Democracy is based on the fundamental fallacy that the vote is the right, and not a function, of the governed. This right is based on the Christian ideal that all men are equal, and this ideal is the foundation of modern socialism. This fallacy leads to the political system of government of the people, by the people, for the people, or, more intelligently put—of the ignorant, by the ignorant, for the ignorant. Ignorance is apotheosized, and, as all men are equal, humanitarianism is founded on the fallacy that all lives must be saved, and philanthropy (crowd cowardice) upon another—namely, the poorest must be helped not according to their worth but according to their needs. Taxation is consequently based on the theory that the efficient must pay for the inefficient. In other words, God helps those who help themselves, and those who do not do so are helped by Government. Democracy may therefore be considered a Satanic instrument ; for it is in conflict with God or Nature.

To-day political parties depend for their power upon the votes of the masses—the most ignorant. On these same masses does the Press depend for its profits. Consequently by politician and pressman, the mass, mob or proletariat is deified and worshipped, and liberty of opinion is nothing more than a self-satisfying illusion. To talk of the freedom of the Press is in fact to talk of something which does not exist. In Italy the Press expresses the opinions of Mussolini, who is anyhow a great man ; in England it expresses the opinion of the *hoi polloi* ; yet we say that the Italian Press is muzzled and that the English Press is free. It is no more free than the political parties are free. In 1918 Lloyd George introduced the pauper's vote, the vote of the most ignorant, and when, later on, a proposal was

made to abolish it, Mr. Ben. Smith cried out : " What would happen if one-seventh of the people of Bermondsey [that was the number then receiving relief] were disfranchised ? Do you think you would get a Socialist majority next time ? "

Government of the ignorant, by the ignorant, for the ignorant has, far more so than the after-effects of the war, led to that state of economic chaos in which we now are. So-called humanitarian legislation is not only throwing thousands out of work, but is paying them for not working. Its effects, though slower, are ultimately more devastating than those of a civil war ; for whilst civil wars kill off the weak, socialist philanthropy ruins the strong—heavy taxation penalizing success. Since 1911 twenty-one different National Insurance Acts have been passed, and unemployment consequently never fails to increase—it is in fact subsidized to do so. " In Poplar," writes Charles Wicksteed Armstrong, " when the Socialist Guardians were in power, and reckless expenditure on relief was practised, the number of persons they found they had to relieve rose from 4493 in October 1920, to 29,329 in April 1922. Conversely, in West Ham, when the Socialist Guardians were dismissed, the numbers fell, from 69,965 in October 1925 to 49,390 in the same month of 1926, in spite of the coal strike, and although no one in distress was left unrelieved." ¹

Though, according to the morality of to-day, people, however inefficient and worthless, must not be allowed to starve, they must not be compelled to work, for this would be an infringement of the liberty of the subject. Yet those who do work are compelled to part with their savings—anyhow a considerable portion of them—in order not only to feed the unemployed and unemployable, but to provide them with amusements, the eroticism of the cinema, and allow them to marry and breed children at the public expense ; whilst the worker's child is denied such a privilege. If people cannot be allowed to starve, surely they should not be

¹ *The Survival of the Unfittest*, p. 62.

subsidized to breed ; for every child born to the workless means in fact a child the less to the worker. In this respect democracy is simply emulating the cuckoo ; for the workers can less and less afford families, because they have to keep those of the workless and work-shy.

When we review this deplorable and insane, topsy-turvy state of affairs, we cannot help recognizing the same influences at work which have wrecked former empires and civilizations. Differential birth-rate was probably the most potent of several causes which led to the decline and ultimate fall of the Roman world, and to-day it is once again at work. In 1911—and the figures to-day are probably still more disproportionate—the births per thousand married males under fifty-five years of age were as follows : Upper and middle classes, 119 ; skilled workmen, 153 ; unskilled workmen, 213 ; but what is even worse is that, whilst the average number born in a family throughout the whole community is four, the average in degenerate stocks is seven, and everything possible is done to foster these stocks and reduce their death-rate.

That the race is deteriorating there is no doubt, yet the people cannot see it. "We are glad to note that this year so many more thousands of people have been treated in our hospitals than last, thus proving the increased usefulness of the institutions," writes a newspaper editor. To such I suppose it is a matter of congratulation that during 1918 40 per cent. of the recruits enlisted were described as C3, and to-day 80 per cent. of men willing to enlist into the Army are rejected as unfit. Also it may cheer such people to know that whilst in 1869 417 persons per million died of cancer, in 1925 this figure increased to 1336—that is, by over 200 per cent.

A worse feature still is the alarming increase in insanity. In 1906 the Joint Committee of the Boards of Education and Control estimated the number of insane people in Great Britain at 150,000 ; in 1926 this figure rose to 340,000, without counting 150,000

"notified insane," making approximately half a million.¹ Here is a glimpse of our vaunted civilization :

"Some human idiots are such stunted, misshapen, hideous and bestial specimens of morbid humanity as to arouse feelings of horror and repulsion rather than of pity or levity. Unfortunately, those tender-hearted humanitarians who raise a howl of protest at the mere mention of sterilization or the still more kindly lethal chamber *have never seen these things*, and so do not realize that the human body without a brain is something worse than the beasts of the field."²

Here is another :


"Great Britain is spending on health measures some £300,000,000 a year. There are the hospitals always full and overflowing. There are institutions for the lunatic, the hopeless, the defective, the helpless, the feckless. On mental defectives alone the country spends twice as much as it did ten years ago. It is probable that about 70 per cent. of the population is C3. . . . To *alleviate* we spend £300,000,000 each year. But how much of this vast aggregate is spent on real measures or *prevention*? A quarter, a tenth, a twentieth part?"³

¹ The figures for the United States are no more encouraging. Out of a population of 120,000,000, there are 1,500,000 persons in the medical profession, including 150,000 physicians. Yet in this country "some 50 to 60 per cent. of the population have decayed teeth . . . some 30 per cent. have adenoids . . . some 25 per cent. have uncorrected defects of vision." There are "3,000,000 partially or wholly deaf children and 350,000 crippled with rickets . . . 100,000 drug addicts and 900,000 feeble-minded, imbeciles and idiots." "Over-production in the Professions," T. Swann Harding, *Current History*, Vol. XXXIV, No. 5, p. 713.

² Professor Berry, Director of Medical Service, in the Stoke Park Colony, Bristol. Quoted in *The Survival of the Unfittest*, p. 39.

³ Mr. C. M. Kohan, secretary of the New Health Society. *Ibid.*, pp. 101, 102.

If these things continue, surely will Western civilization decay away through a moral and physical dry rot. It is not war which will destroy it, but its unfitness to wage peace. The will of man can change all this. It can enforce segregation, sterilization and the lethal chamber. It can insist on birth-control, it can insist upon no vote without work and no relief except in kind. Even if to-day every unemployed man or woman were compelled, in order to earn the dole, to do one or two hours' drill, or physical exercises, a day, I firmly believe that within six weeks of such a compulsion being enforced unemployment would drop by 33 per cent. But no, none of these things, or many like them, will be attempted until civilization founders, and in its shipwreck sweeps away with it government of the people, by the people, for the people, which is, and has ever been, the dry rot of nations ; for the people know not what they do.




BOOK I

CALLED

NOX

THE RELATIONS OF WAR AND
WORLD POLITICS

In which Book it is related how
Man, fearing War, has failed to
master it, and how, lost in
the illusions of Night, he
begets dragons in
his dreams



CHAPTER I

FORCE AND THE WORLD SPIRIT

The Age of Force

THE world of to-day is very different from the world of eighteen years ago, which, still unburied, lies shrouded before us in hope that life may not yet be extinct. Around it for over thirteen years has been held an international wake. Had the nations been wise, in place of gathering round the coffin and thumping upon its lid, they would have cremated the corpse and have cast its ashes to the winds. But wisdom was beyond their rulers, who spiritually were dead men. In truth, they belonged to the world which lay stark before their bended knees—they were wraiths, all but disembodied from reality. With heads bowed in sorrow and veneration, they were blind to the spirit which was emanating from the strife and chaos which had killed their fond ideal.

Since the War the world has swollen in size, because the world we know is big with new ideals, and life's problems to-day are far more complex than they were. The comparative simplicity of 1914 is gone. The fair green fields of that now far-distant period having been furrowed by the ploughshares of war, everywhere do we find new shoots, rank weeds, and innumerable runners which are sapping the strength of the world newly born. Many of the great men of 1914 are still in power, but politically they have shrunk into mummies. To-day they are small men, and are daily becoming smaller, for the world is growing bigger—too big for their petrified souls. Of the great men, the biggest are

the new men, men who rose with the sprouting corn and the tares, and men who are of and not before the problems to-day. Not until a new crop of men has arisen will these problems be solved, and solved they can be, but only by an understanding of the World Spirit as it ferments from the hopes and yearnings of the multitudes, that chaos out of which a new human cosmos is being fashioned.

We see this most clearly in our own country. An observant foreigner has remarked : " England can live without great men comparatively longer than any other country." This may be so, yet without great men no country can endure for long, any more than the best-built house will remain in repair unless occasionally visited by a mason. Cast our eyes around and what do we see ? The same old political gangs gyrating around each other's inefficiencies, the middle generation scrambling after wealth or bolting its doors against poverty, the younger looking around askance, sneered at for worshipping strange gods, and the masses doing lip-service to the old, depressed in spirit, for their worn-out incantations no longer work. What can one think of a country which, when faced by a problem such as to-day faces us in India, can appoint as its Viceroy a man who a few weeks after assuming office said :

" I am quite clear that the work the Viceroy has to do is much too heavy for a gentleman of my mature years, and I venture to hope that all those concerned, when they get over to London in the near future, will hurry on towards the completion of their labours in regard to constitutional reforms so that my life may more closely approximate to the four happy years I spent in Canada as a constitutional Governor-General, and in order that I may be relieved of many of my administrative duties " ¹ ?

Comment is needless, so I will return to Zeus and his thunderings.

¹ *The Times*, June 29, 1931.

In 1914, in spite of intestinal rumblings, Force sat on his gilded throne, and his thunder and lightning were the armies and the navies of the nations. They were the guardians of his government, for law and order were balanced on the bayonet point. To-day, with head and shoulders thrust from out the under-world, a new god is emerging. What forces are at his feet? We cannot see them; but we can guess, and more than guess, that in nature they are Plutonic.

Here is presented to us a curious spectacle. Before us sprouts a new world, still in the greater part ruled by the old monarch. At his feet yawns a chasm in which heaves the new ideal. It is a curious picture—most curious in that, though the world to-day is very different from the world of yesterday, if we turn to fighting force, the old world's foundations, we immediately discover that it closely resembles its parents of 1914. This lack of relationship between force and the spirit of the world of to-day is little appreciated, because the nature of the new ideal is not grasped.

In 1914 there were two great groups of antagonistic Powers in Europe, nations outside these groups being mere spectators of their quarrel. These two groups were urged into opposition through fear of each other. Now *this* fear is gone, and with it the stability of Europe; for the universal danger of a German hegemony having ceased to exist, all nations are free to caper as they please. Fear of the German navy consolidated the British Empire, and fear of the German army was the foundation of the Entente Cordiale. Fear having gone, the British Empire has changed, our relationship with France has changed, and the outlook of every other country has changed, and become far more self-centred and material.

In 1914 we were confronted by a tangible foe, an enemy we could hit at; but to-day our antagonist is intangible, and to use military force against him is of little account. Political conditions have so completely changed that though Russia is at war with us, we are not at war with Russia. In 1914 the aim of military

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force was to secure law and order within the country, and to protect our frontiers from invasion. Now our enemy has discovered a system of war which can surmount all frontiers, and which, in spite of military force, can corrode the very vitals of national existence. Since 1918 military force has failed in Ireland, in Egypt, in the Ruhr, in China, and is likely to fail in India, not because soldiers are unready to fight, or as yet unwilling to do so, but because the hand which wields them is palsied by fear, a fear begotten of an excessive desire for peace and of an ignorance of the true meaning of world conditions, which magnify every crisis like a shadow seen through a mist. Force itself is actually feared by those who rely on it, because, though military force can terrify materialists, its terrors only stimulate idealists. With one it is like pouring water on to a fire until it is extinguished; with the other it is like pouring oil. The whole situation is, in fact, contradictory; for whilst Russia has established a deadly form of psychological warfare, against which our sea power is impotent, the rest of Europe is wrangling over material things, and her statesmen are carrying on as if their one object in life is to revive the before-war epoch.

To arrive at a full explanation of this curiously inverted situation would demand a book, therefore I can do no more than outline an answer.

In my opinion, the World War was the military apotheosis of the Industrial Revolution. From 1768, the year in which Watt perfected his pumping engine, to the year 1914, the bulk of world progress was in nature material; genius had to struggle for its existence, and the spiritual fell into a rapid decline. The outlook of this period was geometric; laws of nature, of human begetting, like the old gods, were deified, and Causality became omnipotent. I do not suggest that the law of cause and effect is wrong, but I do suggest that its ingredients were, and still are, largely unknown; and amongst these the parts played by life and human intelligence were overlooked. Geo-

metricity expressed itself in monetary values ; the sovereign, mark, franc or dollar, as the case might be, became not so much work potentized in a symbol, as an actual symbol of work, of ability, and of social status. This age was pre-eminently material, and the backwash of its materialism was an increase in the moral sense, a desire for freedom from gross matter, from commercialized life, and a vague yet persistent groping for liberty in its thousand and one curious and diseased forms. The Renaissance had liberated Europe from a geometric spirituality ; the Industrial Revolution, the child of this intellectual revival, thrust mankind into the dungeon of the steam age ; and to-day the great cycle of faith, intellect and action is, so I feel, in changed form, about to repeat itself.

Then came the World War, a materialistic orgy of destruction, a perfect counterpart of the materialistic orgy of construction which preceded it. If wars, as I believe they do, render tangible and visible to all the virtues and vices of the states of peacefulness which precede their outbreak, then, if the World War was a brutal conflict, it only reflected the brutality of the age that gave it birth. The gross and ponderous roof which had sheltered the soul of a world, whose bones were of iron and whose breath was of steam, was blown sky-high, and Liberty, intoxicated by release from servitude, danced through the world like a drunken bacchanal. Yet, to-day, the fighting forces of civilized nations are prepared to meet, beat and defeat the pre-war Cyclopes—their like—but when they are now called upon to fight they find in his place Typhon. Then the force they were prepared to meet was one-eyed ; now it is hundred-headed. There is to-day, as in ancient mythology, a war against Olympus—the heaven of a wealthy, prosperous and egoistical commercial age. The result is, that wherever the Olympians look they see hell let loose, yet they do not realize that the fighting man, as we know him, is neither intended nor trained to fight immaterial fiends. What he looks for is a stout lump of flesh to hack to

pieces. He is by trade a butcher, and not a faith-healer.

Revolt against Materialism

Eighteen years ago, except for a few fanatics and anarchists—the magicians and sorcerers of the industrial age—no one doubted that democratic government was the *ne plus ultra* of political perfection. It toned with the period, for the materialism of wealth found in it a counterpart, namely, election by brute numbers—the millionaire counted his gold, and the member of Parliament his votes. Before the Industrial Revolution, governments were either feudal or oligarchic; even in free England it was the aristocracy, and not the people, who ruled. Then came the French Revolution and steam power. Then came modern democracy. Then came the World War. And to-day we find in Europe half a dozen dictatorships, and the old Russian Empire in the hands of a despotism.

It is indeed a strange world we live in; and not a few of the world problems which confront us, and are likely to confront us, will grow stranger still, unless we bring ourselves to realize that democracy and democratic military ideals have foundered. Both have foundered because electorates have become too big and because armies have become too ponderous. The whole organization of government has become top-heavy, overloaded as it is with the ignorance patent to majorities. It is not that majorities do not possess able men, but that their vehicle of thought and action—the masses themselves—is oppressive to ability. It is the same with armies and fleets; for, after a certain point, as size increases, efficiency decreases—the machine becomes too cumbersome for quick reaction to the will which should control it.

The old world, unconsciously though it may be, is sick of materialism. It voided its belly-full during the war—a nauseating struggle. It became intoxicated on idealism after the war. It is sick of mass wealth and

gross numbers, as it is sick of battles won by arsenals and ordnance factories. It yearns for some vague heroism—honour to the virtuous, government by the most able, and victory by the most valiant. As all these virtues are rarities, the spirit of this reaction is against size, against numbers, against majorities—in one word, against the material ideal ; it is in fact a revolt against the ignorance of massed multitudes. To-day it is all a confused jumble ; but it can be sensed here, there and everywhere. The world is overshadowed by some sublime or diabolical incarnation, some Avatar which is now descending from heaven or ascending from hell.

At present, it is but an expectation, formless, nameless and intangible ; but its odour is so strong, and so unlike the odour of materialism that it is most noxious to materialists. Anachronistic as it may seem, it borrows much from the age which gave it birth, just as primitive Christianity borrowed from decaying classical civilization. For want of a word, the new cult may be described as an ethical standardization—the desire for rapid belief, rapid conversion and rapid faith ; it has all the impatience and eagerness of youth. In the material world standardization was the supreme secret of success during the last hundred and fifty years. Spiritually it was the secret of success of early Christianity. The primitive Christian had to be of a type, for heaven was a one-class ideal. Heathens were the majority, and the elect the minority aiming at becoming the majority. Standardization was the aim of the new faith, and has, so I believe, been the aim and end of every faith, for, when it is attained, dynamic force is slain.

To-day we are faced by a new cult : the standardization of incomes, of intellect, of ethics, of amusements, of manners, and even of clothes. In England and America it is called Communism ; in Italy Fascism ; in Turkey Despotism ; in Russia Bolshevism ; and in distant countries, like India and China, Nationalism—all vague terms for the rule of minorities, what-

ever may be their tone, shade or aspirations. The foundations of industrial civilization have not only been undermined, but in many cases have performed a complete somersault. To materialists, a number of nations seem to be standing on their heads; yet, as I have said, if we examine their military ideals, in most cases they are still standing on their feet as firmly as they did in 1913.

In 1914, diplomatic action preceded the outbreak of war; it was ritualistic, and it was an accepted shibboleth that it should do so, must do so. When it broke down, the rules of the game dictated that military action must follow; by which was meant that the parties concerned, having refused to agree diplomatically, must be brought to agree through mutual destruction. Each then sent out its fighting forces—a minority of men, a minority which was to protect the prejudices and enforce the interests of the majority, who, having said “No” in place of “Yes,” very wisely remained at home. The backbone of the war was the will of the majority, the muscles of the war were the loyalty of the fighting minority, and the blood which kept the war body in repair was provided by the industrial classes of the nation, always septic with discontent. Such was the anatomy of war in 1914.

To those of vulgar perception, the war is regarded as having been won by the Allied Powers in November 1918. In truth, the war which had sprung from the gross materialism of the previous hundred years was so won. But long before the World War another war had been declared; this was the war of idealism against materialism, and as during the World War material losses grew greater and greater so did materialism weaken, and so, in direct proportion, did idealism grow stronger. By the time the war terminated, idealistic warfare was in full swing, and it found its centre of gravity in Russia. Since then this war has been daily waged, a war between new ideals and a shattered material world, and in this war the fighting forces have played no part.

What is so amazing is that statesmen and politicians do not see this, or see it so obscurely that they miss its gigantic form. Ever since 1918 they have been toiling and playing with things material—war debts, disarmament, tariffs, prohibition, finance, etc.—and during all this play and toil on the rind of civilization, the soul of civilization has been sloughing its skin. In the East the present chaos foretells the coming of a new culture, a new idealism, the eventual form of which is still too obscure to be seen clearly—as obscure as the Papacy of the Middle Ages was when primitive Christians were rotting the foundations of the Eternal City, and Goth and Hun were crouching low on the Rhine and the Danube ready to spring directly those foundations gave way. The Roman Empire to-day is Europe less Russia, which has always ethnically been an Asiatic Power. The new creed of the under-world has many names, all of which are as repulsive to the followers of the old dispensation as the “isms” and “ists” of the second and third centuries were to orthodox Roman citizens. The modern Goths and Huns are to be sought in Asia.

We know what happened in the Roman Empire, and we realize now that no power in the then civilized world could have stayed decay. But we should also realize, that if the intelligentsia of Rome could have foreseen what was approaching, they could have shaped the new ideal in such a way that the Dark Ages would have been a period of re-creation instead of a reversion to barbarism, often in its most hideous form. They could have made it a dawn and a noontide instead of a twilight and a midnight. They could have advanced the Renaissance by a thousand years. They had no great precedent to guide them; we have—namely, their failure. Are we going to set this precedent aside, and in place wind ourselves in a shroud of dotage and slip into the grave now yawning wide before us, slowly to be eaten up by the worms of social decay?

The Legions of Youth

I have gone to this length—brief though it really is—in sketching-in the moral outline of the world of to-day as it appears to me, because without it there can be no background to my picture. The age of industry was an age of force. The will of the majority, which is the backbone of democratic government, is ultimately dependent on military force, and if, as in our own case, a nation is dependent for its daily food on oversea trade, then on naval force as well. Military force is the guarantor of law and order, naval force of the command of the sea. Naval and military force were the foundations of the Roman Empire, as to-day they are of the European kingdoms and republics, and as these forces were in the third and fourth centuries of the present era inadequate to preserve the structure of the one, are they likely to-day to be adequate to preserve the structure of the others?

It is difficult to answer this question, for the political world of to-day is very different from the political world of fifteen centuries ago. But the moral and spiritual forces which are now taking form are not so different, and in my opinion, they are the more important; for they are, in fact, the yolk within the shell. The Roman world ideal entered its decline when it ceased to exert force. Once the desire to conquer grew somnolent, conquest was replaced by defence—the desire to endure. Militarily, the Empire changed from an offensive organization into a protective one. It was like a middle-aged man who, having made his fortune, retires to live quietly on his income. In the case of an individual, normally his business is carried on by others, but in the case of Rome her business became comatose; fighting ceased, and her legionaries, scattered in protective posts along her frontiers, replaced fighting by flirting, and all that flirting includes and entails. The soldier went back to the people in spite of his arms and his discipline. He married younger, he mixed with,

peasants and artisans and imbibed their ideals. Slowly he became one of them. The people were full of strange communistic whisperings—visionary, beautiful and crude. Thus was Roman discipline rotted. The dwindling of the urge to expand—that is, to conquer—virtually threw the legionaries on to the dole—their true employment was gone, but their pay continued. They then became policemen. Lastly they merged with the crowd, and the fabric of Roman civilization fell to pieces.

To-day, we see much the same tendencies amongst most European nations. The desire to conquer is dead; for they do not want vastly to extend their frontiers though they may want to rectify them. Their armies are virtually police forces drawn from the proletariat, whose ideals are in a process of transformation. The World War revealed humanity to the people in many curious ways. All classes suffered losses, which brought with them similar sorrows. Women of the aristocracy washed up plates and dishes in the canteens, and sons of the people became officers in the fighting forces. The illusions of an epoch were cracked and irreparably broken, yet after the War Europe tried to stick them together, and the result was a patchwork shell similar in form to the one known before its outbreak, but very fragile in substance.

Within this shell the spirit of the new idealism is conglobing, and, though still nebulous, from it will one day materialize a new galaxy, a new world order. This spirit is the spirit of youth, the revolt of the virile and ambitious against the sterile and the satiated. It is a hungry spirit born of the generation which took no part in the war, which is scarcely interested in it, or with the dead society which preceded it, or the diseased society which has followed it. It is a spirit which is seeking self-realization through introspection, to which the theories of such writers as H. G. Wells and G. Bernard Shaw are no longer magnetic—worse, which bore it as do the follies of the generation which gave birth to them. This spirit never saw 1914, and consequently

does not want to see it. It is completely out of sympathy with the mentality of its elders and the problems which its political elders propound.

In the defeated nations and the countries which have been swept by revolution it is to be found in its most virile form. In Great Britain it is almost unknown, a cricket score being still considered a far more important event than a sharp rise or fall in the figures of unemployment. In the United States it has taken on a sex form, as may be judged from such books as those written by Judge B. Lindsey, in which the slogan would appear to be "recreation, not procreation." In Germany, in many ways *at present*, it assumes an opposite form; for as one of its leaders has said: "The whole moral outlook of the young people of Germany is comparably better to-day than it was thirty years ago." Here we find a variety of youth groups and societies, such as, the "Free German Youth," anti-Christian, yet free from any idolatry of the intelligence; the "Free Proletarian Youth," who have broken away from the materialism of Marx and aim at a rejuvenated Puritanism; the "Protestant Youth," who eschew the secular aims of the churches and enhalo Christ with a mystical devotion, and the "Catholic Youth," a group the aim of which is to re-awaken the ancient soul of the German people and break away from materialism.¹ But how long these young people will be content to play with guitars in place of revolvers remains to be seen.

In Italy the Fascist movement is to a large extent a youth movement, a movement which developed out of the paralysis of the elder statesmen. It does not recognize majority rule, it fosters individual initiative, and believes that the only vice is inertia. "All members of the body politic are dependent upon each other. No member has the right to contend against another nor to oppose the State, any more than a Catholic priest or layman would be warranted in combating the Church." It is essentially Pauline in conception—the Italian State is a living unity.

¹ See: C. H. Hereford's *The Post-War Mind of Germany*.

Throughout China and India the youth movement is rampant, and constitutes the foundations of the revolutions in these countries ; but it is in Russia that it takes on its most advanced form. Here its aim is not to resuscitate an old world, or to purify a corrupt world, but to create a new world—a city of Detroit tingling with the fanaticism of a Savonarola. Here we are confronted by a truly amazing and awe-inspiring spectacle.

Much of the following information is taken from an illuminating article entitled "Young Russia" which appeared in *The Round Table*¹ of September 1929. Being innocent of all bias, it constitutes trustworthy evidence. Its importance lies in the fact that throughout history nearly all the great artists, writers, scientists and soldiers have been young men, men between twenty-five and forty-five years of age. This being so, it stands to reason that if two nations, or two cultures, or two civilizations, clash, in which one draws its inspirations from young men and the other from men of middle age—men of forty-five to sixty-five—the chances are that the first will destroy the second. This, and not the Five-Year Plan or any purely economic system, is, in my opinion, the chief danger which to-day threatens Western civilization. Virility in the end must triumph, and in the end senility must succumb.

Russian youth is to-day unchained from Western civilization and shackled by Bolshevik culture. It has cast off everything which appeals to the youth of other lands—religion, morality, family, nationalism and social justice, assuming in their stead atheism, sex freedom, independence of parental authority, internationalism and militant despotism. The first point of interest to note is the diametrical opposition of these ideals ; the second, that the fervour in realizing them is far deeper in Russia than in the rest of Europe. If fervour is militant in Germany and Italy, in Russia it is fiercely militaristic. Extremes are always likely

¹ Another interesting article, entitled "Russian Realities," appeared in the March 1931 number of this Quarterly.

to meet ; for it is easier for a believing theist to become a believing atheist than an indeterminate agnostic, and the fervour of a belief is more important in changing the course of events than is the nature of the thing believed in. We may consequently expect remarkable and sudden somersaults in the Russian youth movement.

The revolt against elder authority, one of the pillars of Western civilization, is complete. "In no land in the world, hardly even in nationalist China, has youth been elevated to such a position of responsibility. The policy that other nations follow in putting into places of command persons of mature age, because of their supposed experience and ripeness of judgment, is precisely the one that the Russians have discarded." The psychological effects of this change upon civilization are likely to be as great as those which followed the replacement of persecution by tolerance in the seventeenth century. Tolerance gave to the world rationalism, science and industry ; imagination, which in most people ceases to expand after their thirty-fifth year, is likely to give the world idealism, introspection and art. As the one led to the establishment of an amazing intellectual civilization, a civilization which proceeded from God to nature and was founded on mind, the other may quite possibly lead from nature back to God and be founded upon heart. To most, this will seem an extraordinary deduction ; if so, then I suggest a comparison between the world of 1732 and that of 1932, and nothing will seem impossible in 2132 ; besides, to return to the opening words of my prologue, truth often comes to us first "in hideous mien." To those who are startled I recommend a careful perusal of the fairy tale "Beauty and the Beast."

That this power of introspection, in exploring the realms of the human heart in place of ransacking the treasure-house of nature, of sinking into oneself in place of expanding out of oneself, which constitutes the main difference between religion and science, does exist in a pronounced form is proved not only by many a Russian

novelist, but by the following quotations : " A youth is in love with a girl. He is an atheist. She is not. He loves her desperately ; he is sure that in time, after marriage, he will win her away from her faith. Meanwhile she is stubborn ; she will marry him only if he consents to a church wedding. Has he a right to yield to her ? And supposing that he has, without consulting his collective, gone through a church ceremony—has, as one youth expressed it, 'compromised with his atheism for no more than two hours'—what is the collective to do ? Expel him and lose an active worker for the Revolution, or pardon him and compromise with 'the powers of darkness' ?" . . . "Endless are the problems that youth is facing in its daily life, and always is it obliged to seek solutions in its own heart. . . . It is so cocksure of itself, its aims, ideas and prejudices, that it regards the rest of mankind as still living in some dark age. . . . It is bursting with faith and an eagerness to live and to struggle." To find a comparison with such a state of heart and mind, we have got to go back to primitive Christianity, but with this difference, that whilst the Christian youth of the third and fourth centuries kept his faith for an unseen world, the Bolshevik youth is immersing his in the world in which he lives. To the Christian, salvation lay in repentance and renouncing things earthly, to the Bolshevik in self-assertion and in the exaltation of labour. Yet again, these are extremes which at some future date may possibly meet, for the attainment of heaven, whether in this world or the next, is one and the same ideal.

Everything is political in the Russian schools, as once upon a time in the European schools it was theological, and theology is nothing more than the politics of heaven. "In no country in the world, not even in Fascist Italy, is youth so continually deluged with political ideas and political enthusiasms as in Russia. I doubt if there ever was a religious movement in the world which sought to inculcate its tenets more, or even as assiduously, in youth as the Communist party

is doing in Russia. Youth is made not only to believe in the new political faith, but to thrill to it, to be ready to fight and to die for it."

"With their innate love of drama, the Russians have linked this faith to everyday life, have woven it into the very fabric of their everyday experiences. They have made it not merely a philosophy, an abstraction, an idea, but a guide and an inspiration, a body of sanctions and usages. It is to them not merely a wave on the ocean, but the ocean itself, constantly heaving up new waves, new storms that overwhelm, submerge and transform. Where else in the world, for example, is youth being reared in a spirit of international mindedness as it is in Russia? The Ukrainian boy speaks his own language, knows that he is an Ukrainian. The Georgian girl knows that she is a Georgian. The Buryat youth knows that he is a Buryat. But they are all brought up to feel that first and foremost they are internationalists; they are to draw no line against any person because of race, colour or nationality. They are to join hands with the African, the Mongol, the Hindu and the Turk, as readily as with the German, the Englishman, the American or any other white person. An earthquake in Japan? A strike in Johannesburg? An uprising in Java? They are to contribute their copecks to provide succour for the struggling and suffering mass, because they themselves are a spiritual part of the mass, are one with it, and must always be of it. Watch a parade of revolutionary youth in Russia, and you will instantly perceive the boisterous, the almost terrific, quality of this spirit of international mindedness. No national assertiveness, no national banners, no national songs. Nowhere a sign of race or colour discrimination. All the tribes and peoples of Russia and other lands, principally Asia, in their native garb and with their native slouch, marching arm in

arm, boys and girls always together, all under the same red banners, wrapped in the same red bunting, striding to the same red tune, singing the same International ! ”

I offer no apology for this long quotation, for in itself it is an illumination casting a clear white light upon that darkness which we call Russia. Do not let it dazzle us, but instead let us consider what it shows us. From one angle the possible internationalization of the world. From another a possible federalization of Asia ; this possibility I will examine in Chapter VIII. From a third, the emergence of a fierce Russian nationalism resulting either from the success of the Five-Year Plan or its failure ; this possibility I will examine in Chapter IV. Here all I will say is that the glimpse of the international Eldorado which the War revealed was soon lost in a host of illusions. The people were ignorant, they could not think, they could only hope and guess. Then out of the East came the pedlar of new lamps for old, and his lamps magically revealed a new world, for their flames shone bright in that cavern of illusions in which these lamps were lit.

Since the war, the Russians have frequently swindled the people, yet with their lamps they have given them hope, whilst those who govern other lands have only increased, or decreased, their wages—they have dealt in things material. Hope is a combustible of sublime and diabolic power, for, as Shelley says :

“ To suffer woes which hope thinks infinite ;
To forgive wrongs darker than death or night ;
To defy power which seems omnipotent ;
To love, and bear ; to hope till hope creates
From its own wreck the thing it contemplates . . . ”

“ These are the spells by which to re-assume an empire o’er the disentangled doom.” Indeed, Prometheus is once again unbound, and the fire he has snatched from heaven, and which he is now offering to an ignorant world, will either consume it or re-create it. Which ?

The Moral Attack

The answer to the above question depends on the leaders of the peoples. Have they wisdom? Do they really know the world as it is, and do they understand the illusionary nature of its appearances? They cannot give the world a new spiritual direction, but they could, if they possess wisdom, canalize the spirituality which to-day is flooding humankind. Yet will they? For it means the disturbing of many material interests and prejudices. They could, of course, alter the basis of political power, but only if they can bring themselves to understand the moral tendencies which surround it. At present they live in an atmosphere of incipient revolutions, just as once did the Roman Emperors. The final result is likely to be the same: a weakening of government, rapid changes in popular opinion followed by the overthrow of hierarchies, and finally chaos and disruption.

The war taught Lenin the fatuity of that form of military force which existed throughout the war, and which continues to exist. To him it was clearly apparent that the whole process of destroying human life and material things was clumsy in the extreme. In no previous war between civilized nations, not excepting the Thirty Years War, had destruction for itself been looked upon as an essential means of establishing peace. In his outlook on war there was nothing new, for Carlyle, in *Sartor Resartus*, depicts it all in the parable of the able-bodied men of Dumdrudge. But in his insight there was. His purpose was not to abolish war, or even to restrict it, but to render it more effective. He saw what few others really saw—namely, that in war it is not soldiers and sailors who fight, but nations who fight, with soldiers and sailors as their weapons. Paralyze the hand which wields the blade, and incidentally perhaps dull the edge of the blade, or destroy its temper, and war may become bloodless, yet all destructive to the hierarchy in control of the enemy's

people. The Russian has a definite policy : he believes that he can establish a better form of peace, of culture and of civilization, than the existing form. The adherents of the existing order very naturally believe that he is wrong, yet, in spite of their disbelief, they do not see that the existing form of fighting force, upon which they rely for their internal security, is no longer a shield but a sieve ; it cannot shelter a nation from insidious propaganda. Further, if this propaganda catches hold, and the people are thrown into a fever, fighting force as it is to-day constituted is the worst of doctors ; for, generally speaking, it can only accentuate the fever, since by destroying human life it increases human suffering, and throws the masses more and more into the arms of the magicians of universal solvents.

If the existing moral outlook on war must be changed because moral changes have taken and are taking place in the culture of nations, so also must we bring ourselves to realize the influence of recent economic and scientific changes on the fighting forces.

We live in an age of rapid and unthinking movement. The railway, the steamship, the motor-car and the aeroplane whirl us from place to place. Newspapers pour out news, good, bad and indifferent, in such quantities that the masses of the people, never given to think much or to reason, accept their opinion as their own. Broadcasting and the cinema offer cheap amusements, and as the masses of the people are unintellectual, they cannot amuse themselves, and therefore have to be amused by an army of film stars and such-like entertainers. We live in an age of standardization, not only of things but of ideas and recreations. The film buffoon and heroine are standardized performers ; equally standardized are the sentiments of the Press and the eternal triangle of the modern novel. We live in an age which, though enslaved by its own gross ignorance, is totally undisciplined, for it is free to think, believe, say and write what it pleases. In the fighting forces we find an extraordinary contrast. The fighting man is compelled to accept an order as he would a

judgment ; his opinions, even on things military, are rigidly restricted ; his political horizon is circumscribed, and in some countries he has no legal right either to pay or to pension. He lives in a crystalline world of discipline, and controlled as he is by its monastic régime, he is kept in a servitude which can only be denominated as barbaric, for it would not be tolerated in any other class of society. On the one side he is bounded by an iron wall, and on the other runs the open meadowland of films and loud speakers and newspaper headlines. The iron wall keeps him ignorant of his great purpose in life, and the lush meadows allow him to gambol and graze with the *hoi polloi* of the land. If his sources of amusement become, I will suppose, Bolshevized, reaction is immediate, as immediate as it was in the case of the Roman legionary once he married a Christian girl. His discipline is fashioned to shield him against the shock of war, but it in no way protects him against the demoralizing influences of peace. To-day it is a discipline which requires reform, for the idea upon which it is founded is part and parcel of the general war idea—that is, a material war, a war of destruction and a war in which the soldier must be trained to prefer obedience to life itself. It is just this type of war which the pedlars of old lamps for new do not wage.

Whatever the reader may think of the ideas I have set forth, there is one point which brooks no dispute. Physical force as an instrument to gain or maintain a state of prosperous and contented peacefulness has failed. During the war it destroyed prosperity, and after the war it has, to a larger extent than ever before, failed to enforce law and order, which are the foundations of contentedness. The strength of Russia is not based on physical force as a destroying agent ; internally she uses it as an instrument of terror, but externally she makes little or no use of it at all. Often have I heard the remark made that one day Russia will go to war with some European nation. To me it is an astonishing statement, seeing that, ever since 1917, Russia,

has been at war with all nations still loyal to the Old-World ideal. The latter have ambassadors in Moscow, and the Russians may have ambassadors in their capitals ; they may trade with Russia and Russia may trade with them ; their subjects may travel in Russia and Russians may travel in their countries ; nevertheless, since 1917, Russia has been openly at war with Western civilization, of which the British Empire is the backbone in the Old World. They have refused to declare war on her. Why? Not because they are too proud to fight, but because their instruments of war can do her no harm. Such as they are, were they to use them, it would be like battering against a wireless wave with a pick-axe.

CHAPTER II

FORCE AND THE PEACE TREATIES

The First of the Hoi Polloi Wars

THE revolt of youth which to-day is sweeping through the world is the revolt against the conventions of a passing civilization. It is not that in youth itself is to be found the summit of perfection, for years mean little to philosophies. It is because age at present clings to the past, and refuses to change with the changing times. Similarly with physical force, it is in its nadir because the hand which should wield it has lost its authority. Were the world peopled by philosophers, the dictum of Meng-tze, or Mencius as he is more often called, would be a true one—namely, that physical force can only subjugate inadequate strength, and not the will of man; but the masses have little or no will, for if they had they could not be morally attacked.

The World War began like any other war, by excuses, threats, lies and the brandishing of swords; yet inwardly it was quite different from any other war, for it was a trial of force in a world of unrealized forces. The intellectual and the moral were rapidly submerged by the physical—the military expression of science and industry. The authority of the few, which had regulated past wars, was swamped by the discord of the many; for though the multitudes knew little about the war, being maintained in a gloomy ignorance concerning it, this ignorance paralysed the wills of those who knew, and palsied their hands. They feared the multitudes, and, fearing them, they failed. The lever

of the war left what should have been a steady fulcrum to flounder into destruction, a destruction which revealed no foresight, no plan, no object, except destruction itself. As construction had been the main-spring of the peace which had preceded the war, so now did destruction replace it, not to create but to annihilate, not to reform but to cripple, until mutual exhaustion left the civilized world not gasping at its folly, but panting to regain breath so that it might renew the conflict in some other form.

Since the Reformation, the fulcrum of peace had been the Balance of Power, a political instrument, a balance between authorities, kings, Cabinets, self-contained states and individual peoples. By 1914 the world of this balance had in the larger part vanished, for national power had become economic as well as political, and was so intricately interwoven with the power of other nations, that the authority of politics was quite incapable of solving international problems by means of the old national mathematics. Restrict Einstein to Euclid, and his theories cannot even manifest in a dream.

Politically the world of 1914 was Euclidean, and totally unsuited to solve the space curvatures of international trade. It has been said that "the war was due to the fact that the weapons of twentieth-century science were in the hands of peoples with sixteenth-century political mentalities." This is largely true, but what is truer is that eighteenth-century political mentalities had for over a hundred years been attempting to solve nineteenth- and twentieth-century economic problems, and, as we shall see, are still attempting to solve them. The economic interdependence of the world was not realized; all that was realized was the political autonomy of individual nations.

The year 1870 was the turning point, one of those abrupt corners in the progress of nations when things should be, but are not always, seen from the new angle. The brief sharp war which this year saw fought was what the American Civil War had been across the

Atlantic. After 1865 the United States strode forward towards economic supremacy, and after 1871 the German Empire did the same, and these two Powers soon came into economic conflict with Great Britain, which had hitherto been the workshop and carrier of the world. In 1870 the population of Germany was 50,000,000 ; in 1914 68,000,000. In 1890 the populations of the Austrian and Russian Empires stood at 40,000,000 and 100,000,000 respectively, and in 1914 at 50,000,000 and 150,000,000. Thus, when the war broke out, we find 268,000,000 people living side by side behind a minimum of frontiers and tariff walls, with their various currencies based on gold. In 1919, what do we see? The three great dynastic military empires, the Hohenzollern, the Hapsburg and the Romanoff, have disappeared, and in their place stand nine contending and jealous nations. No wonder the world is still lying down.

The year 1919 is therefore another turning point ; 1917 most certainly is so, as from thence date the final destruction of old Russia and the beginning of the search after an economic Eldorado, such as is foreshadowed in the present Five-Year Plan. Yet in 1919 what do we see? A looking round this new corner? No. The politicians turn a somersault and gaze at 1914—1914 immensely broadened*and intensified, a world in which, as Mr. Keynes says in his book *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, the rich can "spend more and save less" and the poor can "spend more and work less." A curiously inverted picture.

The war itself was just as curious when we examine it. It was unlike any other war, for it was in fact the first of the great democratic wars, or perhaps, better stated, the first of the world wars fought under the demagogic system. It was therefore an animal war, a war of the *hoi polloi*, the people, the masses, the multitudes and the canaille. During the Napoleonic Wars, science, literature and art still maintained their international spirit. In this war, so potent was popular opinion that they were degraded into instruments of

international strife. Scientists, who are supposed to be clear thinkers and seekers after truth, downed truth and sang hymns of hate ; whilst writers and artists, swept off their feet by the emotions of the human herd, hurled anathemas and vile cartoons at each other's heads. The only clean part about the war was the fighting, the rest was filth. The clergy, the newspaper men and the politicians raked up mud and squirted it in the name of God at their enemies.

The spirit of the war was but the unleashed spirit of the peace which had preceded the war, social sadism released from its conventional bonds. In the peace which followed the war we see the same. The two together are a mirror in which can clearly be seen the Medusa head of Western civilization, a picture not wasted on awakened Asia.

“ Fair is foul, and foul is fair,
Hover through the fog and filthy air.”

The war revealed that the body of this civilization was purely material, and that its soul was that of a cheating rogue. It ended by economic, not military, collapse. This collapse affected the whole world, and not, as in former times, the vanquished nations only. Then came the peace treaties, which, in place of attempting to re-establish economic stability, based reconstruction upon force and vengeance. As force had failed to win the war, an attempt was made to make it win the peace. Hence the origins of the present turmoil, and to these origins I will now turn.

The Thieves' Kitchen

Viscount Cecil says : “ We have . . . traditionally stood for peace. But it has been peace with honour.”¹ This is one of those self-satisfying conceits which democracies so love to hear. During the period of aristocratic warfare there was something to be said for this contention, but in modern democratic times it is quite

¹ *The Way of Peace*, p. 77.

untrue. In 1864, we maintained peace by dishonouring our treaty obligations with Denmark ; in 1918, we, as one of the Allies under the chairmanship of President Wilson, on November 5 offered Germany a surrender on terms ; and no sooner were these terms accepted than we tore them up, and imposed quite other ones. For this piece of roguery the world has suffered ever since.

On this date President Wilson transmitted to Germany the terms of the armistice agreed upon by the Governments associated with him. These were based on his "Fourteen Points" and his various addresses before Congress.

Among the "Fourteen Points" we find the following :

"III. The removal, as far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

"IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

"V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims."

Further, damage done to civilians and their property was to be paid for ; Alsace-Lorraine returned to France and Poland to be reconstituted.

Before Congress, on February 11, 1918, he said : "There shall be no annexations, no contributions, no punitive damages. . . . Self-determination is not a mere phase. It is an imperative principle of action which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril. . . . Every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival States." And on September 27, 1918 : "The impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and

those to whom we do not wish to be just. No special or separate interest of any single nation or any group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all."

These terms are definite, and though they may be quibbled over, they cannot be controverted. Germany accepted them, and the Armistice of November 11 was signed.

This done, an act of political immorality was perpetrated in England by Messrs. Lloyd George and Bonar Law; they determined on a General Election which would sweep the Coalition Government into renewed power on the tidal wave of popular enthusiasm begotten by the ending of the war. Though politically this was an astute act, morally it was unsound, for it meant government by popular emotion.

On November 22, these two representatives of democracy—a Liberal and a Conservative—issued their election manifesto, which contained the following: "Our first task must be to conclude a just and lasting peace, and so to establish the foundations of a new Europe that occasion for further wars may be forever averted." This admirable object was far too lofty, it did not satisfy the war neurosis of the masses. This being so, Lloyd George, on the 29th, hoping to raise enthusiasm, said: Germany "must pay as far as she can, but we are not going to allow her to pay in such a way as to wreck our industries." This was sound common sense, consequently the people were not much interested; then, the next day, Mr. Barnes, who represented Labour in the War Cabinet, knowing the people better than the Prime Minister, shouted from his platform: "I am for hanging the Kaiser!" Here was the flavour of blood, and British democracy was swept off its feet.

All parties now fell into line with the champion of Socialism. Sir Eric Geddes, who before this blood sacrifice was suggested had doubted the power of Germany to meet the whole cost of the war, at once

said : " We will get out of her all you can squeeze out of a lemon and a bit more. I will squeeze her until you can hear the pips squeak " ;¹ and on December 11, Lloyd George issued his final manifesto :

- " 1. Trial of the Kaiser.
2. Punishment of those responsible for atrocities.
3. Fullest indemnities from Germany.
4. Britain for the British, socially and industrially.
5. Rehabilitation of those broken in the war.
6. A happier country for all."

Looking at these six points to-day, it would appear that seldom has there been issued such clap-trap ; yet democracy swallowed it head and tail, and returned Mr. Lloyd George to office. Once in power, points 1 and 2 were dropped like red-hot coals ; point 3 wrecked Europe, and is still one of the outstanding causes of world depression, and the remainder have been replaced by nearly 3,000,000 unemployed in Great Britain alone, who are costing scores of millions of pounds a year to maintain in idleness.

Why did Mr. Lloyd George do this ? The answer is given by C. Howard-Ellis, who writes : " He generally saw the better course, and always adopted the worse when that seemed necessary in order not to endanger his lease of power. . . ." And then of him at the Peace Conference : " The causes are profounder than the rascality or weakness of a handful of politicians. Lloyd George's record at the Conference was bad, but it was popular. . . . He won his General Election by an overwhelming majority on hanging the Kaiser and making Germany pay for the war. . . . On the rare occasions when he did try to rise above the blood-lust of the people he was faced with the imminent risk of losing his job, and promptly retracted." ²

He was in fact not a free agent. He was a political

¹ See : *The Economic Consequences of the Peace.*

² *The Origin Structure and Working of the League of Nations*, pp. 42, 43.

balloon inflated by the hot breath of the mob. Such is democratic rule and government. Alva and Torquemada were in their days respectable representatives of the Catholic Church ; in 1918, Lloyd George, Bonar Law, Sir Eric Geddes and Mr. Barnes were respectable representatives of democracy. Who shall condemn the one and not the other, though of these two categories of men the second has caused out of all proportion the greater suffering ?

Whilst Lloyd George was tearing up the Armistice terms, which were as solemn an agreement as was Germany's undertaking not to violate the neutrality of Belgium, there was seated in Paris a disillusioned old man who had lost all faith in humanity, and who looked upon Germany as a vile, treacherous beast, a monster to be destroyed. His arid ideal was to put the European clock back to before 1870, and to establish the military hegemony of France, though he saw that it could not be an enduring one. His name was Clemenceau. As Mr. Howard-Ellis says, he "stood throughout the Peace Conference for nothing but hatred and fear, and a cynically frank desire to cripple and fetter" Germany "for ever."¹ His policy was the policy of France which, according to Ray Stannard Baker, was :

- " 1. French military control of the Rhine.
2. A permanent alliance of the Great Powers to help France hold it.
3. A group of smaller Allies to menace Germany from the East.
4. Territorial reduction of the German Empire.
5. Crippling of the German political organization.
6. Disarmament of Germany but not of the Allies.
7. A crushing indemnity.
8. Deprivation of economic resources.
9. A set of commercial agreements preferential to France, prejudicial to Germany."²

¹ *The Origin Structure and Working of the League of Nations*, p. 43.

² *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*, Vol. II, chap. xxv.

He also tore up the Armistice terms, and for them substituted a Carthaginian Peace, and was sitting in the thieves' kitchen of Versailles when President Wilson, like Moses, descended from his mountain-top with the tables of the "Fourteen Points" in his hands. Had he but cast them on the ground before these worshippers of the Golden Calf, and smashed them to pieces, the world to-day could certainly not be as evilly disposed as it is—a world founded on the dishonour of a demagogic peace, compared to which the war was a Vestal of chastity.

The truth would appear to be, that democracies should not indulge in wars, as they are totally incapable of terminating them honourably. Woodrow Wilson did not realize this; an honest man, he stumbled into the thieves' kitchen, blindfolded by righteousness. Within six months he was stripped naked of morality, to stand a token to mankind of the poverty of honour and honesty in democratic assemblies.

The Carthaginian Peace

In 1914, Mr. Asquith proclaimed that "we shall never sheath the sword, which we have not lightly drawn, until Belgium recovers in full measure all and more than all that she has sacrificed, until France is adequately secured against the menace of aggression, until the rights of the smaller nationalities of Europe are placed upon an unassailable foundation, and until the military domination of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed."

The war was fought for these ideals, and though, as I will show in Chapter VII, without pooling—that is, internationalizing—their resources the Allied Powers could not have won the war, the peace which followed the war was fashioned out of these ideals also. Though Wilson stood for internationalism of a kind, Clemenceau was determined to establish a Carthaginian Peace. What happened then to the Armistice terms? They were publicly torn up directly the noose was well

round the German neck. They were not terms, but a trap.

The treaties of Versailles, St. Germain, Neuilly, Trianon and Sèvres, all bearing French names and endowed with the French spirit, were forced upon the defeated nations with a brutality which would have disgraced the Inquisition, and without any regard whatsoever for the future welfare of Europe or the establishment of a better peace. The prime mover in each one of them was France, who, terrified by German virility, was determined to secure herself, cost what it might, by disintegrating Germany and encircling her wraith with a ring of hostile spooks. The principle of self-determination, the moral pivot of the Wilsonian plan, was turned into a French entrenching tool, and the League of Nations was only accepted by France at the price of the surrender of international justice.

The new nations, especially those formed out of the old Austrian Empire, are in no way complete national unities. Austria was left with 6,000,000 people and a capital meant for an empire of 50,000,000; 250,000 Austrians were handed over to Italy and 3,100,000 Germans to Czechoslovakia. Hungary was compelled to hand over 500,000 Hungarians to Yugoslavia, 65,000 to Austria, 750,000 to Czechoslovakia and 1,700,000 to Roumania. In the territories added to Roumania only 53 per cent. of the population is Roumanian, in those given to Czechoslovakia 48 per cent. is Slovak, in those to Yugoslavia 37 per cent. is Serb and Croat, and in Czechoslovakia less than half the population is Czech. The fact is that none of these conglomerations of peoples is in any meaning of the word a nation; consequently political harmony is impossible, and economic welfare equally so. Austria, a great economic unit, was broken up, and peace in this area will never be certain until a Zollverein is established. France was, however, terrified by such a thought, because she was, and still is, obsessed by the idea that an economically strong central Europe must constitute a military threat

to her. Having ruined Austria, the next step was to ruin Germany.

Before the war, German economic strength was founded upon her overseas commerce, her colonies, her home industries, more particularly coal and iron, and her transport and tariff systems. All these were destroyed by the Carthaginian Peace. Her colonies were seized, including the private property of the German colonists residing in them, and in Alsace-Lorraine the French Government was entitled "to expropriate without compensation the personal property of private German citizens and German companies."¹ Practically the whole of the German mercantile marine was surrendered, and all invested capital in foreign countries was confiscated. Reparations, which I will examine later on, were, as Mr. Keynes says, "employed to destroy Germany's commercial and economic organisation as well as to exact payment." £1,000,000,000 was demanded by May 1, 1921, "whether in gold, commodities, ships, securities or otherwise." Five thousand locomotives and 150,000 railway wagons were surrendered, and the German waterways handed over to an inter-allied Commission.

Probably the most disastrous terms of this iniquitous peace were those which referred to German coal, for they not only knocked away the pivot of German industrial organization and dealt Great Britain a deadly blow from which she has never recovered, by reducing her overseas coal trade, but also set back as nothing else could have done the recovery of European prosperity. The Saar Basin was to be surrendered, and after a fifteen years' occupation by France a plebiscite held, which, if favouring Germany, would entitle her to repurchase this area "at a price payable in gold." Seeing that the Saar district had been German for over a thousand years, and that in 1918, out of its 650,000 inhabitants less than 100 were French, this transaction is surely one of the most barefaced pieces of robbery ever perpetrated. The Upper Silesian

¹ *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, p. 64.

coalfields, subject to a plebiscite, were to be ceded to Poland. On the top of this loss, between the years 1919-1920 and 1928-1929, Germany was to deliver to France 210,000,000, to Belgium 80,000,000, and to Italy 55,000,000 tons of coal.

Having ruined Germany economically, the next step in the Carthaginian Peace was to keep her ruined, in spite of the obvious fact that without her recovery Europe must remain ruined also. Having reduced her to bankruptcy, the most fantastic reparation claims were put forward, for under Article 231 of the treaty she was compelled to accept the whole guilt of the war.¹ Though at the Peace Conference the British Government urged the cancellation of all war debts, this was not agreed to by the United States, consequently it was settled that Germany should pay for the war. According to Mr. Keynes, the Belgian claims exceeded "the total estimated pre-war wealth of the whole country." The French claim for the destruction of house property was over 33 per cent. of the entire house property of France. Astronomical figures were juggled with, and people went literally stark raving mad. In *The Times* of December 3, 1918, Sir Sidney Low wrote: "I have seen authoritative estimates which place the gross value of Germany's mineral and chemical resources as high as £250,000,000,000 sterling or even more; and the Ruhr Basin mines alone are said to be worth over £45,000,000,000." Commenting upon these figures, Mr. Keynes says: "In point of fact, the *present* market value of all the mines in Germany of every kind has been estimated at £300,000,000, or a little more than one-thousandth part of Sir Sidney Low's expectations."²

Some thought that Germany should and could pay

¹ In full this article reads: "Part viii, Reparations, Section I, General Provisions, Article 231.—The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies."

² *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, p. 188.

the whole cost of the war, which was estimated at £24,000,000,000. This, apart from any sinking fund, meant that she would have to pay an annual interest of £1,200,000,000 till the crack of doom! Though the damage done in the devastated area was calculated at between £400,000,000 and £600,000,000,¹ such figures did not satisfy French politicians. M. Dubois placed it at £2,600,000,000, M. Loucheur at £3,000,000,000, and M. Klotz at £5,360,000,000—that is approximately two and a quarter times the value of the entire house property of France as estimated in the *Annuaire Statistique de la France* of 1917. Finally, in 1921, the Reparation Commission fixed Germany's indebtedness at £6,600,000,000, a sum which she was in any circumstances, and over any length of time, incapable of paying, consequently it was a mad figure. In 1871 Germany demanded of France £200,000,000, and France paid it; in 1921 the Allied Powers demanded of Germany thirty-three times this figure, and though subsequently this stupendous sum has been vastly reduced by various Commissions, every penny paid by Germany has been paid out of foreign loans. If this is not madness what is?

Commenting on the question of indemnities, the year the Peace Treaty was signed, Mr. Keynes wrote in his *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*:

“I believe that the campaign for securing out of Germany the general costs of the war was one of the most serious acts of political unwisdom for which our statesmen have ever been responsible. To what a different future Europe might have looked forward if either Mr. Lloyd George or Mr. Wilson had apprehended that the most serious of the problems which claimed their attention were not political or territorial but financial and economic, and that the perils of the future lay not in frontiers or sovereignties but in food, coal, and

¹ To date the cost has been £651,000,000.

transport. Neither of them paid adequate attention to those problems at any stage of the Conference. . . . Yet the financial problems which were about to exercise Europe could not be solved by greed. The possibility of *their* cure lay in magnanimity.”¹

The League of Nonsense

The Treaty of Versailles was the handiwork of old men. Signor Orlando a political wraith ; Clemenceau honestly vindictive, whose honesty obliterated his humanity ; Woodrow Wilson honestly humane, whose honesty obliterated all reality, and Lloyd George, harlequin-like, leaping this way and that between the shadows of these dreamers of past and future worlds, honesty personified, for he believed in nothing but himself. Four honest men, each one honest in his own way, and then the most dishonest peace in history, a peace as full of turmoils as the Hydra was full of heads. Yet there are not a few who still firmly believe that the war was fought to make the world safe for democracy. Perhaps after all they are right ; but what a world !

“ Round about the cauldron go ;
In the poison'd entrails throw.

Cool it with a baboon's blood,
Then the charm is firm and good.”

The League of Nations, which should not have been a league of nonsense, but of common sense, had Woodrow Wilson possessed this “ rarest of all the senses,” was dropped by him into the cauldron of Versailles to cool its horrible ingredients. It was a tremendous ideal cramped into a deformed and simian body. It was an old idea, as old as Alexander's dream, a dream which had perturbed Saint Pierre, Sully, William Penn, Rousseau, Kant, Tsar Alexander I and a host of other dreamers, and a dream partially sub-

¹ *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, p. 134.

stantiated in the organization of the British Commonwealth. Had Wilson been an economist, a second Adam Smith, in place of an emasculated Socrates ; had he realized that the world's body must be refashioned before the soul of fraternity could inhabit it ; had he heard the hundred years' murmurings of trade and commerce which demanded an interdependent world, his league might have become the greatest of realities—a clearing-house for economic questions. Instead it was a nonsensical gathering. A Junta of victorious nations, a bourgeois instrument the aim of which is, as one writer says, "to make the whole world a big second-class railway carriage." It is a respectable, conventional, strictly proper assembly of elder statesmen and bureaucrats, who can decide nothing of vital importance without the United States and Russia, who are not members, and even if they were, it could decide less, because the greater its membership, the more difficult becomes unanimity of opinion. Great problems are shunned, because bumblebees and such-like insects can crash through its delicate web. "The League," says Commander Kenworthy, "has never yet succeeded in checking the designs of any single one of the great Powers,"¹ though on account of the Great Powers it has sometimes put a snaffle in the mouths of the lesser ones.

"Without Public Opinion the League can do nothing,"² so says Viscount Cecil, and he should know, and to-day there is a score of public opinions not only in Europe, but in every European country. "The League cannot rise higher than the level of the nations composing it,"³ so writes Mr. Howard-Ellis, and he also should know ; consequently the League is but the looking-glass of Europe, and in it may be seen what Europe is like. It is a league which attempts to solve unsolvable problems—disarmament and such like. As

¹ *Will Civilization Crash ?* p. 159.

² *The Way of Peace*, p. 13.

³ *The Origin Structure and Working of the League of Nations*, p. 63.

regards insignificant ones, unanimity is seldom attained. In May 1931, Mr. Philip C. Nash, Director of the League of Nations Association, writes : " Once more it was evident that the European nations are very slow to come together in agreement on anything whatsoever. Only ten nations signed the convention dealing with road signals, and only nine the one dealing with the taxation of foreign cars. These matters are not vitally important or controversial, and the question is, why cannot the nations agree? The reason circulating in League circles at Geneva seems to be that the vested interests in the railroads do not want to see motor transport encouraged." ¹ How, then, can it be expected that the League will solve any important problem? Towards such its policy is negative ; it either suspends them or ignores them. Thus, Mr. Howard-Ellis tells us that the policy of the League is to concentrate on the laws of peace and to refuse to touch the laws of war, because war disgusts it,² yet it attempts to prohibit the use in war of poison gases and bacteriological methods of warfare. It is neither flesh, fish nor fowl.

According to Article XIX of the Covenant, " The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world." And, according to Article XI, every member of the League is given the right to bring to the notice of the Council, or the Assembly, any circumstances likely to disturb international relations. To-day every peace treaty requires revision, and the world is full of circumstances arising out of them which are perpetually stimulating turmoil ; why, then, are not these things rectified? The answer is given in Articles V and X. In the first we read : " Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant or by the terms of the present Treaty, deci-

¹ *Current History*, Vol. XXXIV, No. 2.

² *The Origin Structure and Working of the League of Nations*, p. 351.

sions at any meeting of the Assembly or of the Council shall require the agreement of all the members of the League represented at the Meeting." In the second : "The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League." What, then, is the use of placing vital reforms before it? It is a static organization embedded in the *status quo*, an instrument of obstruction, and not of progress, and an organization which, if it cannot decide on traffic signals, is most unlikely to decide on the revision of the treaties. Yet, in spite of these tremendous defects, it is the only symbol we have of a united, peace-loving world. Its value is, that though international problems are still being examined from national angles, the nations are called together at one spot, Geneva, and there examine them. "Even more important," writes H. Temperly, "was the fact that the Treaties themselves were made to centre round the idea of the League to so great an extent that without it they became plainly unworkable. The recognition that the problems raised in Paris can only be solved by a permanent international organization is perhaps the greatest result of the Conference."¹ This is true, for the only alternative is war.

The Medean Cauldron

Before I leave this chapter, and in the next examine how the violence and rapacity of the treaties established a peace in which true peacefulness is impossible, it is, I think, important to realize the outstanding lesson of the year 1919—namely, the utter impotence of national democracies to solve international problems.

The object of the war was to prevent Germany establishing a hegemony over European nations—in fact to found in her own way that unity which had existed under the Roman Empire. This dream, which had evolved from out of the Napoleonic Wars coinci-

¹ *History of the Peace Conference*, Vol. I. pp. 276-277.

dentally with that of the Holy Alliance, had been infused through the Germanic peoples by such writers as Fichte, Hegel, Treitschke, Nietzsche and Houston Chamberlain, and eventually became the controlling obsession of Wilhelm II. Speaking at Aix, on October 19, 1911, the year of the Agadir incident, the Kaiser said of his father: "How his eyes glistened when he told stories of the coronations at Aix, with their ceremonies and banquets, of Charlemagne, of Barbarossa and their greatness! He always closed by saying, 'This must all come again; the power of the Empire must rise and the glitter of the Emperor's crown must shine forth again.'"¹

This dream was essentially sublime, for in it lay enshrouded the vision of Alexander—the eventual unity of the world. Yet German reasoning was utterly in error; it supposed that this unity could be established by the methods of Charlemagne and Barbarossa, methods a thousand years out of date. In fact, had Germany won the war, in place of European nations being freed from their national illusions, that exclusive separatism begotten in the days of the Reformation, they would have become nothing more than discontented prisoners in a super-national jail, the bars of which would ultimately have been wrenched apart in a series of bloody and devastating revolutions.

Once freed from the German incubus, the European problem remained in no way changed. The war had delivered the nations from slavery, and was consequently a righteous war, a crusade against oppression; yet it showed clearly the necessity of unity in order to mitigate discord, and in doing so it simultaneously showed that to return to the international discord which had given birth to it was to cast aside, like pearls before swine, the priceless gift this stupendous conflict offered to mankind. Its creative forces were lost to sight in its destructive effects.

To-day public opinion is unanimous that all our

¹ *The German Emperor as Shown in his Public Utterances*, Christian Gauss, pp. 300-301.

troubles may be traced to the war. This is a fickle conceit, a mere convenience to excuse our incompetence and stupidity ; for the world in which we live was not created by the war, but by the peace treaties which followed the war, and these treaties, though they were brought to life by the war, were not begotten by it, but by the years which preceded it, their selfishness, greeds, fears and doubts. The outstanding tragedy was not that the war had destroyed so much, but that it had destroyed so little of those old ideals which engendered it.

It is easy to blame individual men, such as Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Barnes, etc. I have done so, because it is important to realize that men of old ideals, of robbery, chicanery and lynch law, are totally incapable of solving the problems which to-day demand solution. In fact, they are just as much throw-backs to Charlemagne and Barbarossa as were Frederick II and William II of Germany—worse, for the dream of unity is beyond them. The true blame does not rest upon their shoulders, for they were but the flies upon the wheel of a civilization which raised all this dust. It was Western civilization which was not only responsible for the war, but for the peace treaties, and these reflect the countenance of democracy.

From the opening of the present century, to go back no further, what do we see? A mechanical world, seemingly perfectly ordered, living in an intellectual anarchy. In the spiritual domain the expositions of the higher criticism were not only battles of words but of souls. Men like Huxley and Häckel were prophets ; but since these fervent contests of the nineteenth century, the reality of God has become so shadowy that theological arguments stimulate little or no response. Man is thus thrown back on to himself, and turns to science for support. Science, which during the last century was founded upon unalterable law, an intellectual in place of a spiritual divinity, has rapidly followed the footsteps of theology—chance having replaced law and probabilities certainties. Nothing even

in the outer world is any longer real, steadfast or reliable, and as man is the creature of his surroundings, his soul is replaced by a conscious vacuum, scientific doubt leading him to doubt his very intelligence. Hence the human being is despiritualized and re-materialized in the form of a self-seeking animal.

Not only has man lost his soul, but his reason, and is consequently thrown back upon his animal instincts, his emotions and the emotions of his fellowmen. The cement of morality crumbles and becomes more and more friable, as his intellect disintegrates. Love, marriage, the family, honour, honesty, social behaviour, the sense of right and the welfare of posterity are all shrouded and then impregnated by a carnal miasmal mist, until "Eat, drink, for to-morrow we die" inoculates life with an acute Sardanapalism, the inner disease of Western civilization.

This ideal, the enjoyment of the brief and mortal present, is not due in any large measure to the war, but to the progressive elimination of religious belief, intellectual certitude, moral obligations and economic law, in order to satisfy the greeds of individual men, communities, classes and nations. In many ways, as I will explain in other chapters, the World War was an unconscious attempt on the part of afflicted democracies to throw off the disease which was eating into their bowels. It was an attempt which failed, because once the fever subsided, once the physical struggle was over, no effort was made in the peace treaties to tackle the disease. The origins of the war were not examined let alone diagnosed; its effects were alone treated, and by a system of witchcraft, Germany was asked to disprove her guilt by walking over red-hot ploughshares. Nauseating drugs and magical offal were forced down the throat of war-exhausted Europe, and as I will show in the following chapter, every effort to vomit forth "Eye of newt, and toe of frog, wool of bat, and tongue of dog," has so far been prevented by one Power—France. This great nation, through a short-sighted and fearful selfishness bordering on insanity, has ever

since 1919 peered into the cauldron of Europe "For a charm of powerful trouble," and whispered loud enough to be heard by all who are not stone-deaf: "Like a hell-broth boil and bubble." Thus was the earthquake tamped.

CHAPTER III

FORCE AND THE PEACE PROBLEMS

The Hegemony of France

TO-DAY Europe is with child by Satan, and the days of her quickening are at hand. Well may the words of Dante in his *De Monarchia* be applied to her : "O! Race of mankind ! what storms must toss thee, what losses must thou endure, what shipwrecks must buffet thee, as long as thou, a beast of many heads, strivest after contrary things."

In 1914, Germany strove to establish a hegemony over Europe. She failed, and was shattered in the attempt. In 1919, France stepped into her blood-stained shoes, and, in place of establishing a Cæsarism based on arrogance, she established a Cæsarism founded upon hysterical fear. It is a curious picture, this nemesis which has been meted out to a distracted world. A nemesis which whispers : "You, O men, whom I judge impartially according to your deeds, must learn to discover of yourselves that there is but one path towards peace, and that path is not by force alone."

Had Germany won the war, it can scarcely be doubted that for a period she would have founded a virile despotism, yet not a purely destructive one, for her ideal was to re-establish the empire of Charlemagne, if not that of the Cæsars. France, who did not win the war, and who was saved time and again by her Allies from losing it through the treachery of her politicians, won the peace, for the peace treaties were predominantly French. Their aim was not to establish an empire, but to disintegrate empires so that the weak-

ness and senility of France might appear strong and virile in comparison with the nations which surrounded her. As old men had worded the treaties, so did old France endow them with the spirit of decrepitude. Her hegemony was the hegemony of terror, of palsied imagination and of chattering teeth, and by terror she has striven to enforce it.

Truly a pitiful picture, this great nation, a nation which could produce a Turenne and a Napoleon, in spite of the winning of the war, to be snarling like a beaten dog.

When the French talk of peace they mean the Peace of Versailles, and they do not mean the peace of the world. Thus Europe is split into two hostile camps—France and her satellites, who look upon the treaty settlements as sacred, so sacred that they must be enforced by the bayonet point, and those who believe that a treaty only is a temporary convention, and that war is the worst means of changing it. Between these two camps limp the defeated nations, and outside this sorry picture on one side stands America, hauling into her coffers European gold, and on the other, Russia, enticing into her web European souls. It is an amazing picture—the inheritors of Western civilization, destroying the Temple of the Ages with bayonet, money-box and spell.

The present security against war, so says one writer, "is the preponderance of France and her allies, not all-round disarmament, and the determining factor in deciding whether the treaties of peace shall be altered or any political change shall be made in Europe is the will of the same group of Powers, and not the judicial decision of the Hague Court or the arbitration courts of the public opinion of the world as expressed through the Council or the Assembly of the League of Nations."¹ From one angle only is this statement true. It is correct to say that behind the Treaty of Versailles stand 617,000 French soldiers, 253,000 Polish and 127,000 Czech, and that 100,000 Germans cannot overthrow this all but

¹ *The Round Table*, Quarterly, September 1929.

round million of armed men. But it is totally illogical to suppose that this military preponderance is a security against war, for at most it is but a temporary halt between two battlefields. Great Britain has largely disarmed herself, and to-day is more threatened by French submarines and aircraft than she was in 1913 by German warships. Italy is hostile to France; and the Allies of France, whose lands have proved convenient dumping-grounds for French military equipment, know full well that should it appear profitable to France she would drop them like hot coals. And behind this tangled skein of roguery, trickery and fearfulness stands Russia, a not altogether unknown quantity, ready to take Germany in her arms.

The present security against war is an illusion begotten of French decrepitude. France knows this well enough, otherwise why should she tremble before 100,000 German rifles—a nineteenth-century army? She knows that her million soldiers, who can when necessary be reinforced by millions more, are no better than the hordes of Darius dressed up in twentieth-century uniforms. Security against immediate war has been maintained not so much by them, as by fostering and perpetuating economic ruin. Why, in 1923, did France violate her treaty by occupying the Ruhr? and why, in 1931, did she at first refuse to fall in with the Hoover debt suspension proposals unless the Austro-German Customs Union were abandoned? The answer is obvious: Because as long as Germany can be maintained in a state of economic and financial chaos, she is unable to exert military force against France.

In 1923, the French entered the Ruhr, and by means both shady and dishonourable they attempted to establish an independent State in the Rhineland, a hope they had sustained ever since the days of Richelieu. In 1931, a purely economic proposal terrified them, yet they cannot see that the real danger is not Germany but Russia, and that if Germany becomes Bolshevized, even if only temporarily so, the fortifications of their frontiers, on which they have recently spent £26,000,000, will be

about as effective in keeping out the Bolshevik bacilli as Canute's gesture was in retarding the inflowing tide. France, and with her Europe, are heading for a precipice.

German attempted hegemony was bad, French actual hegemony is worse. To talk about the present security against war is to talk about something which does not exist. Look at Europe, and look at the world ! Pre-war diplomacy was trickery, but post-war diplomacy has been banditry, for no true attempt has as yet been made to establish a world peace, though unlimited words have been expended upon this subject. In the years following the signing of the peace treaties there have been more wars and revolutions, and far more devastating ones, than in the years which preceded the war. Austria as a separate state is an anomaly ; the Polish frontier cannot be maintained ; the Danzig corridor is an anachronism ; Latvia, Lithuania and Esthonia cannot last ; the state of Hungary and of the Trentino are crying injustices ; the defeated Powers remain disarmed, yet most of the victorious are yearly increasing their armaments. Such are the results of the French peace—of the French spirit of fearfulness embodied in the peace treaties. France is still terrified by old Europe, and yet more terrified by the idea of a new Europe. In spite of this undoubted fact—for it is daily advertised from Paris—there is a growing feeling not only in Italy, and of necessity in the vanquished countries, but also in Great Britain and the United States, that the peace treaties cannot stand. They must be amended ; and this feeling has been vastly accentuated by the economic crisis which began to submerge the world in 1929, a crisis which to a very large extent can be traced to French policy.

One thing is certain ; the peace treaties will be modified either by reason or by war ; the first course being preferable to the second, but the second preferable to the maintenance of them in their present forms. The League of Nations is impotent. Under Article XIX of the Covenant it can advise the reconsideration

of treaties which endanger the peace of the world ; but the Assembly of the League cannot modify any treaty, for the modification of treaties lies "solely within the competence of the contracting States"—this is its own ruling. The only instrument left to remove this tumour from the body of the world is war. Once again the hand of man will accomplish what the will of man should accomplish, because the vitality of Europe is not exhausted, and, rightly or wrongly, it will not tolerate, even in French hands, the execution of Lenin's policy, the aim of which was to destroy the Capitalist System—that is, Western civilization—by debauching the currency. In 1923, the French nearly succeeded in this : they sent the mark reeling into millions, and had they fully succeeded they would in all probability have been sucked down in the German maelstrom. Commenting on Lenin's destructive plan, Mr. Keynes says : "Lenin was certainly right : There is no subtler, no surer means of overturning the existing basis of society than to debauch the currency. The process engages all the hidden forces of economic laws on the side of destruction, and does it in a manner which not one man in a million is able to diagnose. . . . In the complex world of Western Europe the Immanent Will may achieve its end more subtly and bring in the revolution no less inevitably through a Klotz or a George than by the intellectualisms, too ruthless and self-conscious for us, of the bloodthirsty philosophers of Russia." ¹ Perhaps, after all, Destiny has decided to turn over another leaf of the Book of Fate, and perhaps France is the penknife with which she is lifting the page. Yet—it seems to me that the will of man can, through justice and reason, transcend Destiny, for is not the Book of Fate the book that man himself has written and is forever writing ?

War an Instrument of Policy

Every war of any magnitude liberates a revolution, and, as I will show in Chapter IX, every revolution in

¹ *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, p. 220.

Europe during the last five hundred years has ended in a war. To-day, on account of the interdependence of nations, any war between the greater Powers must lead to a world revolution—that is, a readjustment of human ideals, orders and systems. The one is nothing more than the obverse, or reverse, of the other; a change in position, angle and outlook, it is like a coin spinning through the air. Is it, however, necessary, seeing how interdependent the world has become, to change the position of the coin by the destructive blasts of war? This is a problem which since Alexander dreamed his dream has perturbed the thinking world, and to-day this problem has been infused by the thinking few into the emotional many, consequently it is a problem which is confused by a variety of issues.

Clausewitz, who was the first great thinker in modern times to review the whole problem of war, was of opinion that "war is a political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means."¹ These words are often quoted, but seldom understood. Their inner meaning is this: political commerce—that is, the relations between a government and a people, and a government and other governments—is founded on power, which during peace-time expresses itself in the main morally and intellectually, and during war-time physically. This commerce is therefore threefold in nature, depending upon justice, reason and force. The abolition of force is impossible in a well-ordered society, as impossible as the abolition of justice or reason. To abolish the police is to invite anarchy, and to abolish armies and navies is to do the same in a higher degree. The question is not one of abolition, but of adjustment between justice, reason and force. In a well-ordered nation justice is common to all men, and reason controls the actions of the majority. It is not a question of right or wrong, but of order, and order is maintained by authority, which, when faced by a discontent, can change its methods of justice and of reason peacefully, or refuse to change

¹ *On War*, Vol. I, i. 24.

them, because it is endowed with the force—that is, power—to say “No !”

The same problem confronts the world to-day, which is a society of nations, in place of a society of individuals. To abolish war, war being looked upon as a thing in itself apart from justice and reason, is as irrational a proposal as the abolition of the moon ; because if by some magician all armies, navies and air forces were removed from this world, war would remain and to-morrow a universal anarchy would prevail. The logical proposition is to establish a central world authority, which through justice, reason and force can maintain a unified and contented world order. This may be called the divine logic, for no power on earth can accomplish such a work, and all attempts to accomplish it through force alone have ignominiously failed. We are therefore left with human logic, which means that in place of starting with the creation of a powerless authority, we begin to readjust reason and force as they now exist within and between the nations, until, little by little, a compound is created which will give birth to authority. This is the slow process nations themselves have passed through.

- To-day we see this process in embryo ; as it were a speck of intellectual jelly endowed with enormous vitality, which is constantly being pulled out of shape by idealism and reaction, and more often than not by a mixture of these two powerful forces. Thus, we have at the present moment, within and without the League of Nations, two contending parties : the French school, which bases the maintenance of peace on force, whether in the form of the balance of power controlled by France or by an international police force under French direction ; and the Anglo-American ideal of the abolition of war, because, according to this school, to base world peace on force is a contradiction in terms.

Of these two schools of thought the French is certainly the more logical, and yet the more reactionary. It is true that the balance of power has in the past maintained peace for short periods, but never for long,

because force of itself cannot create justice or reason, but can only accentuate their lack. It is the necessity to change, and to go on changing these two factors, which is so little appreciated, and unless they are changed no verbal or written anathema will remove the fact that war must continue to be an instrument of policy, for the justice of one age is often the injustice of the next. The ideals of both schools are untenable, and do not solve the peace problem, which is the soul of the war problem, for a perfect peace can beget no war; and though a perfect peace is an unattainable ideal, the more adaptable to change a state of peacefulness becomes the less likely are wars to occur.

On these two schools of thought geography exerts a predominant influence. France lies alongside Germany, and though Germany is virtually disarmed, the French inferiority complex is so deep-rooted that nothing short of the total annihilation of the German race is likely to satisfy her that she is safe; the French outlook is therefore purely military; political and not economic questions monopolize her policy.

Across the Atlantic, the American outlook is diametrically opposite. The United States is confronted by no immediate enemy, and thousands of miles of sea separate her from all potential foes. Her main problem is, therefore, not a political but an economic one—namely, freedom of the seas. In the last war this freedom was denied her by British naval supremacy, consequently to secure it, and also to get rid of a large number of battleships which were an encumbrance, the Washington Conference was assembled in 1921, and Great Britain agreed to adopt a one-power standard.

Between these two policies, American on the one side and French on the other, Great Britain, with no great statesmen to guide her, and constantly inflicted with coalition or minority governments, has been pulled this way and that, until her defence policy has lost all shape or form. At the Washington Conference she agreed to a ratio in the tonnage of battleships and aircraft carriers of the United States 5, herself 5, Japan 3, France 1.66,

and Italy 1-66. The net result of this agreement was to place her on a battleship parity with the United States, to allow France to increase her battleship tonnage by 175,000 tons, and to put forward a demand for a submarine quota of 90,000 tons, nominally for defence purposes, but actually as a standing threat to British overseas trade. The only power which came out of this Conference strengthened was France, strengthened to the detriment of Great Britain, which meant that British European policy might be brought to veer more towards the French.

Then, in 1923, France invaded the Ruhr. This, in spite of the fact that the first and second Ultimatums of London (signed on March 3 and May 5, 1921) threatened this act, shocked public opinion in Great Britain. Next, in the following year came the "Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes," a measure which was still-born, as Great Britain refused to sign it, for had she done so she would have involved herself in every French quarrel that was likely to occur. This Protocol was merely an instrument to maintain the *status quo* by force, and in spite of justice and reason.

The Ruhr invasion, an act of extreme folly, if not of actual hysteria, bankrupted Germany, and in the spring of 1924 led to the Dawes Committee, and then to the signing of the Locarno Treaties in October 1925, and the entry of Germany into the League of Nations in the following year, and finally to the Young Plan in 1929, and the evacuation of the Rhineland in 1930.

The outcome of Locarno was that once again the French position was strengthened. Though France did not gain all she would have under the 1924 Geneva Protocol,¹ the diplomatic unity of the British Empire was split, for in Article 9 may be read: "The present Treaty shall impose no obligation upon any of the British dominions, or upon India, unless the Government of such dominion, or of India, signifies its accept-

¹What particularly annoyed the French was that internationally Germany was placed by the Locarno Treaties upon an equal footing with themselves.

ance thereof." These treaties also involved Great Britain in war should the Rhineland be invaded under conditions which the League of Nations considered demanded intervention. Further, these treaties left intact the military preponderance of France, as well as that of Poland and Czechoslovakia. One might have thought, therefore, that the French should have been satisfied.

This, however, was far from being the case, and for two reasons : first, the United States was not a member of the League, and was bent upon obtaining freedom of the seas, which is incompatible with the enforcement of economic sanctions ; secondly, because the League of Nations was not only impotent to enforce any sanctions whatsoever, but incapable of deciding the question of aggression once Germany became a member ; for, as all decisions must be unanimous, Germany will certainly not vote against herself. Once Germany was in the League, she was to no small extent protected from France, consequently to the French it seemed that much of the guilt had been rubbed off the Locarno gingerbread.

The failure of the Geneva Naval Conference in 1927 was to all intents and purposes a French setback ; for though France was not directly concerned in it, the disagreement between Great Britain and the United States on the question of cruiser parity in no way set a limit to British cruiser construction, and consequently detrimentally affected the French navy. Some other means had therefore to be sought out which would compel Great Britain to weaken her fleet, and so become more amenable to French submarine threat. It cannot be denied that however frightened France may be of German virility, actual or potential, her contempt for British diplomacy is colossal, and not altogether ill-founded.

The next French move was so astute that it may be classed as a masterpiece. Mr. S. O. Levinson of Chicago had invented an expression "the outlawry of war" ; this had taken hold of American imagination,

for which the French have the highest contempt. On April 6, 1927, in an innocently worded letter, M. Briand suggested that here was to be sought the pivot of peace. This suggestion was so naïve that at first it was overlooked, then it was discovered by certain Americans, and America's broad chest swelled with pride. The result was that in August 1928 the Pact of Paris, better known as the Kellogg Pact, was signed by no less than fifty-six nations, all these Powers (including China) renouncing war as an instrument of national policy.

What was the result? All nations, except Great Britain, increased their armaments. The British did not do so because their Admiralty could now ignore a naval war with the United States. Besides, ever since the Washington Conference, the United States had little by little begun to realize that her future depended on the economic development of the rest of the world, and that it would therefore become less and less possible for her to enforce her right to trade with a nation which had been outlawed by the League. Under the Covenant, Great Britain could no longer proclaim a blockade whenever she liked, but under Article XVI she was bound to use her navy against an outlaw nation. The United States was not bound by the Covenant, but as she had signed the Pact of Paris, this question no longer affected her as a neutral. Thus, seemingly, the problem of the freedom of the seas became merged into that of the peace of Europe and the world.

There was, however, a fly in this ointment. In the history of the law, outlawry has always carried with it an act of force. Without force it is merely the expression of an opinion. The criminal is brought before the magistrate by police force, and a criminal nation can only be brought before a World Court by a similar force—an allied army or an international police force. Nothing would please the French more than such a sanction, for, with the possible exception of Russia, France possesses the most formidable army in the world, and consequently would be in a position to control any

allied army or an international police force called upon to punish a criminal nation ; further, she knows that without such forces the Pact of Paris is thin air.

The United States, however, takes an opposite view. Her real reason is that she does not want to get embroiled in European quarrels, so she pleads Madison's old excuse made before the Philadelphia Convention in 1787, that to base peace on the employment of force is to use "an ingredient" which "when applied to a people collectively and not individually" is likely "to provide for its own destruction." In other words, it was contrary to justice to endow the Federal Government with the right to enforce the Constitution on an individual State, because this could only be done by force. The result of this inverted logic was the greatest civil war in history.

This lack of force behind outlawry logically leads to the question of self-defence. If a nation is attacked, and if the attacker is not to be scotched by international police, then it must defend itself or be annihilated. Self-defence is consequently within the law. Whilst the League of Nations does not abolish war, for it only prohibits members of the League going to war for some nine months, and then binds those not in dispute to take economic sanctions against a delinquent ; the signatory parties of the Pact of Paris renounce war as an instrument of national policy, but do not agree that they will in no case resort to war for the solution of their disputes. All that this Pact has done is to legalize various specific kinds of war. Of it, Salvador de Mada-riaga says : "Mr. Kellogg had to recognize explicitly that his proposals reserved the right of self-defence. . . . This point established, it is evident that no outlawry of war declaration is going to be worth the paper and ink if it leaves to each and every state the sole right of defining when it is fighting a defensive war. . . . To outlaw purely and simply does not mean anything. . . . The Pact is as good as non-existent." ¹

Where, then, does the astuteness of France come in ?

¹ *Disarmament*, pp. 41, 202.

War was outlawed, but outlawry could not be enforced. Though she lost the rubber, she won on points ; for the logical outcome of the Pact of Paris was the London Naval Conference of January 1930, in which the United States, Great Britain and Japan settled their cruiser argument. • This agreement considerably reduced British naval strength, and so indirectly added to French naval power and air power, which France has not the slightest intention of abandoning as instruments of national policy—in fact, their very existence prevents them being anything else.

Pressure, however, always engenders resistance, and the higher the friction resulting, the more intense becomes the moral heat. For ten years—that is, from 1919 to 1929—Germany lay physically crushed, panting for breath, and it was not until the British and French armies evacuated the Rhineland, in the autumn of 1929 and the spring of 1930, that Germany was able to rise to her knees. The result was immediate : the working classes, having for long been deluded into believing that reparations were matters of high finance and international economics, had little by little begun to realize that whatever they might be they were crushing their homes, starving their children, and sucking away the lifeblood of the nation.

The revolt against oppression took place on September 14, 1930, the date of the German elections. Adolph Hitler, hailed as the German Mussolini—though far from being such—won over 7,000,000 voters, and increased the number of his supporters in the Reichstag from 12 to 107 ; also the Communists obtained 5,000,000 votes. These two parties, though opposed, are firmly agreed on three points : the Treaty of Versailles must be revised, the Eastern frontier question must be settled to the satisfaction of Germany, and reparations must be abolished. These are the three common planks in their political platform, and united they intend to stand upon them.

The effect on France was immediate. On September 16, *L'Intransigeant*, in an editorial comment, said : " The

German elections have announced to the world the awakening of a Germany of revenge and war." And on the same day "Pertinax" in *L'Echo de Paris* wrote: "To-day we see that Germany was a mere illusion which owed its existence only to the occupation of the Rhineland by Allies. Two and a half months after the last Allied troops had left the Rhine Bridgeheads that Germany vanishes. Seldom has a policy such as M. Briand's seen its calculations proved so completely wrong. There is only one Germany, and that Germany believes only in force."

The Germany that was vanishing was the Germany in serfdom to France—in truth a political illusion. The Germany that was emerging was a Germany beckoning to Russia—a possible reality. Physical force had once again failed, because it was not supported by either justice or reason. By its relentless pressure it had released moral force, a force which is stronger than gold or steel. The tide has turned, and is now flowing against the treaties, and no physical force is likely for long to buttress them up. No nation will disarm as long as these treaties are threatened, or as long as they remain intact, and, paradox though it may seem, to save what in their arrogance they stand for—namely, world peace—they must be drastically modified, otherwise justice and reason will proclaim another war, in which the might of France may dissolve once again into the chaos of 1789. The ideals of the French Revolution are to-day in their last lap, and a still more potent revolution is sweeping over the face of the world.

The Disarmament Riddle

The late Lord Balfour once remarked that "he was more disturbed by peace movements than by talk about war," then he added: "For these demonstrations do not deal with the real causes of war: they just put up a paper screen, painted to delude the people of goodwill all over the world into thinking that something is really being done to prevent war, while in reality

behind the paper screen the forces of militarism are sharpening their knives all the time.”¹

This is so obviously true that many think the only way to preserve peace is to take away the knives ; but how can this be done when politically the paper screens are stronger than steel, and as long as the causes of war are not even examined ? Such is the riddle of the disarmament problem.

The causes of the World War I shall examine in Chapter VII, and the inner causes of the present world chaos in Chapter IV. Here, for a moment, I will revert to a point I have already dealt with, namely, that the war was fought to safeguard the ideal of nationality, and was won through co-operative—that is, international—effort. The peace treaties were pre-eminently national instruments—they created nations ; whilst the League of Nations was an international mirror in which when the countenances of all the nations were reflected, a dim, far-distant World State might be seen. The League, with all its defects, stood for a future reality, the peace treaties for a passing myth. Since 1919 the inner and unseen struggle has been between this reality and this myth. What is the world to be, a congeries of fighting nations or a united whole ?

The pivot of this problem is political power. In the last resort national power rests upon physical force, and is daily maintained by a just and reasonable use of it. International power, as represented in a World State, must be similarly founded. To repeat Madison’s mistake can only lead to civil war, whether disarmament takes place or not. This can clearly be learnt from the history of the American Civil War ; neither the North nor the South was in any way prepared for war, yet a war to a finish was fought. Nevertheless, to establish an all-powerful international police force, even if it were possible to do so, would as inevitably lead to war, unless the causes of war are first removed. In the United States to-day many millions of people do not want prohibition, and the Government, in spite of its

¹ P. Kerr and L. Curtis, *The Prevention of War*, pp. 14, 15.

police power, is unable fully to enforce it. In Europe, as long as the existing injustices remain, however powerful the European State might be, wars would break out, as they did during the days of the later Roman Empire, for injustice under physical compulsion is not only a cause of war, but a form of war, and the most degraded form, for an unjust tyrant is a bully, and the revolution which overthrows him a glorious event.

A reasonable disarmament of the nations is obviously a good thing, because armaments are political weapons. In Part V of the Treaty of Versailles it was clearly stated that, "In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses. . . ." Therefore German disarmament was to be the beginning of a general disarmament.

Turning to the Covenant of the League of Nations, we find that all its members bind themselves to reduce their armaments "to the lowest point consistent with national safety." This is laid down in Article VIII. But what is "national safety"? Is Germany to be considered safe, or is France to be considered safe? The one has a standing army of 100,000 men and the other of over 600,000; the one has an insignificant fleet, the other a powerful one; the one has no military air force, and the other the largest in the world.

According to Article XI, it is the friendly right of each member of the League "to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threaten to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends." Obviously it would be only right were Germany at the next disarmament conference to raise the question of French military preponderance. Also would it not be right for her to point out that, under Article XVI, which empowers the Council to call upon members to protect the Covenant by armed force, on account of her mili-

tary weakness she is unable to do so, or even if she could spare a quota, as she is forbidden to equip herself with tanks, fighting aircraft and other modern weapons, her men would have to fight under an overwhelming disadvantage?

Are the sanctions honest or are they hypocritical? Do they apply to certain members and not to others, or are they to be enforced by all members? Are fighting forces to remain national perquisites, or are they to be looked upon as international requisites? Are they instruments of international peace, or of national defence, or of both?

All these many questions—and there are scores like them—are political in nature, because war is an instrument of policy and armaments are instruments of war; consequently, disarmament, as well as war, is the outcome of policy. A writer in *The Round Table*, Quarterly, of December 1928 says: "The root of the whole trouble about disarmament since 1920 has been the concentration of every nation on its own security, and its failure to realize that no nation can make itself secure by armaments without making its neighbours insecure." And another writer in this same periodical, for June 1930, says: "... no practical progress has been made towards an agreement for "the "limitation and reduction" of armaments "because no political basis for such an agreement has yet been found." Salvador de Madariaga writes: "Let it be said again, and not for the last time, the only solution of the problem of disarmament lies in the organization of the World Community in such a way that power may be used only as a weapon of the World Community against law breakers."¹ Mr. David Davies in a colossal volume supports this contention. He says: "The only inference to be drawn is that disarmament will not of itself secure the peace of justice unless it is accompanied by sanctions"²—to him an international police force.

¹ *Disarmament*, p. 195.

² *The Problem of the Twentieth Century*, p. 29.

But he does not clearly point out that through the establishment only of a just World State can such a police force operate justly, for unless the World State is a just one, this police force is nothing more than a band of brigands.

The conception of the World State was not lost on M. Briand, who explained in his Pan-Europa Memorandum of 1930 that "political questions must take precedence over economic questions in the organization of Europe." What did he mean? That the vanquished nations must openly acknowledge French hegemony over Europe and the inviolability of the Treaty of Versailles. A year later, when the question of the Austro-German customs union arose (a step towards Pan-Europa), he openly stated that if the World Court decided that it did not infringe the Treaty of Versailles, France would bring the question before the League of Nations. As the League's decision has to be unanimous, this simply means an indefinite shelving of this question. From this we see that on its present Charter the League cannot possibly evolve into a World State. It cannot establish justice or reason, and therefore it is incapable of wielding force justly or reasonably, if at all. No wonder, therefore, that national security continues to obsess the nations.

We see this clearly when we examine armaments in relation to peace pacts, for each attempt to eliminate war by paper compacts has so far been followed by an increase in armaments. Armaments are the true test of the real state of international relations. Mr. Davies is so clear on this point that I will quote his words. He says :

"Armaments are the visible sign of national passions and international unrest. They represent the products of unrestrained and unbridled competition between nations. . . . Whatever the root causes may be which drive nations to war, there can be no doubt that the existence of armaments is the most pronounced symptom of the disease.

The armament graph, like a barometer, registers the feelings, the fears and the ambitions of the international atmosphere. . . . When the stocks are low, we may assume fair weather and peace ; when they increase, the outlook is stormy and hostile. If there were no armament race we might feel tolerably certain that the root causes of war were not operating or, at least, that they were in a state of suspense.”¹

Before the outbreak of the last war we saw the same thing. “What is most remarkable about the growth in military preparation,” writes Mr. Noel Baker, “. . . is the rapid increase in its rate as the catastrophe of 1914 came near. At the end of the century the speed increased : in ten years from 1898 to 1908 all the great Powers among them increased their military and naval budgets by about £100 million—£10 million a year. For the next six years, from 1908 to 1914, the six Great Powers of Europe alone increased their budgets by more than £100 million.”²

The same process is at work to-day, and, in place of being retarded by Locarno agreements and Pacts of Paris, it is actually accelerated by them, as these understandings do little more than reveal the strength and weaknesses of nations. The following figures will show this clearly enough ; they are extracted from Mr. MacDonald’s speech in the House of Commons on June 29, 1930, as reported in *The Times* the following day.³

As regards the British navy, which was on a two-power standard in 1914, since this date the number of its personnel has fallen from 151,000 to 93,630 in 1931,

¹ *The Problem of the Twentieth Century*, pp. 269-70.

² *Disarmament*, p. 4.

³ According to the French Memorandum on Disarmament submitted to the League of Nations on September 12, 1931, the total tonnage of the French navy is 628,607, less four ships under construction. Number of aeroplanes and seaplanes—1847, plus 528 stationed overseas. Land forces in all—30,482 officers and 575,650 other ranks. Total defence budget, £110,500,000.

which will be further reduced to 91,840 in 1932, the lowest figure since 1895 ; whilst the U.S.A. figure will stand at 114,000 and the Japanese at 85,000, increases of 47,000 and 35,000 respectively over their 1914 strengths.

NAVAL EXPENDITURE

Nation.	1914. (In millions.)	1924. (In millions.)	1930. (In millions.)
Great Britain -	£51·5 £76·0 ¹	£56·0	£52·4
U.S.A. - -	£30·0 £42·0 ¹	£70·0	£78·0
France - -	£26·7 £29·2 ¹	£13·8	£24·3
Italy - -	£15·3 £18·25 ¹	£ 9·8	£16·9
Japan - -	£ 8·5 £15·4 ¹	£23·0	£26·0
Germany - -	£31·0		£ 9·25

As regards the number of ships, Mr. MacDonald said:

"In 1914 the British Commonwealth possessed eighty-nine capital ships, and to-day fifteen capital ships. That is owing to the operation of the Washington Treaty of 1922. The number of cruisers has decreased since 1914 from 131 to fifty-nine built, building and authorized. The number of destroyers we possessed in 1914 was 298 plus seventy torpedo boats, and these figures will be reduced to about 120 by the London Naval Treaty. We have forty fewer submarines now than in 1914, in spite of the fact that the number of those vessels has shown a marked increase in other countries. For example, the number held by France has increased by thirty-five ; those held by the United States by thirty-five ; Italy by thirty-eight ; and Japan by forty-nine."

¹ Value in 1931 currency.

As regards Army expenditure, in 1914 Great Britain spent £28,800,000, or in terms of present-day currency £40,000,000; in 1924, £45,000,000, and in 1931, £40,000,000.

"Since 1925 the military expenditure of France has increased by £20,800,000, that of Italy by £15,400,000, and that of the United States by £15,680,000. Then take the man strength. In 1914 ours was 186,420, exclusive of forces maintained at the expense of India and Colonial Governments. That exclusion still holds good. In 1924 it was 161,600, and in 1931, 148,800. . . ."

As regards the Air Services, to-day Great Britain is spending £18,000,000—that is £2,000,000 more than in 1921. France is spending £21,000,000, an increase of £4,000,000 since 1929; the United States £34,000,000, an increase of £20,000,000 since 1922, and Italy shows an increase of £6,000,000 since the same date. As regards aircraft, Great Britain possesses 800 first-line machines, of which only 400 are permanently available at home, and France 1300 of the first line.

As regards Russia, Mr. MacDonald gave no figures, and as this country is always talking of war, and is constantly stating that "war is unavoidable between growing communism and decaying capitalism," the following figures, the accuracy of which I cannot vouch for, are anyhow of interest.

Russia to-day possesses seventy infantry divisions of 8500 men each, making a total of 595,000 men, backed by a militia army of 900,000. She has an Air Force equipped with 1200 machines, and 250 in reserve. Besides these, 200 machines belong to "The Air and Chemical Defence Society," an organization numbering over 7,000,000 members. The object of this Society is: to inculcate a war spirit; to raise funds to purchase war material, and to train factory workers and peasants in the use of arms.

It will be seen from the above figures that, with the

exception of Great Britain, Peace Pacts and Locarno Treaties have had no influence whatever upon the reduction of armaments, and apparently a marked influence upon their increase. The whole problem of disarmament is in fact a tangled ball of string, not of one continuous length, but of many lengths perpetually growing and becoming more and more entangled, until the only solution in unravelling it will be to cut this Gordian knot by another war. For instance : France is insistent upon dominating Europe by military force ; the United States is still divided between how to prevent war and how during a war to maintain her neutral rights ; Italy, through Mussolini, has frankly stated that the results of disarmament conferences show the necessity of being ready for war—"When the King calls." Russia has suggested total disarmament, and, since 1927, has increased her military budget from 692,000,000 to 1,390,000,000 gold roubles ; Japan has stated that as German military weakness in no way counterbalances Russian strength, she cannot contemplate a reduction in armaments ; and Germany has said, through General von Seckt, that "the greatest menace to peace . . . was not armaments, but that one country should be armed, and another not. The chief question to be asked at the Disarmament Conference was whether or not Germany was to be recognized as a partner of equal status." ¹ If she is not to be, she will re-arm ; if she is, she will be allowed to re-arm. In either case France can do one of two things : she can exert armed pressure, or increase her armaments ; for that she will do nothing is not to be expected. Thus the armament race of 1900 to 1914 will once again begin, and this means war.

Why have the nations come to this sorry pass ? Why are those who believe in Western civilization directly playing into the hands of Bolshevik Russia, and rendering themselves contemptible in the eyes of awakened Asia ? There are many reasons for this, such as fear and greed in their many forms ; but the chief reason,

¹ *The Times*, June 23, 1931.

in my opinion, is that the whole of the war problem has been polluted by humanitarians, and, sopped as it has been in a sloppy altruism, it has lost all form. War is not an altruistic but an economic question ; it is a continuation of peace policy, and the foundations of peace policy, in the present material age, are economic. Disarmament is also an economic question, for to establish "yard-sticks" in the terms of man-power is to-day an absurdity ; such measures belong to the nineteenth and not to the twentieth century. Article VIII of the Covenant lays down that armaments must be reduced. The United States is not a signatory, but is most insistent upon disarmament. And why ? Because of her economic strength ! To-day, when war depends on machine-power and not upon man-power—and this question I shall examine fully in Book III—prior to conflict any reduction in armaments benefits the belligerent which possesses the greater industrial power ; for war is waged not so much with weapons prepared beforehand as with those manufactured during the struggle. War is a continuation of economic policy in another form : consequently the causes of war are to be sought in economics. The present world turmoil is not due to arms, but to economic systems which demand arms to protect them. This is the problem of the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

THE FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD CHAOS

The Economic Revolution

WHAT is the factor which above all others differentiates the present age—that is, the last hundred and fifty years—from all preceding ages? Movement. And as to this there can be no doubt. Though production has vastly increased, it is movement, in its many forms of steamship, railway, motor-car, telegraph, telephone and wireless transmission, which more than any other factor has created the modern world. Movement is the vital element in what we call Western civilization, and restriction of movement is its death element.

Commerce, to flourish, must be free; commodities are not made for the seller but for the buyer, and the seller cannot exist without the buyer, and the more things bought the more things sold; these are facts which were noted by Adam Smith over a hundred and fifty years ago, but which are constantly overlooked by present-day politicians. Tariffs, protection, safeguarding and trade embargoes, are all one and the same name for pot-holes in the road of commerce which delay trade by reducing buying, and consequently restrict selling. If all our roads were like battlefields, what would the motor-car industry be like?

During the agricultural epoch—that is, before the Industrial Revolution—commerce was an insignificant factor when compared with what it is to-day. Overseas trade was mainly a luxury business, and, therefore, not essential to society. Now, to a country like our own,

it is vital, for we have but a few more than 1,000,000 people engaged in agriculture, whilst in France, Germany and Italy there are respectively still 10,000,000 thus employed. Without our overseas trade we should be bankrupt, for it is an erroneous idea, certainly so after the year 1870, to suppose that our wealth has depended upon our manufactures; for in spite of their importance our greatest asset was, that we were the carriers of the bulk of the world's trade.

Up to 1870 the economic structure of the Western world was sound; thence it began to enter a decline. The rise of the United States after the Civil War and of Germany after the Franco-Prussian War to the position of industrial Powers upset the economic balance by the declaration of a tariff war. Such wars, as long as the home markets remain available, are profitable, but directly they are gorged, a struggle for foreign markets begins. This happened soon after 1870, and, as I will describe at greater length in Chapter VI, Western civilization entered the present war period.

From then onwards, in order to buttress up the tariff walls, armies and navies rapidly grew in size, and after the opening of the present century their cost, reacting upon the national exchequers, forced up tariffs and taxation, and began to lead to the piling up of debts. Then came the war, and then came what may be called living on the instalment system without income: in other words, by borrowing money from posterity—that is, buying and selling with phantom gold.

Writing in a recent number of *The Daily Telegraph*¹ Sir Ernest Benn says:

“It is doubtful whether in 1900 our public liabilities were more than 5 per cent. of our total wealth. Six per cent. would most certainly have covered them. Our position was that we were spending 5 per cent. of our income on public purposes, and that we had a public debt amounting

¹ Reprinted in *The Living Age* (U.S.A.), July 1931.

to 5 or 6 per cent. of our total wealth. Public expenditure and public wealth were both covered twenty times and secure."

He then points out that in November 1930 Sir Josiah Stamp, president of the Royal Statistical Society, estimated our total wealth at £18,000,000,000, and he himself estimates our public liabilities at £22,000,000,000, "only one-third of which is directly due to the war." Consequently, "we owe more than we possess."

During the nineteenth century "each generation inherited advantages and wealth from the past, enjoyed them, preserved them, improved upon them, and bequeathed to the future something better. Thus was progress registered."

"We, on the other hand, the economic revolutionaries of the twentieth century, loudly boasting of our citizenship, our social understanding, our determination to advance and to improve the lot of mankind, will be seen to have squandered the inheritance of the past, mortgaged the earning power of the future, and left our children to liquidate an account which, while disclosing quite clearly our national or public insolvency, also and consequently destroyed the economic basis upon which each one of the 45,000,000 of us was entitled to depend for his well-being."

As only one-third of our immense liabilities is directly due to the war, to what are the other two-thirds due? Sir Ernest Benn does not inform us, but I hazard in answer: the socialization of economics—that is, the false standard of labour values, the high standard of living, inane humanitarianism, and the political principle of "more pay and less work," which since the war has been the vote call of democratic governments.

If this is doubted, a clear proof may be obtained by a cursory glance at Australia's political and economic

history, and I select this country as an example, as it is pre-eminently socialistic.

First, there was the desire to foster industries for defence ; this led to protection. Next, a minimum wage law was passed, and buttressed up by an egoistical settlement policy, which, to maintain an artificially high standard of living, has to all intents and purposes excluded immigration. The minimum wage was considered necessary because protection had increased the cost of living, which in its turn led to higher protection, on the ground that higher wages had increased the cost of production. As production is so heavily protected that world competition is artificially eliminated, and as the home market is so restricted that its powers of expansion are definitely circumscribed, manufacture can only be maintained at the expense of agriculture. As the farmer is compelled to pay such daily wages as 18s. for a wagoner, 13s. for a potato-picker and 23s. for a stack-builder, besides providing such men with free board and lodging, he can only meet his wage bill by buying land with credit from a bank. In brief, increasingly since the war have political measures attempted to cure economic ills, and as political power is almost entirely in the hands of the industrial trade unions, the farmer is impotent, and the backbone is knocked out of the country.

In Australia we have in miniature a clear picture of the causes of European chaos. Political measures have ruined prosperity, and not only is war an instrument of policy but so also is protection. War is waged for defence, tariffs are imposed for defence ; both are but different means towards the same end—the restriction of movement.

From 1870 onwards, trade competition and restrictions had caused such endless friction that they culminated in a war in which it was clearly seen that the world was in reality an interdependent whole and not a set of political departments. Then came the peace treaties. And what do we find ? Do they attempt to eradicate the main cause of the war and so establish a

better peace? No! The economic question is not only overlooked, but, as I have shown in Chapter II, it is bludgeoned into a political jelly. No effort is made to rehabilitate Europe, Russia is left to stew in its own juice, no attempt is made to restore the finances of Germany, and the old Austro-Hungarian empire is Balkanized. The Allied Powers should have insisted upon the retention of a customs union between the Danube States. But no, this did not suit France, and ethnography, and not economics, pleased Woodrow Wilson. As Keynes says :

“The Wilsonian dogma, which exalts and dignifies the division of race and nationality above the bonds of trade and culture, and guarantees frontiers but not happiness, is deeply embedded in the conception of the League of Nations as at present constituted. It yields us the paradox that the first experiment in international government should exert its influence in the direction of intensifying nationalism.”¹

Here are presented to us the reinforced foundations of the present world chaos—economic nationalism in the grip of purblind politics.

Economic Warfare

Peace is essential to an economic civilization, as essential as faith is to a religious one. It would seem unwise for such popular writers as Mr. H. G. Wells to say : “Let us, in short, simply put our collective foot down and say, ‘Stop that war!’ and it will stop.”² It will do nothing of the sort, it will only sweep us into it. To stop the tides you have got to annihilate the moon, and to stop war you have got to eliminate its causes.

International peace must be founded on social justice. What is, however, astonishing is that ~~this~~ truth

¹ *A Revision of the Treaty*, p. 11.

² In his introduction to J. M. Kenworthy's *Will Civilization Crash?* p. x.

is recognized in Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles. We read: "Whereas the League of Nations has for its object the establishment of universal peace, and such a peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice."¹ But this treaty does not point out that, besides justice, there is economic prosperity, an equally important factor in our civilization, and that international peace is not compatible with water-tight economic departments, and that "economic nationalism is incompatible with prosperity, just as nationalism in armaments is incompatible with peace."² Interdependence will out. Mr. Shotwell says, and truly:

"The movement for international peace owes its validity, which is real, to the fact that a new civilization has arisen which rests upon the interdependence of nations, and that the prosperity of the present depends upon the buying power of the future. . . . If we are to have peace, it is because the world has turned that corner in history when civilized societies need peace for their continued existence, and find the instrument of war no longer pertinent."³

But whether we have turned that corner or not, we refuse to see it. Napoleon saw it, a hundred and thirty years ago, Alexander the Great saw it 2120 years before Napoleon did, but the corner was then so far ahead that it was impossible for these men to turn it. Richard Cobden saw it in the dark days of the mid-nineteenth century. He "was fond of saying that war and protection, peace and free trade were inseparable. It would seem as if he was right. Economic law, properly regulated by human legislation, left to function freely, would rapidly increase the prosperity, the inde-

¹ Also in Article 427 of Part XIII, "... labour should not be regarded merely as an article of commerce."

² *The Round Table*, Quarterly, March 1930, p. 236.

³ *War as an Instrument of National Policy*, James T. Shotwell, p. 29.

pendence and the unity of the human race, and of all the individual nations as well. It has been the deflection of economic law by nationalism on the one side, and by a selfish and politically omnipotent capitalistic class on the other, which has produced most of our present troubles." ¹

Over eighty years ago Cobden saw this corner; economically we have turned it, politically the nations of Europe are keeping straight on, plunging deeper and deeper into a trackless wilderness, and growing more and more exasperated as they lose their way. According to Mr. Hoover, "the population of Europe is at least 100,000,000, greater than can be supported without imports, and must live by the production and distribution of exports." ² Nevertheless Europe plunges on through the jungle towards a desert of utter sand, where foreign wars will cease to worry them, because they one and all will be swept up in the dust-storms of universal revolution.

"The history of European tariffs since the Armistice," writes a shrewd American observer, "has been the record of two major economic forces, Russia and America, and of the two major policies, British and French, in an unstable solution of new boundaries, economic depletion, social disorganization and political change. The interplay of these forces and these policies upon the post-war Europe has produced the familiar picture of an economically Balkanized Continent, equipped with towering tariffs and struggling for economic advantage through political power or by opposing political weapons to economic changes." ³

The Russian revolution threw Europe upon the economic mercy of the United States. British policy, which demanded a reduction of tariffs, was opposed by

¹ *The Round Table*, Quarterly, March 1930, p. 240.

² Quoted in *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, p. 219.

³ "The Economic War in Europe," by an Official of the United States Government, *Current History*, June 1931, p. 361.

French policy, which "has subordinated European economic revival to . . . political security in a manner which has made her the most effective opponent of economic peace in Europe." The war blockades taught every nation to look to its food supply. "This led to high protective tariffs on farm products, creating the curious spectacle of a continent which cannot feed itself taxing the food of its people in order to satisfy strategists and peasant politicians. Back of it all and through it all are a mass of bayonets, of warships, squadrons of aircraft, strategic loans, diplomatic undertakings and alliances, bargains and special favours, discriminations and fears and rivalries and ambitions; governments manœuvring tariffs as they once manœuvred armies, and signing treaties of commerce as once they signed treaties of offensive and defensive alliance."¹

If this is not war, what is? During the last twelve years this economic war has been so extravagant in its cost, so devastating in its world-wide influences, that to many when actual war comes it will be a relief, a far greater relief than it was in 1914, because to-day peace is becoming unbearable.

Debts demand loans, loans inflate debts, which are piled upon the shoulders of posterity. "National debt is immoral and destructive," said Napoleon; "silently undermining the basis of the State, it delivers the present generation to the execration of posterity." Dante said much the same: "It very greatly concerns all men on whom a higher nature has impressed the love of truth that, as they have been enriched by the labour of those before them, so they also should labour for those that are to come after them, to the end that posterity may receive from them an addition to its wealth." Such is a medieval view of economics, and it is diametrically opposed to the present democratic one.

In 1919, and again in 1922, the British Government urged the cancellation of all war debts; but the United

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 366.

States thought she saw in them a means of tying Europe to her economic apron-strings. Professor Laski says : "The more Europe pays the United States, the less likelihood is there of that continent's coming near the abyss of war." Even if this were true—which it certainly is not—he overlooks the abyss of revolution.

The United States did not insist upon debt payments in order to maintain peace in Europe, but because she was legally entitled to be paid, and because, since she had refused to become a member of the League, without payment her influence over Europe would have been weakened. Debts, like tariffs and cannon, are instruments of policy. To have cancelled them would have done her no harm, but rather a great deal of good. She could well have afforded to do so, and in 1930, in spite of trade depression, her wealth was vastly greater than that of Europe in 1914, let alone the Europe of to-day. The enforcement of these debts has rendered financial stability impossible.

"I'll have my bond ; I will not hear thee speak :
I'll have my bond ; and therefore speak no more."

To meet their bill the French by inflation reduced the value of the franc, and by so doing threw 80 per cent. of the war cost on to the shoulders of those who possessed capital before the war and on those who had accumulated it during it. Italy did the same ; and by a similar process, though it was involuntary, Germany got rid of her entire internal debt. Great Britain, on the other hand, returned to a gold standard, and by throwing the whole burden of her debts upon the present and future earners of income, is compelled to confiscate so large a part of their earnings in order to pay interest on her debts that she is moving definitely towards the ideal of Bolshevism—namely, that no one should have a *private* income at all. The dole still further reinforces this argument. When, some years ago, the socialists in England were anathematized by the capitalist Press for suggesting a levy upon capital, they were only suggesting that the generation

who made the war should pay for it by means other than inflation. This appears to be a perfectly just suggestion—he who calls the tune pays the piper.

The insistence upon debt payment has Bolshevized the gold stocks, 60 per cent. of the world's visible supply being now concentrated in the United States and France. Worse still, silver has been devalorized, having lost more than half its purchasing power ; consequently the bulk of the peoples of Asia, 900 millions and more, have withdrawn or are withdrawing from the world's markets, as they can no longer afford to purchase abroad. Coupled with the loss of Asiatic trade, reparations payments, in accordance with the Young Plan, are dragging Western Europe back, whilst the Five-Year Plan is pushing Russia forward ; and as Russia, by means fair or foul, is struggling towards economic power in order to dominate and then extirpate Capitalism, capitalistic civilization is extirpating itself.

To pay American debts, Europe borrows from America. In 1928, she borrowed \$672,000,000. In 1929, she wanted to do the same, and go on doing it until the crack of doom. Unfortunately for her, this crack came about this very year with the Hitler elections, which showed the instability of Europe. On account of this and the deepening vortex of depression, which ten years of squandering and extravagant living had created, the United States refused to lend more than \$156,000,000. This was a crushing blow to Germany, who, having already paid to France, by means of loans, £950,000,000 in reparations, was still, under the Young Plan, compelled to pay £85,000,000 yearly until 1985 !—a debt of £4,675,000,000, which she manifestly could not do without further loans. Thus it happened, in July 1931, that this musical-comedy finance, which had amused European statesmen for twelve years, broke into open farce :

“ Then everything happened at once. All the banks in Germany closed their doors for forty-eight

hours. Dr. Luther began to fly round Europe in an aeroplane, asking at each capital if they could let him have any money, and being hastened by each on to the next.

"And then the sign of a real world crisis . . . suddenly became manifest. . . . The Hitler elections started the rot. Nothing has been done to face up to that situation." ¹

On Great Britain the repercussion of this financial landslide proved disastrous. London, the banking centre of Europe, if not of the world, was suddenly found to be a Humbert safe. What had emptied it? The war? To a certain extent. But above all, prodigality and squandering, which, leading to over-taxation, were throttling the goose which so far had laid the golden eggs. Then England grew hysterical. In 1929 Mr. Snowden had cut out of the Unemployment Insurance Bill the condition that the dole would only be paid to those who could prove that they were "genuinely seeking work." In September 1931 a newspaper leader writer proclaimed (and this was meant as a compliment) that "in a sense he was the symbol of his countrymen," a saying which was only too true. Then, losing all sanity, this writer said, "'England yet shall stand,' declared this pale, crippled man, founded like granite amid shifting sands. Here was the voice of England." ²

What were its words? Remember, decline in trade was largely due to over-taxation; consequently the obvious remedy was stringent economy to reduce taxation. Now listen to the oracle: In 1931-32, £76,200,000 is to be raised, and in 1932-33—£171,500,000, in order to square the Budget. Of these two immense sums, economies are to contribute £22,000,000 and £70,000,000 respectively, and the rest is to be obtained by saving on debt amortisation

¹ "The World Crisis," by Walter Elliot, M.P., in *The Sunday Times*, July 19, 1931.

² *The Sunday Times*, September 13, 1931.

and increased taxation ; therefore, in the second half of the financial year 1931-32 British industry and trade will be worse off by £54,200,000, and in 1932-33 by £101,500,000 ! Yet this act is proclaimed a masterpiece of financial cunning, and, as it cannot work, the European trade war by tariffs is to be extended. The echo of this voice is a chuckle from Moscow.

Viscount Cecil says, and with wisdom : " It is foolish for a man to preach international peace and to advocate industrial war,"¹ yet this is what most of the so-called statesmen of Europe have been doing during the last twelve years. With twenty-six tariff walls in an area less than half that of the United States, Europe (less Russia) cannot develop full prosperity. " Almost all its nations," says one writer, " are trying to develop a ' balanced ' economic life and internal self-sufficiency, partly in the interest of ' nationalism ' and partly for military reasons. Yet not one of these nations, with the possible exception of Germany, is large enough or prosperous enough to provide an adequate home market for its basic industries. An immense over-development of small plants is therefore taking place, which can only supply local needs at unnecessarily high cost ; capital is wasted in creating these redundant industries instead of developing real European capacity ; the cost of living and of enterprise is necessarily high, with the consequence of gradual economic stagnation and unemployment, which prompt every Government to try to help its industries to compete in an already over-supplied and restricted world market by means of subsidies at the expense of the taxpayer."²

In the United States we get a different picture, and only a slightly less gloomy one. Until recently it seemed that American economic foundations were laid upon blocks of gold, and that an unlimited and ever-expanding prosperity lay before her. Protection had

¹ *The Way of Peace*, p. 14.

² *The Round Table*, Quarterly, March 1930, p. 238.

served her well, because the size of her home market was immense ; yet it had cramped the life of her people, producing a standardization of thought which restricted originality, that fountain-head of progress, and fostered a self-sufficiency which blindfolded the American nation.

Though politically the World War had made her a world power, economically she continued to isolate herself from the world, and in spite of the fact that she was not a little proud of having become the Old World's creditor. As the Allied Powers demanded immense reparations from Germany, and then did their utmost to prevent her paying them, so also did she, in her turn, devise schemes for financing exports and simultaneously impose tariffs which prevented credits being established.

Unable to sell its products in the world market, American industry has been compelled to reproduce its plants abroad, and so employ foreign in place of American labour. What is the result? Increasing unemployment at home, a situation which is likely to last as long as the United States fails to realize that the New World and Old are not two worlds but one. As an example of her obsession, quite recently she imposed the Hawley-Smott tariff. At once Canada retaliated by a counter tariff, which it is reckoned will ultimately cut off two-thirds of the \$900,000,000 worth of goods annually imported from the United States. Such actions between individuals would be considered unprofitably eccentric, but between democratic nations they pass for economic wisdom.

Yet there are signs that the United States is awakening to reality. Mr. Raymond B. Fosdick says :

"We are trying to run a twentieth-century world with eighteenth-century political ideas. . . . The United States continues to live in the intellectual atmosphere of Jeffersonian individualism. Its philosophy of international relations is inherited from Hamilton. It repeats the Declaration of Independence as if nothing had happened since 1776. . . .

It does not see—at least it will not admit—that the advice contained in Washington's farewell address is as obsolete as the stage coach in which he rode from New York to Philadelphia.”¹

In an address delivered at San Francisco in June 1930, Mr. Owen D. Young said :

“When our political policy in international affairs becomes co-operative in spirit, which need not involve us in entanglements or alliances ; when our economic policy looks to the economic development of the world as a whole and the improvement of living standard and consuming power of peoples everywhere ; when our tariffs and our treaties are made to evidence this spirit ; then we may hope for effective plans for farm relief, for reduction of our surplus of raw materials and manufactured goods, for relief of unemployment, and for what is more important than all, a better spirit of all nations towards us and toward each other. That means peace, and peace thrives in a world of contentment and mutual welfare. It cannot live in a world or in a nation where there are great inequalities and injustices caused by man-made barriers.”

The only practical solution to Europe's economic chaos is not war, but free trade—liberty of movement. This was pointed out by Mr. Keynes as long ago as 1919, when the plot to ruin the world was hatched at Versailles. He then wrote :

“A Free Trade Union should be established under the auspices of the League of Nations of countries undertaking to impose no protectionist tariffs² whatever against the produce of other members of the Union. Germany, Poland, the

¹ Quoted from *The Round Table*, Quarterly, March 1931, p. 317.

² See further details—footnote, p. 248, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*.

new States which formerly composed the Austro-Hungarian and Turkish Empires, and the Mandated States should be compelled to adhere to this Union for ten years, after which time adherence would be voluntary. The adherence of other States would be voluntary from the outset." ¹

Eight years after these words were written, the tariff chaos in Europe resulted in the League of Nations assembling a World Economic Conference, which was attended by representatives of fifty countries, including the United States. Though it accomplished little, its importance cannot be over-estimated, for it drew up a convention for the abolition of import and export prohibitions and restrictions. It put its finger on the pulse of Europe, and diagnosed the cause of the fever—the growing dissatisfaction with the existing tariff systems; but as these are buttressed up by private interests, and as private interests are better organized and more vocal than public interests, its convention led to nothing of material importance. "Seen from the outside," says one writer, "it was disquieting; seen from within, it simply registered the temporary ascendancy of the French policy of political security or economic ruin." ² Another effort was made to bring about a tariff truce in 1929, but the list of exceptions put forward by France nullified its results. In 1931, yet one more attempt was made, but to no purpose; nevertheless, the report of the 1927 Conference stands a new testament of a new world order.

Great Britain and Free Trade

The World Economic Conference was strongly supported by Great Britain, but increasing unemployment at home forced each political party to search for some universal solvent which would keep it in power or return it to power on the votes of the unemployed.

¹ *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, p. 248.

² "The Economic War in Europe," by An Official of the United States Government. *Current History*, June 1931, p. 363.

The Socialists promised an increase in the dole, the Liberals expenditure on public works, and the Conservatives tariff reform. All three of these philosopher's stones, outwardly so different, were nevertheless of the same financial substance—each meant increased taxation in one form or another, in spite of the fact that the real and obvious remedy was a reduction in taxation, which could only be effected by stringent home economy and the eventual introduction of international free trade. The one meant upsetting interests at home,¹ the other interests abroad ; yet rather than disturb these interests, each party thrust a differently coloured plank out from the deck of the tax-logged ship of State and asked the nation to walk it, in order to drop into the millennium.

In the history of British trade, without exception, a demand for protection has always arisen during times of stress. It was so during the hungry 'forties, after the war in South Africa, and once again to-day after the World War. Periods of depression, by reducing the power to buy, disclose the inefficiencies in the systems of selling and producing, because the struggle for existence between efficient and inefficient industries is enormously accentuated. The result is, that as the less efficient retire to the wall, they proclaim at the top of their voices that the country will go to the dogs unless they are protected from the attacks of their more efficient competitors.

¹ For example, one of the greatest economies would be to reinstate agriculture, which can only be done by organizing our farm lands so that they can be worked by machinery. To-day they are mostly organized for hand and horse labour, that is to say, in small holdings in place of large. To use machinery on them may be compared to hitching a locomotive to a gig. No tariff can solve this problem, because a tariff begins at the wrong end of it. Only co-operation, or State control, can do so, and as the first depends on individual farmers grouping themselves, an almost impossible process in so conservative a country as Great Britain, it would appear that State control (not State ownership) is the only practical solution. If we really want to solve this vital problem, we should study the Soviet Five-Year Plan, adopting from it what is suitable for *our* civilization and rejecting what is not. (N.B.—Fences will have to go, and what will the hunting interests say ?)

Empire Free Trade, another name for the same panacea, is nothing more than a political stunt, which is accepted by a considerable number of people for the simple reason that they do not understand what it means, and consider, therefore, that it must contain some hidden charm. What does it mean? In brief, free trade within the Empire and close protection against all countries outside the Empire. The only flies in this ointment are, that the populations of the Dominions are less than 25,000,000, whilst the population of Europe numbers 438,000,000 (including Russia); that the Dominions are scattered all over the world, whereas Europe lies at our door, and that whilst our import and export trade with the Dominions amounted to £445,000,000 in 1930, in Europe it amounted to £682,000,000. Yet this stunt in a modified form has been accepted by the Conservative Party, which has become Socialistic, whilst the Socialists have become Liberal. What could be more socialistic than the following effusion cannoned off Lord Beaverbrook's cushion into the pocket of popular ignorance by Mr. Baldwin at Himley Park, on June 27, 1931?

"What a fetish that word cheap is! Cheap goods mean cheap men. The word cheapness was *born in the minds* of the British people by the political *economists* of the mid-Victorian time, and with difficulty can they shake themselves free from that incubus. Who pays for that cheapness? The men who to-day are walking the streets. That cheap steel is sweated out of the unemployed in Great Britain, blast-furnace men who are walking the streets, and the steel smelter, the collier, the miner of limestone, the men who ought to be at the coke ovens, the railwaymen. And for what? For cheap steel from abroad. I say the price is too high, and we will never pay it any more."¹

Mr. Baldwin knows as well as any one else that cheap goods under efficient management do not mean

¹ *The Times*, June 29, 1931.

cheap men. The Ford car is a cheap and a good car, and yet Mr. Ford pays his men the highest wages in the labour market. Knowing this, why did he talk about "fetish"? Was it to keep the Conservative ship from sinking? Was not his object, not to lower or higher the cost of production, but to lower the then existing Government and exalt his own party? He must know that our very existence depends on the importation of large quantities of materials for food and industry; that they must be paid for either out of our savings or out of our earnings, and that if these are insufficient the only alternative to unemployment is State control—birth and otherwise.

To economists of this type I recommend the perusal of the following extracts, taken from a document written in defence of free trade by Mr. Huth Jackson, in 1904 :

"Importation cannot continue without corresponding exportation. A particular home industry may suffer from free foreign competition, but in the result, the capital and labour displaced find more beneficial employment in new and increased production better suited to our situation. . . .

"The history of commercial diplomacy between foreign countries during the last thirty years is an unbroken record of failure. In each case a preliminary Tariff war cripples the trade of either country, and the ultimate agreement arrived at, when both have become exhausted by the struggle, bears no proportion to the sacrifice made to attain it."¹

Should these economists be unable to accept these views, seeing that Mr. Huth Jackson may be placed in the class of mid-Victorian political economists, perhaps they will consider the following, written by a mid-Georgian, and called, "A Petition addressed by Free Traders to the House of Commons in 1756."

¹ Quoted from "Great Britain's Interest in Free Trade," by Sir Hugh Bell, Bart, C.B., *The Nineteenth Century and After*, November 1930.

“ 1. There cannot be a clearer Proposition concerning Trade, than, that it is the interest of every Manufacturing Country to get as great choice and variety of raw Materials, and upon as cheap terms, as can possibly be procured. For an error in this respect, is fundamental, and hardly to be corrected by any subsequent care or diligence. Therefore, the Legislature hath wisely ordained, That though Wool, for instance, grows in greater Plenty in England than perhaps in any other Country, yet the Wools of all Nations shall be admitted into England Duty-free ; justly considering, That we can never have too great a Choice and Plenty of that necessary Material of extensive and profitable Industry, or upon too cheap Terms.

“ 2. A Second Proposition, not inferior either in Evidence or Importance, is, That unless some Commodities are taken from other Countries by Way of Barter in the Course of Trade, You can have but a small Vent for your own Manufactures ; it being impossible for any Nation to make all their Payments in Gold and Silver, even if they abounded with the richest Mines of those Metals. Nay, though it were possible, it may be greatly questioned, Whether it is not more for the Interest of a Manufacturing Nation to import sometimes raw Material by Way of providing for the future Industry of the People, than to be always importing Gold and Silver ; which, when they come to be unconnected with Labour and Industry (as in this case they would soon be) have no other Effect, than to introduce Laziness, Vanity and Extravagance—and in the End Poverty.

“ 3. A Third Proposition, by way of Preliminary, is this, That Cheapness in regard to Price, and Goodness in regard to Quality, are the Support and Prop of all Manufactures ; And that it is impossible, in the Nature of Things, for a Nation to preserve any Manufacture, if it strikes off, or

suffer to be struck off these two grand pillars, Cheapness and Goodness. They may indeed tamper for a while ; and seem to do something, not unlike a Quack in Physic, towards botching up a broken Constitution, but it will soon appear that all they have been doing, was only to make bad worse.”¹

It may be urged, and with justice, that a tariff is a potent weapon wherewith to fight its like. Yet it should never be overlooked that it is a double-edged weapon. By raising the cost of living, it raises wages, and as few things are more difficult, or troublesome, as reducing wages, once a tariff is imposed it is seldom shaken off. It is the psychological, and not the economic effect of tariffs which is so consistently overlooked.

The God of the Economic Age

Nations get what they deserve, and in the end the forces of the age manifest in full form. Man can control his destiny, but if he will not, these forces will control it for him. The Spirit of the Age is our servant or our master. Which, depends upon ourselves.

The god of this age is the machine in its thousand and one forms. Man made the machine, and, consciously or unconsciously, through the will of man, the machine has transformed the world in which he now lives, and has transformed it out of all recognition when compared to the world which he once inhabited. The machine is the material expression of the ideas of the few, the Watts, the Fultons, the Stephensons and the Marconis. The mass of humanity is still primitively minded, and democracy is the rule of the mass ; consequently we are living in a world begotten by science and still controlled by ignorance. Its faults lie in its control, and not in its mechanism.

¹ Quoted from “Great Britain’s Interest in Free Trade,” by Sir Hugh Bell, Bart., C.B., *The Nineteenth Century and After*, November 1930.

The influences of the machine are many, two of its most important being those connected with labour and commerce. During the Industrial Revolution population increased by leaps and bounds, then, as machinery became more perfect, masses of people were thrown out of work. For example, in the United States, in 1820, 83.1 per cent. of the population was engaged in agriculture, in 1920 only 26 per cent., and this percentage is rapidly falling. The reasons for this are obvious: Wheat harvested with a sickle and threshed with a flail required thirty-five to fifty hours of work for an acre yielding fifteen bushels. The introduction of the cradle (a scythe with fingers) saved ten hours per acre. Then came the binder and thresher, which cut the work per acre down to five hours. Lastly came the tractor and combine, and the work is cut down to less than one hour. This means, that in an eight-hours' day one machine and three or four men can do as much work as eighty to a hundred men a century ago.¹ It is modern farm machinery which is causing a growing unemployment in the agricultural populations, and is stopping immigration to agricultural countries. In manufacture it is the same; the ceaseless competition in new labour-saving machinery, which in itself is often uneconomic if changed frequently, as it is very expensive, is to-day throwing thousands of men out of work who, even if eventually absorbed by other industries, for the time being are a drag on the market.²

The only practical solution to this difficulty is the establishment of trade monopolies,³ not to corner

¹ Since 1920 the loss in the United States in farm population has been 3,000,000.

² Between 1919 and 1929 in the United States the output by factory worker was increased by 45 per cent., and the decline in employment was 10 per cent.—that is 900,000 people.

³ Or, quite possibly, by State control on a modified Russian system, which, leaving the individual free to profit, will prevent him establishing cut-throat competition. At present trade is as fissured with private wars as the Middle Ages were with baronial forays.

goods and so force up prices, but to regulate the influence of machinery on labour. Thus, for example, if all the motor-car manufacturers in the United Kingdom were formed into one monopoly, though foreign competition would continue, within the country competition could be regulated, and it is the sensible regulation of competition, and not protection by tariffs, which to-day is required. Not only will such monopolies reduce unemployment, but they will cheapen the article manufactured; for it is a matter of common sense that a large number of small businesses cannot, on account of their overhead charges, compete with a few large ones. In 1926 (I have not the figures for to-day) the United States produced 4,259,627 motor-cars and we 198,700; but 80 to 90 per cent. of the American output was produced by ten concerns, we having eighty-eight. Had the eighty-eight been reduced to, say, eight, in all probability safeguarding would have been unnecessary; all it did was to subsidize inefficiency in some form or another. As Mr. W. Meakin says: "An essential condition for full rationalisation is the organization of a whole industry, either by unification or co-operation, so that a common policy can be adopted by all engaged on it."¹

Trade monopolies, or any business on an extensive scale, is next to impossible unless the markets are equally extensive; for, as selling depends on buying, production is governed by sales. The restriction of markets by tariffs has the same effect upon industry as tying up the feet of a Chinese girl; the poor little creature can only hobble, and so can the poor little industry.

"Once we admit that the foundation of modern civilization, whether in the West or in the East, must be the machine driven by power, and that the problem before humanity is not to hinder the substitution of machines for human and animal

¹ *The New Industrial Revolution*, W. Meakin, p. 20.

power, but to take advantage of what it can do in relieving mankind of endless drudgery and in supplying amply all his physical needs, it becomes obvious that the freer economic intercourse all over the globe becomes, the better it will be for everybody. . . .

"The freer the intercourse, the more rapidly will development take place, and standards of living and education rise, for capital will flow where it can produce more cheaply and easily. . . ." ¹

The machine says "I want freedom," the masses of men say "I want protection". Freedom presupposes strength, protection weakness ; therefore the probabilities are that in the end the machine will win. This is the problem of the future, in which the United States of Europe is the beginning but not the end.

Pan-Europa

The phantom of the Roman Empire still stands behind the squabbling nations, yet since the days of Philip II of Spain we English have opposed its materialization, and we should not forget this when we criticize France. To-day what is politically possible for France is economically impossible for Germany, and through Germany for Europe, and through Europe for the world, because France is thinking in terms of the balance of power, and Germany, Europe and the world are beginning to think in terms of the balance of trade. Whatever France does, and whatever turmoils and wars she may create, her policy is doomed, because it is opposed to the Spirit of the Age ; just as in the sixteenth century the policy of Spain was opposed to the spirit of tolerance. Either France will change her policy, or before this century has run its course she will take her place with Greece, Venice and Portugal.

As I have mentioned already, on September 5, 1929, speaking at the tenth Assembly of the League

"Where are we Going ?" *The Round Table*, Quarterly, March 1930.

of Nations, M. Briand mentioned the subject of an European union. On the 9th, at his famous luncheon "between the pear and the cheese," he launched his idea of a general European organization, whereupon the British delegates at once proposed a tariff truce. This was certainly not what M. Briand wanted, for he knew full well that frequently tariffs, as political instruments, are more formidable than armies. Nevertheless, in February and March 1930 a Conference for Concerted Economic Action assembled, and was wrecked by France's allies—Poland and Czechoslovakia. However, another Conference of northern European countries was held at Oslo in December, at which Holland, Norway, Denmark, Belgium and Sweden agreed not to raise their tariffs without due notice to each other. On May 17, 1930, the French *Memorandum sur l'Organisation d'un Régime d'Union Fédérale Européenne* was issued. Its contents may be boiled down to two main points.

- (i) The economic problem must be subordinated to the political.
- (ii) France having "sterilized" a large amount of gold encouraged a system of loans to the nations of the Little Entente.

Before I explain how this bluff was called, I think it is as well to make clear what a union of European nations really entails.

It means a state of peace, consequently a state in which the causes of war have been eliminated. Peace cannot be maintained without prosperity, consequently free trade is essential. Peace cannot be maintained without justice, consequently the peace treaties must be amended. These are the essential reforms which under no circumstances will France agree to.

On March 21, 1931, Germany suddenly threw upon the table of European affairs a tentative plan for the establishment of a customs union between herself and Austria. This called the French bluff. What were the German cards?

Article I

"*Section 1*—Absolute independence of both nations shall be preserved as well as strict regard for existing obligations toward third nations. The contract shall serve to initiate a new order in European economic conditions by means of regional treaties.

"*Section 2*—Both parties especially declare themselves bound by this contract to negotiate with any other nation desiring to enter into a similar agreement."

Article III

"*Section 1*—During the duration of the contract no import or export duty is to be levied on commodity traffic between the two countries."

Article VII

"*Section 1*—No import, export or transit prohibitions shall exist between Germany and Austria. . . ."

France felt that she had been torpedoed. She knew that the Union would prove a success, and she was afraid that it might prove so successful that Hungary, and later on the Little Entente nations, would be sucked in by its current, and that a central European Zollverein would be established under the leadership of Germany. She determined in her turn to torpedo the Union by means of that never-failing weapon of destruction the Versailles Treaty, in which Germany had agreed that the independence of Austria "shall be inalienable, except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations," a principle which the Union in no way infringed. Then came a financial crisis in Austria and another in Germany. President Hoover, as I have already mentioned, stepped into the breach, and his proposals, which were purely financial, were at once forged into political weapons by France. On

June 30, in the French Senate, M. Lémery said, "They had no desire to remit a debt of 12,000,000,000 francs to Germany in order that she might use it to arm against the Allies."¹ A few days later France asked for "political guarantees"—the abandonment of the Customs Union plan, suspension of the second "pocket" battleship, and dissolution of several leading German Nationalist organizations; and then, a few days later still, "a moratorium for ten years with regard to the Peace Treaty—that is to say, that during that period none of the thorny political questions involved in the Treaty of Versailles would be raised."² For over ten years her inferiority complex had disrupted Europe, and had this suggestion been agreed to, for ten years more must it have continued to do so.

The "settlement" of this question leaves us in doubt whether European nations are still sane. Essentially an economic question, it was referred for decision to the Permanent Court of International Justice and stretched on the political rack, the winches being operated, among others, by Salvador, Cuba, Columbia and China! Had Cuba or Salvador voted the other way, the Union would have been an accomplished fact, as neither did it is disallowed.

In spite of France and her fits of hysteria, peace in Central Europe will never be established until all its nations are federated economically. Federal unions are nearly always beneficial, because nationalism demands security, and security demands federation. Eventually the Customs Union will go through, in the end nothing—not even war—can stop it. When it does, a new order will open, an order directly leading to Pan Europa. Then the world, through freedom of trade, is likely to see established three great groups of nations of European stock—namely, Pan Europa (Europe less Russia), the British Commonwealth and Pan America. When these three groups are united by a common Customs Union, and so become an economic unit, the most virulent of the existing causes

¹ *The Times*, July 6, 1931.

² *The Times*, July 21, 1931.

of war will be eliminated, and the Western world, having become economically interdependent, should a nation revolt, then a true economic sanction can be applied—namely, expulsion from the Union. In the Middle Ages interdict was potent because faith was a reality ; in such a Union as I visualize expulsion will be as potent because economics will be equally real. The economic equivalent of war will be eliminated in the West. What about war itself?—for it has moral foundations as well as economic ones.


BOOK II

CALLED

LUX

THE INFLUENCE OF WAR
UPON CIVILIZATION

In which Book it is related how War has
lightened Man's path and fired his
mind, creating what he can-
not see by destroying
what he lusts
after



CHAPTER V

PEACE AND WAR

The Expurgation of War

THERE is a logical cause for everything. There is a logical cause for war, just as there is a logical cause for love, for rest, or for nutrition, for envy, hatred, spite, greed and fear ; yet man, standing between the beasts of the field and the angels, is not essentially a logical creature, for in his composition there is still so much of the animal that frequently the reason which is his is swamped by his sentiments.

The masses do not like war, for it terrifies them. Once they did not like witchcraft, or heresy ; these also terrified them. What they hope for is an affluent lethargy, intellectual, moral and physical. Such is the driving force of humanity—an unattainable goal. Tertullian was not far wrong when he said : "I believe because it is absurd."

In its day witchcraft was a living force, real as the world itself, yet a tremendous absurdity—at least so it seems to us to-day. It was the manifestation of a spiritual and moral pestilence ; to the masses an enigma, and not a fact. It was outlawed by papist and by protestant alike, for as to its iniquity both cordially agreed—one of the few subjects upon which concord between them existed. The persecutions which this outlawry gave rise to were so horrible that to-day they are scarcely believable. The cure attempted was far worse than the disease. How was society released from this incubus ? Not by moral medicine, or by moral surgery—that is, by exorcism and the stake—but

by an increased intellectuality which ultimately rendered the conception of witchcraft absurd, and disclosed that its powers did not lie outside, but within society. It was not religion, mainly concerned with the next world, which accomplished this cure, but reason, which embraces the world in which we live. It was not faith in the devil which purged society of this idea, but disbelief in his powers—not solemnity, but ridicule.

From the earliest days of recorded history, and probably for tens of thousands of years before this distant date, witchcraft blighted society with a tremendous curse, and continued to do so until but a little over two centuries ago. It served its purpose as a moral and intellectual stimulant; then, reaching its zenith, certainly so in Europe, it suddenly disappeared. Scepticism, that intellectual purge, removed it as surely as a strong dose of calomel will scour a man.

Turn from witchcraft to war, and what do we see? On one side militarists, the modern sorcerors, and on the other pacifists, white-robed priests spluttering out anathemas such as, War is an evil thing, a filthy thing, a barbarous thing, hideous, wicked, horrible, cruel, frightful, etc., etc. And when they have exhausted the dictionary, what do we then see? Wars and wars, and still more wars, and peace as far off as ever.

For instance, take Madison, from whom I quoted in my last chapter. He had so great a horror of war that at the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 he became party to its omission from the Constitution, and in consequence a spiritual partner in the greatest civil war in history. Again, take Mr. Howard-Ellis, and there are thousands still more emotional. He says :

“ War is a collapse of civilization, not a means of defending it, still less a holy cause. There is no such thing as a war for liberty, or democracy, or justice. These are spiritual things, and the essence of war is hostility to these above all spiritual values.

.

"War never creates anything, but hastens and distorts the development of pre-existing tendencies.

To believe in war "we have to become mystics, monomaniacs, social sadists, who accept as dogma beliefs that to humanists seem unspeakably silly, blasphemous and abominable."

"The logic of war is so mad and unnatural that men have still to some extent resisted its conclusions. . . .

"But the logic of war is inexorable, and the last war revealed depths of barbarity which would have seemed incredible in 1914. . . . The next war will be worse than the last."¹

It is men like this writer, men who let their emotions swallow their reason and their hearts run away with their heads, who are so dangerous, for, as Bossuet said : "Nothing is more terrible than active ignorance." It was men of this stamp who once upon a time accused poor old women with hairs on their chins and warts on their noses of raising storms in order to sink the King's ships, and such-like twaddle. And when they pleaded innocent, red-hot pins were thrust into them to make the Devil squeal ; and when they pleaded guilty, they were hustled to the stake ; yet, according to the morality of the day, their tormentors were just men.

It is foolishness to talk about social sadists and monomaniacs, or that there has never been a just war or a war for liberty. It is irrational to say that war distorts every pre-existing tendency, for this, as I will show, is obviously incorrect ; in fact, the ignorance of the nature and the influences of war is so colossal that I intend to devote the next two chapters to this question.

What is witchcraft ? Alliance with the Devil. What is war ? Intensified peace. Change the Devil, as Miss

¹ *The Origin Structure and Working of the League of Nations*, pp. 53, 54, 319, 320.

Marie Corelli did in her *Sorrows of Satan*, and witchcraft becomes quite a genteel occupation ; change peace, and the future of war may become an innocent sport. "Every up-to-date dictionary," writes William James, "should say that 'peace' and 'war' mean the same thing, now *in posse*, now *in actu*." It may even reasonably be said that the intensely sharp competitive *preparation* for war by the nation is the *real war*, permanent, unceasing ; and that battles are only a sort of public verification of mastery gained during the 'peace' intervals.¹ If this is so—and I for one believe that it is so—then to place war under interdict and anathema can do no good ; it is peace which we must exorcise, peace which must be freed of its diseases.

The Causes of War

What is the cause of war ? There must be some definite reason why wars occur, for, like every other human activity, war is developed from some preceding change. Concerning this question popular opinion is founded on an illusion. The people and their leaders, though they see a war germinating during peace-time, persist in looking upon peace and war as two separated series of activities. Metaphysically, to them peace is good and war is evil. The result is that this Manichean illusion contorts the whole of their political outlook. They do not see, or rather cannot see, that the fundamental cause of war is discontent with the existing state of peacefulness. Either one side is discontented with the conditions which surround it, or both. If argument will not change these conditions—that is, if reasoning fails—then physical force is resorted to, and the majority of the people consider that this is just. There is in fact no essential difference between the cause of a war waged by two powerful nations and the cause of a quarrel between two small children. The discontented child says, "Give me that doll," the contented replies : "I won't," and the result is a rough-

¹ *Memories and Studies*, p. 273.

and-tumble. Exorcism, or outlawry, of the idea of obtaining the doll will not prevent the children from quarrelling, nor will it prevent wars between nations. If wars are to be prevented, their causes, *peace-discontentedness*, must be eradicated. The discontented child must either fear the slipper, or the bogey-man, more than it wants the doll ; or the other child must be removed ; or the discontented child given a doll of its own. These alternatives, directly or indirectly, imply the expenditure of force ; for a third party has to overcome the difficulty by either smacking, terrifying, taking away, or giving. Yet there is a fourth solution to this nursery problem : whilst maintaining a reasonable discipline, to leave the children to themselves, and presently, as their intelligence expands, neither will want the object of their quarrel. The war problem is almost identical, but as it is very difficult to apply the first three nursery solutions, there is no alternative to international conflict except the fourth. The problem is not to outlaw war, but to establish it on a reasonable footing, and then wait until nations out-grow it or willingly cast it aside.

Though the causes of war are intricate and many, ~~they~~ must not be confounded with the pretexts which detonate hostilities, such as the accidental spilling of a glass of water on Louis XIV's ambassador by a lady-in-waiting to Queen Anne, or the wife of an English missionary biting her thumb in the presence of King Theodore of Abyssinia. Amongst primitive peoples the motives of war are food and love, especially the second in exogamic tribes. In Assyria wars were waged to obtain labour ; in Mexico to propitiate the gods ; in ancient Persia and Peru to proselytize, amongst the Romans to gain frontier security as well as wealth, and between the early Christians to settle theological arguments. Broadly speaking, the desire for peace, and for the maintenance of peaceful activities, good or bad, has been the principal motive of conquest. In this respect modern wars are not far removed from ancient ones. The supposed infringement of national honour by the

execution of Louis XVI, in 1793, initiated a war which lasted for twenty-two years, a war between two systems of thought. In 1914 the *direct* cause of the World War was a threat to frontiers, and to-day one of the standing causes of war is, as I have shown, the protectionist system, or the establishment of tariff boundaries. Finally, man, it must be realized, is still the savage, for as a French poet has said : " Le vieux sang de la bête est resté dans son corps." In the ignorance of social harmony, national or international, lie deep the causes of war, so that it may justly be said that every ignorant person, or society, is a standing danger to the peace of the world.

" Call ye that a Society, cries he again, where there is no longer any Social idea extant ; not so much as the Idea of a common Home, but only of a common overcrowded Lodging-house ? Where each, isolated, regardless of his neighbours, clutches what he can get, and cries ' Mine ! ' and calls it Peace, because in the cut-purse and cut-throat scramble, no steel knives, but only a far cunninger sort, can be employed ? " ¹

Or again :

" Why do they prate of the blessings of Peace ? We have made them a curse ;

Pickpockets, each hand lusting for all that is not its own ;

And lust of gain, in the spirit of Cain, is it better or worse

Than the heart of the citizen hissing in war on his own hearthstone ?

But these are the days of advance, the works of the men of mind,

When who but a fool would have faith in a tradesman's ware or his word ?

Is it peace or war ? Civil war, as I think, and that of a kind

¹ *Sartor Resartus*, T. Carlyle.

The viler, as underhand, not openly bearing the sword."¹

Such are some of the diseases of peace, and war in itself is not a disease, but the result, or outward manifestation, of a disease, a sickness incubated in peace and hatched out in war-time. If all nations were contented there could be no war. What, then, are the reasons of their discontent? This is the true war-problem which faces us to-day, and it must be tackled as a doctor, in contradistinction to a witch-doctor, tackles a disease. The microbes of war must be discovered, and then controlled or eliminated.

In his fascinating book *The Making of Humanity*, Mr. Briffault writes of the World War: "The war was but the visible avatar, the materialized out-throw of the multitudinous abominations amid which we lived." In a defective society, and still more so in a diseased one, corruption is cast off by war, either civil or foreign, for social, like human, life depends for its health on the free action of its excretory functions. This fact is more often than not overlooked by the peace-makers, whose attention is generally concentrated on the prevention of foreign wars. It is civil wars, or revolutions, which are the main problem. For instance, China is a signatory of the Pact of Paris, yet during the last ten years this country has been harrowed by unceasing civil war. It is the perfecting of peace far more than the elimination of war which is the true war problem.

The Creative Power of War

To destroy is not necessarily to annihilate. Creation must more often than not be preceded by destruction, and as in war destruction is always dramatic, the common mind is hypnotized by material loss.

Cicero and Sallust declare that the object of war is to assure peace; a better definition is to be found on the plinth of General Sherman's statue at Washington, where may be read these words: "The legitimate

¹ *Maud*, Lord Tennyson.

object of war is a more perfect peace." Inversely, had it not been for the wars of the past the world to-day would still be in a state of barbarism. Men never seek change as long as they consider themselves comfortable, and the comfort of one age is frequently the discomfort of the next. War not only breaks down the barriers between nations, but within a nation itself it uproots dogmas and conventions. In primitive times war was a moral necessity whatever it may be to-day. Henry Maudsley writes :

"Have not nations owed their formation as much to brotherly hate as to brotherly love—more perhaps to the welding consolidation enforced by the pressure of hostile peoples than to the attractive forces of their components? And what is the spur of commerce but competition? War in one shape or another, open or disguised, has plainly been the divinely appointed instrument of human progress, carnage the immoral-seeming means by which the slow incarnation of morality in mankind has been effected.

"When we look at facts sincerely as they are, not satisfied to rest in a void of speculative idealism and insincerity, we perceive that in every department of life the superior person uses his superior powers to the inevitable detriment of the inferior person, even though he may afterwards dispense benevolently out of his superfluity to some of those who fall by the wayside. The moral law only works successfully as a mean between two extremes, excess of either being alike fatal. He who aspires to love his neighbour as himself must at the same time take care to love himself as his neighbour, making himself his neighbour while he makes his neighbour himself; his right duty being to cultivate not a suicidal self-sacrifice which would be a crime against self, but just that self-sacrifice which is the wisest self-interest and just that self-interest which is the wisest self-sacrifice. So he obtains the utmost development of self within the limits of the good

of the whole. He will not go very far in morality if he compound for lack of self-renunciation on his part by a special indulgence of his own self-love in dictating sacrifices to other people. Were men to carry the moral law of self-sacrifice into rigorous and extreme effect they would perish by the practice of their virtues. When they had succeeded in eradicating competition, in making an equal distribution of wealth, in prolonging the feeblest life to its utmost tether, in banishing strife and war from the earth, in bringing all people on it to so sheep-like a placidity of nature that they would no more hurt and destroy, and to such an ant-like uniformity of industrious well-doing that no one would work for himself but everyone for all, they would have robbed human nature of its springs of enterprise and reduced it to a stagnant state of decadence. A millennium of blessed bees or industrious ants ! For it is the progress of desire and the struggle to attain which keeps the current of human life moving and wholesome alike in individuals, in societies, and in nations. Not to go forward is to go back, and not to move at all is death."¹

These words are worth pondering over. Maudsley was one of the profoundest thinkers of the second half of the last century. He saw the creative side of war as well as its destructive side ; he realized that, as long as man remains what he is, war is not only a necessary purge, but a necessary spur to prevent him sinking from the wild-boar stage into that of the farmyard pig—the doled animal.

In the past, the era of great wars has been the era of great empires. Ruskin, no militarist, noted this seventy-six years ago. He said :

“ . . . When I tell you that war is the foundation of all the arts, I mean also that it is the foundation of all the high virtues and faculties of men.

¹ *The Pathology of Mind*, Henry Maudsley, p. 26.

"It is very strange to me to discover this ; and very dreadful—but I saw it to be quite an undeniable fact. The common notion that peace and the virtues of civil life flourished together, I found to be wholly untenable. Peace and the *vices* of civil life only flourish together. We talk of peace and learning, and of peace and plenty and of peace and civilization ; but I found that those were not the words which the Muse of History coupled together : that, on her lips, the words were—peace and sensuality—peace and selfishness—peace and death. I found, in brief, that all great nations learned their truth of, word, and strength of thought, in war ; that they were nourished in war, and wasted by peace ; taught by war, and deceived by peace ; trained by war, and betrayed by peace ;—in a word, that they were born in war, and expired in peace."¹

War has hardened races to withstand changes in social structure, and it has also dissolved them ; it has constituted a school for heroism and a playground for valour. "That which invests war, in spite of all the evils that attend it, with a certain moral grandeur, is the heroic self-sacrifice it elicits." Thus writes Lecky in his *History of European Morals*.

"War is father of all and king of all ; and some he made gods and some men, some slaves and some free." Thus wrote Herakleitos in the sixth century B.C., and since that early date, warfare has been perpetual : "Saul may have slain his thousands, but it is to the greater glory of David to have slain his tens of thousands." Such has been the outlook of mankind, and it is an outlook which, scorning death, has made life dare to accomplish.

Life is brief and cheap, and the desire to triumph over the ephemeral is engrained in the bone of man. As a modern example of the glory of war, some seventy or eighty years ago, a statue of Jenner, the discoverer of

¹ *The Crown of Wild Olives*, (1900), pp. 123-124.

vaccination, was placed in Trafalgar Square, London, and then after a few years, and without public protest, it was removed to Kensington Gardens to make room for one of a soldier of moderate distinction. Listen to Doctor Johnson :

Johnson : " Every man thinks meanly of himself for not having been a soldier, or not having been at Sea." *Boswell* : " Lord Mansfield does not." *Johnson* : " Sir, if Lord Mansfield were in a company of General Officers and Admirals who had been in service he would shrink ; he'd wish to creep under the table. . . . No, Sir ; were Socrates and Charles the Twelfth of Sweden both present in any company, and Socrates to say, ' Follow me, and hear a lecture in philosophy ' ; and Charles, laying his hand on his sword, to say, ' Follow me, and dethrone the Czar ' ; a man would be ashamed to follow Socrates. Sir, the impression is universal ; yet it is strange. . . . The profession of soldiers and sailors has the dignity of danger. Mankind reverence those who have got over fear, which is so general a weakness."

This last line is very true, for fear is failure, and the bulk of men are always failing. The conquest of fear is the road to heroism—the pitting of life against death, love against hatred and truth against falsehood. Man is not only a ferocious and rational animal, but also a noble and heroic one. The chivalry of war is as ancient as war itself, for the brave recognize the brave. According to the Code of Manu, poisoned arrows and other cunning devices are prohibited. Even in the turbulent days of the Religious Wars in Europe, Rabelais pointed out that " according to right military discipline, you must never drive your enemy into despair."

Until humanity has evolved a more perfect state of peacefulness, wars are likely to be necessary as moral purges. In the past, when war-like fervour has died

down, decadence has set in. This is well depicted in Botticelli's famous picture which shows satyrs stripping Mars of his armour as he lies sleeping by the side of Venus. As attack masters defence, so gradually does the economic replace the martial spirit. A war-like people worships women, but economic mankind enjoys them only, which is the first sign of an advancing civilization. Progress demands that from time to time things be thrown into the melting-pot of war, for progress is fed on the mixed cultures evolved in conflict ; yet the military spirit in itself is antagonistic to civilization, because it is the child of its imperfections.

Justice and War

Is it true that there has never been a war waged for liberty or justice? Is it true that the spiritual is so utterly divorced from the physical, that these are states absolutely apart? Did not Christ say, "I and my Father are one"? That the spiritual is of the physical, and the physical of the spiritual, and that when these two are united by the intellectual the human being appears? "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life ; and man became a living ~~being~~ soul."

Also is it true that there is an Absolute Justice, an Absolute Right, an Absolute Truth? Perhaps in the realms of metaphysics, but in this physical world the Absolute only manifests through unceasing change. What is just to-day is unjust to-morrow, what was right is often wrong, and what was true is often false.

The problem of peace and war is in fact wrapped up in this one word "justice," and because man's idea of justice is always changing it is a problem which defies a cut-and-dried solution. To enforce slavery was once an act of justice, to burn witches was another, because, when the saving of souls was the pivot of civilization, the losing of souls was to blaspheme against the Divine will. Bayard, that *chevalier sans peur et sans reproche*, was the soul of courtesy to captured knights and even

to bowmen, but musketeers he invariably slaughtered in cold blood. Why? Because the old, well-established forms of fighting were considered right and proper, and the new wrong and devilish. Thus has it been with all new ideas. For instance, a certain Mr. Crosse, vicar of Chew Magna in Somersetshire, "regarded the use of the newly invented optic glasses as immoral, since they perverted the natural sight and made all things appear in an unnatural and, therefore, false light." He argued "that society at large would become demoralized by the use of spectacles; they would give every man an unfair advantage over every woman, who could not be expected, on æsthetic and intellectual grounds, to adopt the practice."¹

Was it just to enforce slavery by law, or to burn witches, or even to prevent the manufacture of spectacles? In their own day, possibly "yes," to a large number of people, to the majority, and often practically to all. But justice must be balanced by reason, and reason is always changing, and when at loggerheads with justice both fall back upon force. If we lived in a mathematical world, where 2×2 always made 4, force might be dispensed with, for justice and reason would coincide; but we do not, we live in a human world where one idea added to another idea does not make two ideas, but an entirely new idea. Thus two ideas on peace may make a devastating war,—for instance, the Civil War in America.

To maintain justice by force alone is the direct road to civil war, because justice as sought by the minority is always in conflict with that established by the majority. "Force and Right," says Joubert, "are the Governors of this world. Force till Right is ready"; but so long as man remains man will right be changing. To this subject I will return a little later on.

The logic of war may be mad: but what is madness? Is it mad to open an umbrella before a charging cow? Is it mad to protect oneself, one's children and one's home? A rabbit will protect its young, and even Vis-

¹ *Lectures on the Method of Science*, F. Gotch, p. 35.

count Cecil says : " It is impossible to condemn wars really undertaken in self-defence."¹ Hall writes : " Even with individuals living in well-ordered communities the right of self-preservation is absolute in the last resort. *A fortiori* it is so with States, which have in all cases to protect themselves " ;² and Lawrence says : " The right of self-preservation is even more sacred than the duty of respecting the independence of others. If the two clash, a State naturally acts on the former."³ To overlook or to attempt to abolish the instinct of self-preservation is to overlook, or attempt to abolish, humanity. Once again it is crying for the moon, it is the yell of a lunatic.

Is the Versailles Treaty just? France apparently considers that it is ; Germany considers that it is not. Can a World Court, in which France and Germany sit side by side on the jury, give a unanimous answer to this question? The plebiscite as applied to Schleswig was honest, as applied to Eupen, Malmedy and portions of Upper Silesia it was dishonest. It was not applied in the Southern Tyrol, in Macedonia and Bessarabia. Why? Because in these areas a dishonest application of it was not possible.

Is peace or the maintenance of peace at any price the end of life? Is there nothing in this world dearer than life? Are men solely animals? James Martineau, philosopher and divine, considers otherwise :

" The reverence for human life is carried to an immoral idolatry when it is held more sacred than justice and right, and when the spectacle of blood becomes more horrible than the sight of desolating tyrannies and triumphant hypocrisies. All law, all polity, is a proclamation that justice is better than life, and if need be, shall over-ride it and all the possessions it includes ; and nothing can be weaker or more suicidal than for men who are

¹ *The Way of Peace*, p. 207.

² *International Law* (8th edition), p. 65.

³ *Principles of International Law* (7th edition), p. 125.

citizens of a commonwealth to announce that, for their part, they mean to hold life in higher esteem than justice. And if the day comes when nations are content to submit to every dispute, whatever be its origin, to the decision of a court, it may be not that the world has grown better, but that men have become meaner and baser because there is no longer anything that they hold dearer than life."¹

Dr. T. de Witt Talmage wrote in a similar strain :

"The sword has developed the grandest natures that the world ever saw. It has developed courage—that sublime energy of the soul which defies the universe when it feels itself to be in the right. It has developed a self-sacrifice which repudiates the idea that our life is worth more than anything else, when for a principle it throws that life away, as much as to say, 'It is not necessary that I live, but it is necessary that righteousness triumph !' There are thousands among the Northern and Southern veterans of our Civil War who are ninety-five per cent. larger and mightier in soul than they would have been had they not, during the four years of national agony, turned their back on home and fortune, and at the front sacrificed all for a principle."²

Christ "marvelled" at a Roman soldier's faith, pronouncing it to be the greatest he had found on earth. Were he to be reborn to-day, would he not also marvel should he hear such a man proclaimed "a social sadist" ? He said : "I bring not peace but a sword," because he realized that justice demanded the sword, and he has been rightly proclaimed the Prince of Peace, because peace without justice is incipient anarchy.

To live, is the urge of Nature ; but to live righteously—that is, in accordance with our deepest convictions—is surely the foundation of all morality and religion.

¹ *Studies of Christianity*, p. 352.

² Quoted from *Four Years under Marse Robert*, Robert Stiles, p. 367.

Can a man who believes that he is reflecting the will of God submit his faith for judgment to a police court?

Reason and War

Whilst the problem of justice and war is a moral one, rising in its ultimate form to the spiritual, the problem of reason and war is intellectual, descending thence to the material. In and through war man has striven for liberty of conscience and also for liberty of action. As the one generally meets opposition within, and the other from without, a people—that is, by another people—conflict assumes two forms: namely, civil war and foreign war. Of these two, that waged against a foreign enemy develops nationality and favours the conservative spirit, whilst civil, or revolutionary, commotions open the door to men of genius and accelerate progressive ideas. The relationship between revolutions and war cannot be overlooked; both of these activities are fermentations arising out of the imperfections of peace, and any attempt to eradicate the one without eradicating the other cannot possibly purge peace of its impurities.

To turn now to society, its study is largely one of the human herd. In very early times mankind in all probability lived in small groups of families, the coalescence of which into herds, and later on into communities, was the necessary consequence of the food quest. Warfare was then defensive in nature, and must have remained so until the invention of the bow, which heralds the introduction of the first cultural period, for by offensive warfare it became possible to enslave an enemy, and so gain leisure, which is the foundation of intellectual development. Amongst the simpler, and consequently more primitive phases of thought are to be found fear and greed. Fear stimulates the imagination and leads man towards belief in invisible powers; greed accumulates and dissipates energy in trade and war. Out of these two instincts evolve amongst non-cultural peoples two great orders of society: the priests and the nobles—

men of thought and men of action. The power of the first is based on spiritual force, and of the second on physical. The struggle between these two orders produces culture, the lack of it stagnation. Thus, in India we find that the priests intellectually obliterate the nobles, and in China that the nobles obliterate the priests, and progress halts. The rest of society was made up of slaves and serfs, and, when the people were virile, oppression frequently resulted in the more animal rather than the more civilized portion of a community migrating into other lands. Hence in all probability the war-like propensity of the barbarians who percolated into Europe, bringing with them not the culture but the active ignorance of the East.

In modern Europe and America we find a comparable transition. There is no actual migration, but as the power of the priests and the nobles dwindles, so does the power of the masses beneath them rise, like scum, to the top. The result is that peace is no longer a simple interplay of two orders of wills, but a confused and active jumble of many wills in conflict with the old order and in conflict with themselves. The agricultural order of society, being compartmental—for the masses were tied to the land—rendered warfare simple—a duel between the intellectual few, those who not only possessed power, but were separated from the masses. In this order of society, the controlling factor in peace was the balance of power. Now that the agricultural order has been largely replaced by an industrial order, the control of peace has become far less centralized; the walls of the social compartments have dissolved, the solvent being commerce and trade, and in consequence war has become economic, a struggle of greeds rather than of fears.

As greed replaces fear, peace, which formerly was profitable to the few, rapidly becomes profitable to the many, and then increasingly unprofitable to the whole; for, if to-day Sir Ernest Benn and Sir Josiah Stamp are in any way correct, it cannot be said that democracy has proved itself to be an unqualified blessing. Peace

is no longer profitable, consequently war is no longer profitable ; but it is not war which has ruined peace, but peace which has ruined itself. Increased and ever-increasing taxation of the more intelligent minority by the less intelligent majority has, during the present century, been one of the most potent forms of conflict, a conflict which will completely change our present civilization. This was noticed by Thomas Paine as long ago as 1790, when in *The Rights of Man* he said :

“ War is the common harvest of all those who participate in the division and expenditure of public money, in all countries. It is the art of conquering at home ; the object of it is an increase of revenue ; and as revenue cannot be increased without taxes, a pretence must be made for expenditures. In reviewing the history of the English Government, its wars and its taxes, a bystander, not blinded by prejudice, nor warped by interest, would declare that taxes were not raised to carry on wars, but that wars were raised to carry on taxes.”

“ The higher the civilization the more disastrous is war,”¹ writes Viscount Cecil. War “ is no longer an *ultima ratio*, for it has lost its *raison d'être*. ~~Victor~~ and victim may suffer a common disaster . . . the territory covered by the advance . . . is perhaps of far less value to it than the wealth which it has sacrificed to win the victory,”² writes Mr. Shotwell.

These statements are only partially true. Though wars are destructive to the old order, they are not necessarily so to the new. The last war taxed the industrial plutocracy, which had largely replaced the older agricultural aristocracy, almost out of existence ; but through ever-increasing social expenditure it has raised the proletariat. In fact, only less conspicuously, the same process has been at work in England as in Russia. In England income-tax and death duties

¹ *The Way of Peace*, p. 107.

² *War as an Instrument of National Policy*, pp. 31, 33.

"dekulakize" the capitalist classes as surely and as effectively as confiscation of cattle and agricultural implements at this moment are "dekulakizing" the wealthier Russian peasantry ; whilst the establishment of the dole is the first step towards the collective farm or factory system. The end is not Communism, far from it, but State Capitalism ; all individual wealth being absorbed into the State, and all individuals being paid by the State. This, as far as it can at present be seen, is the ultimate authority towards which democracy is moving. Without authority there can be no social harmony either within or between nations. It is not only that modern war is so destructive of social order, but that modern legislation is so unproductive of harmony and solidarity. In the hands of the masses peace and war have lost their values. Peace creates war and war disintegrates peace ; the result is a continual turmoil. Can this turmoil be prevented or cured by the establishment of a World State ? This is the speculative problem to which I will now turn.

The World State

• A World State cannot possibly be a negative authority, ~~it must~~ be positive ; its object being not to destroy war, but to transform peace. Also it cannot be solely a State founded upon force, whether economic, or military, or both ; but a State of justice, reason and force in equilibrium, regulating the moral, intellectual and physical activities of society. Its problem is one of establishing uniformity in diversity, or of authority in a state of freedom, and this is its supreme difficulty, for the world is not girt by one civilization, but lies entangled in many, an intricate web of states and conditions of justice, reason and force, which among themselves are often antagonistic.

Arbitration is a beginning, but not an end. Arbitration may settle a dispute, but it does not necessarily remove the roots of a dispute, just as disarmament may prevent a war, but does not remove the causes of war.

A strong and universal authority alone can do this. Not an authority like the present League of Nations, which theoretically can apply sanctions—financial and economic pressure and military and naval action, for though these may prevent war, they do not regulate peace, and it is in peace that the disease lies. Thus far all experience goes to show that attempts to regulate war break down under the stress of war, unless they are enforced by powerful neutrals. Neutrals, however, can no longer be relied on, for the world has economically become so interdependent that any great war will soon engulf all the great nations, and the small ones are of little account. Nevertheless, the League of Nations does keep this problem before the thinking few, a problem which has perturbed the mind of man for over two thousand years.

It is not my intention here to write a history, but only to point to certain conclusions, and though lessons can be learnt from the leagues of ancient Greece, such as the Amphictyonic, the Delian and the Achaean, these are so far distant as to be of comparatively little importance.

The present European problem rose from out of the Reformation, which, splitting Europe by disrupting its spiritual authority, at once gave birth to a number of World State conceptions. The most noted of these was the "Grand Design" of the Duke of Sully (1560-1641). His object was to federate Europe and eliminate war. To effect this he proposed to establish a Senate, modelled on the Amphictyonic Council, consisting of sixty-six members representing the fifteen States of Europe. This Senate was designed to establish concord between the nations, supervise the domestic and religious affairs of its members, and, in order to enforce its will, to have at its disposal an army and a navy. "To succeed in the execution of this plan," writes Sully, "will not appear difficult, if we suppose that all the Christian Princes unanimously concurred in it."¹ This of course is the standing difficulty, for if everyone will agree, almost anything can be done.

¹ *The Grand Design*, p. 34.

The next scheme was put forward by William Penn soon after the close of the Thirty Years War, a scheme which tallies closely with that of the present League of Nations, for no international police force was suggested, sanction being enforced by the loyal members of the European Diet on the disloyal ones. After the War of the Spanish Succession, the Abbé de Saint Pierre devised another scheme, of which Frederick the Great said : "The thing is most practicable ; for its success all that is lacking is the consent of Europe and a few similar trifles."¹ On the lines of the League of Nations he guaranteed the *status quo* in Europe, and that war should be declared by the European Senate upon all recalcitrant members.

Jean Jacques Rousseau next tried his hand towards the close of the Seven Years War. In 1761, he published his views in a book called *A Lasting Peace through the Federation of Europe*, which was republished in 1917. Again, his instrument of peace was to be based on the compulsion of force.

Fortunately for Europe, none of these schemes was in any way possible. Had they been, either a series of devastating wars would have occurred or a *status quo* would have been established which would have rendered European civilization sterile.

In a different category stands the philosopher Immanuel Kant, who in 1795, published his treatise entitled *Perpetual Peace*. In it he shows that no reliance can be placed upon man's moral nature, and consequently that physical compulsion, if exerted, must inevitably be misapplied, because moral force itself will be wanting. His views are that man is controlled by a Destiny, a kind of categorical imperative, which, though he may fight against it, in the end he cannot overcome. He says :

"This guarantee [of perpetual Peace] is given by no less a power than the great artist Nature, in whose mechanical course is clearly exhibited a

¹ *Letters of Voltaire and Frederick the Great*, R. Aldington, p. 160.

predetermined design to make harmony spring from human discord, even against the will of man."

And again :

" This design . . . is called Providence, as the deep-lying wisdom of a Higher Cause, directing itself towards the ultimate practical end of the human race, and predetermining the course of things with a view to its realisation."¹

Further, he says :

" To all this diversity of individual wills there must come a uniting cause, in order to produce a common will which no distributive will is able to give."²

He considers that such a problem must be capable of solution :

" For it deals, not with the moral reformation of mankind, but only with the mechanism of nature ; and the problem is to learn how this mechanism of nature can be applied to men, in order so to regulate the antagonism of conflicting interests in a people that they may even compel one another to submit to compulsory laws and thus necessarily bring about the state of peace in which laws have force. . . . Hence the mechanism of nature, working through the self-seeking propensities of man (which of course counteract one another in their external effects), may be used by reason as a means of making way for the realisation of her own purpose, the empire of right, and, as far as is in the power of the State, to promote and secure in this way internal as well as external peace. We may say, then, that it is the irresistible will of nature that right shall at last get the supremacy."³

¹ *Perpetual Peace*, pp. 143, 144.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 154, 155.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 164.

Lastly, he believes in what may be called a cyclical elimination of war, a subject I shall discuss in Chapter X,—namely, that “as the periods in which a given advance takes place towards the realization of the ideal of perpetual peace will, we hope, become with the passing of time shorter and shorter, we must approach ever nearer to this goal.”¹

In brief, Kant's theory was that in the long run wars tend to unite the human race, because grouping lessens the incidence of war. Nature's goal is unity, and her driving force towards it is war.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 196.

CHAPTER VI

WAR AND HISTORY

The Mechanism of War

WHILST a first-class mind soars above the commonplace, relying upon its fearlessness, the second-class mind establishes some mawkish convention which magnifies its morality in the minds of the third class, and on this seeming superiority its power rests. Genius relies upon itself, mediocrity relies upon inferiority. Both have their special uses. The one leads forward challenging the unknown, the other draws back closing the ranks of the straggling army, which must have a discipline, a morality, a convention in order to maintain its solidarity, and so prevent it disintegrating into barbarism.

To-day when the foundations of nineteenth-century civilization are sinking in the slime of democracy and the edifice of society is sloping out of the perpendicular, mediocrity fulfils as useful a purpose in anathematizing war as once did the medieval priest when he anathematized the Devil. If the masses are not encouraged to loath war, they may too readily indulge in it. Therefore war is vilified ; yet in this vilification there is no truth, and to say that "war has never created anything, and that it has only distorted pre-existing tendencies," is no better than throwing dust in our eyes and virtuously blinding ourselves to reality. If, during the Middle Ages, a man had said, "Perhaps the Devil is not so black as he is painted," he would have been declared a heretic ; similarly to-day, when mediocrity hears a man say, "War is not altogether an evil thing," mediocrity must appear thoroughly shocked. It is

because this genteel convention is so deep founded that I intend to examine in this chapter the influence of war upon civilization up to the close of the eighteenth century. It is because these influences are so little appreciated that the existing tendencies of war are so little understood. The mechanism of war is part of Kant's "mechanism of nature," and until rational thought is applied to this subject, trial and error must continue, and the elimination of the diseases of peace be consequently retarded.

The Classical Period

The classical period of war constitutes a military microcosm, because our knowledge of it is restricted in detail, and yet is sufficient in essentials for a boldly outlined picture of war to be painted. During this long period of some fifteen hundred years, all the salient factors in military science and art are clearly discernible, yet unless these are woven on the framework of the natural history of war, the picture is apt to become confused and unintelligible.

The first great factor which confronts the student is that of geography. It was geography which separated the Greeks into city states, and which enabled the Assyrians and Persians to create a centralized empire. In more than one respect the Taurus range of mountains was the dividing line between ancient Europe and Asia—that is, between Greek and Oriental civilization. In Greece itself the pass of Thermopylae and the isthmus of Corinth were the two most important factors underlying politics and strategy.

As important as geography, and closely related to it, was the economic condition of Greece. From the earliest age the Greek city states had suffered from food shortage; cattle were few in the land, and little corn was grown save in the valleys. As the city population increased, the only outlet was colonization; consequently we find that from an early date the Greeks formed settlements overseas, the most extensive being in

Pontus, Egypt and Sicily, the great grain centres of the Mediterranean world of the fifth century B.C.

These two factors, the geographical and the economic, were the two halves of the mould in which Greek tactics and grand strategy were cast. The food stocks were concentrated in the valleys, and destruction of them entailed not only starvation, but also loss of exports of oil and wine whereby foreign corn could be purchased. This factor determined the composition of Greek armies even as early as the sixth century B.C. As most cities were walled, the only means of coercion was destruction of food stocks, and unless the city attacks had access to the sea and possessed a powerful war fleet, as Athens did in the fifth century B.C., either the enemy destroying the crops in the valleys had to be destroyed, or submission tendered. Thus it happened, almost without exception, that battles were fought on the plains, and for such, failing heavy cavalry, which the Greeks did not possess, heavy infantry—hoplites—were the most effective arm. Further, battles were seldom fought during the winter, not because, as it is frequently supposed, the rigour of the climate prohibited them, but because there were no crops to destroy; and as the defensive was still the stronger form of war, the assault on walled cities offered little chance of success. The influence of topography on military organization and tactics is well exemplified in the Persian Wars. The Persians, depending on cavalry, found narrow valley fighting most difficult; equally on open plainland, where flanks could easily be turned by mounted men, did the Greek hoplite armies find themselves at a serious disadvantage.

By the sixth century B.C. the population of Attica had outgrown its food supply, with the result that the Solonian legislation recognized that Attica had to be converted from an agricultural into a manufacturing state. The policy of Themistokles (514-449 B.C.) was one of commercial expansion, the pressing problem of Attica being control of the sea routes leading to the corn areas, the control of the corn areas themselves

and provision for unemployment. From 457 to 404 B.C., during the Peloponnesian Wars, Athens waged a desperate contest to control the sea routes to Sicily and Egypt. Perikles (490-429 B.C.), in his turn, based his grand strategy on the economic factor. If he could control Egypt, Sicily and Pontus, Athens would become mistress of the Hellenic states. Lack of consolidation at home wrecked his foreign policy, which came tumbling down like a house of cards when Megara and Boeotia revolted in 447 B.C. Thereupon Perikles removed the treasury of the League from Delos to Athens, and so for the time being became financial autocrat of Greece.

The whole of this period is full of grand strategical lessons, little discernible in their true perspective unless related to the civilization of this period. Throughout, the economic factor plays the leading part. The interminable struggles between cities and leagues are not objectless, but one and all are based on food supply. The command of the sea, as in modern times, is all important. The quarrel of Corinth and Athens over the island of Corcyra was not a mere pretext for the outbreak of the second Peloponnesian War, but a definite cause, for Corcyra was the strategic focal point of ~~Sicilian~~ and Italian trade. The whole war was a food war, and a war for colonial control, not of distant lands, but of distant markets and centres of supply.

From decentralization and spasmodic confederations, the two outstanding curses of ancient Greece, a change towards centralization was made under Philip of Macedonia, and was brought to an apex by his son, Alexander the Great. The military skill of this super-man of antiquity is from the point of view of the subject at hand of but minor importance. Already long before his day, the Graeco-Persian wars (490 B.C. and 480 B.C.) and the Battle of Cunaxa (401 B.C.) had shown clearly the weakness of the East. The Peloponnesian wars and the Peace of Antalcidas (386 B.C.) had equally shown the weakening of Greece. Hitherto gold had been the Persian weapon against the Hellenic militias, but Philip had left Alexander a more powerful arm—a

national army—and with this he set out to conquer the world of his day. First he secured command of the sea, secondly command of the Egyptian corn area, and thirdly of Persian gold, which gave him command of the land. The result was the destruction of two civilizations—Greek and Persian—and the creation of a Hellenistic world. On Greek thought and Persian gold were laid the foundations of what to-day we call Western civilization. Greece conquered the world of thought, and Alexander scattered these thoughts from the Aegean to the Euphrates. On Persian gold Alexandria and a hundred great cities were founded, and from these cities a scientific age arose which, had it not been for an accident of history, might eventually have rivalled our own. This accident was the occupation of the swamps of the Tiber, traditionally in the eighth century B.C., by a virile tribe of barbarians known to history as the Romans.

For these sturdy farmers war was a domestic necessity, shut in as they were by hostile tribes. Divided at an early date into two castes, the high and low, quarrels and insurrections were frequent; consequently the Patricians seized the lands of the people and filled the jails with debtors. In these acts may be discovered the beginnings of Rome's future world policy, which was one of frontier security and the search after gold. Internal tranquillity was eventually established when the Roman period of foreign wars opened, and, as Draper says in his *History of the Intellectual Development of Europe*: "As the circle of operations extended, both parties see their interest in cordial coalescence on equal terms and jointly tyrannize exteriorly." In the western Mediterranean zone, Spain, a great silver-producing country, was the main bone of contention between Rome and Carthage, just as in the eastern zone the Lydian gold-mines had been between Greeks and Persians. Here, in Spain, the rising Republic came into contact with the Carthaginians, and by so doing unconsciously set to work to complete Alexander's dream of a centralized world governed by one all-controlling authority. The

steps taken were very similar—namely, command of the sea, command of economic resources, and then destruction of the enemy's central authority: that is, command of the land. Roman military glory ended at Zama (202 B.C.), and from the destruction of Carthage, in 146 B.C., onwards, Rome's policy was the disorganization of neighbouring states. Once disorganized, absorption became easy, and, generally speaking, the Romans were lenient towards the conquered, for in them they saw a source of wealth. Conquest resulted in a vast accumulation of slaves, and many of the later campaigns of the Republic and Empire were little more than slave-hunts. As the slave population increased, the native husbandmen, who had formed the backbone of the legions, were driven from the land, and filled the cities with unemployed. During the second century A.D. gold poured into Rome, for the whole urge of imperial expansion was the search after wealth. As the peasantry became demoralized, more and more had the government to rely upon a mercenary force, and the more it did so the more centralized did it become. Towards the middle of the third century, through greed as much as through mismanagement, gold rapidly gravitated from Italy towards the centres of exchange in the East. This was the true beginning of the Decline and Fall, for the stability of Roman rule depended on ability to pay her mercenary legions and to feed her unemployed population, which was now a veritable millstone about her neck. The Empire had been cemented together with gold, and without gold it could have but one end—disintegration. Meanwhile a new force was being evolved within the intestines of the Eternal City.

The Dark Ages

The organization of a permanent police force by Augustus, which replaced the mercenaries of the Civil Wars, was the triumph of the capitalism of this age, and for four hundred years this corps of hirelings crushed revolt within the Empire. Besides eventual lack of

money to pay this police, the doctrines of primitive Christianity, communistic in nature, gradually undermined its discipline and morale. The dullness of Roman life which followed the centralization of power opened the door to many ecstatic sects, one of which was Christianity. The police army, being a mercenary force, recruited mainly from the barbarous tribes of Spain, Gaul and Germany, was easily attracted towards new wonders and superstitions. The Christians as a sect stood apart from the Empire, or constituted, as several historians have said, an empire within the Empire. Though the eventual Church made no attempt to abolish war, the early Christians theoretically anathematized it. The war they waged was the war of the Word ; they were hostile to wealth and to the social order, and carried on extensive propaganda in the legions ; for they firmly believed that the end of the world was at hand, and that the only world worth fighting for was the next. As surplus of wealth had destroyed the native soldiers of Rome, so did an excess of faith undermine the discipline of the mercenaries, yet, curious as it may seem, the discipline of the soldier became the model for the early Church.

The Empire now definitely entered its final stages of decadence. It was too small, and not, as many suppose, too large to survive. It lay like an oasis in a desert of barbarians, and by degrees was buried in its shifting sands. Not only could soldiers not be found, but generals could not be bred, consequently the legions were commanded by barbarians. At length these generals and their men could not be paid, then civilization foundered. At midnight on April 24, 410, eleven hundred and sixty-three years after the founding of the city, the Salarian Gate was treacherously opened to Alaric, and Rome was sacked by the Goths.

The fall of Rome was the most appalling disaster in history, yet we find St. Augustine writing :

“ In the place of this earthly city, this vaunted mistress of the world, whose fall closes a long career

of superstition and sin, there shall arise 'the City of God.' The purifying fire of the barbarian shall remove her heathenish defilements, and make her fit for the kingdom of Christ. Instead of a thousand years of that night of crime, to which in your despair you look back, there is before her the day of the millennium."

The five centuries following the sack of Rome cover a period of social and military degradation unrivalled in recorded history. In the East, the age of faith was destroyed by the Vandal invasion of Africa, by the campaigns of Chosroes, King of Persia, and by the onrush of the followers of Mahomet. The loss of a central power made wars incessant; famines and pestilences followed in their wake, with the result that during the life of Justinian (483-565) the human species was diminished by the almost incredible number of one hundred millions.

The conquest of Africa by the Vandals cut off the Italian supply of corn, and Italy was swept by famine. In the north and west the barbaric races of Germany swarmed over the land, pillaging and massacring. Highly imaginative, and fearing natural forces, they carried their dream of Walhalla into the Christian faith, and imbued Europe with the terror of death. Their priests, heavenly warriors who protected them from nature, could, when once Christianized, equally well protect them from the powers of Satan, king of the dead. The Teutonic warriors did not, as many German writers affirm, regenerate the broken Roman world, for what they did was utterly to barbarize it.

Strange as it may seem from the modern point of view, the Church did not object to the barbarians, she welcomed them, for in them she found ready converts. This welcome undoubtedly facilitated their invasion, and as they swept over the Empire, the defence rapidly preponderated over the attack, and rendered centralization of government impossible. Strongholds sprang up on every crag, and incessant wars were waged

between the bands of brigands which infested every country.

There were few roads and no police, consequently the law of the day was "Might is Right." With few exceptions, in Western Europe brigandage was the foundation of commerce for a period of some 600 years. Lacking physical force, the Church, with a wisdom which was truly remarkable, by degrees established in its place a spiritual terror. The creation of the medieval Devil was the greatest act in political life until the establishment of standing armies in the seventeenth century. Once the Devil became a reality, some form of law and order was established, for hell was a spiritual jail, and the demons which emanated from it were spiritual policemen. Yet, whilst in our modern system, far less imaginative, prisons and police forces are established to be respected, so profound was the philosophy of the Church that the very forces of evil were utilized to create conditions of virtue, and yet remain so separated from goodness that plunder as a cause of war was in the larger part replaced by something more desirable—namely, the conquest of the Devil and all his followers.

The dogma of hell not only harmonized with the crimes of the age, but walked daily with men. On the nature of war this dogma had a strange, yet all-powerful influence; for the art of war was replaced by the art of the magical attack. Constantine and Clovis were both promised victory through faith—that is, through a miracle. Enchantments were used as engines of war, attacks were made by talismans, and on the interpretation of omens were the problems of strategy decided. So all-powerful became the belief in relics that wars were waged to possess them, and St. Bernard looked upon a campaign merely as the vehicle for miraculous expressions.

A typical example of the attack by magic is the quarrel between Pope Gregory VII (Hildebrand) and Henry IV in 1076. "Henry marched on Italy," writes Brooks Adams in his *Law of Civilization and Decay*, "but in all European history there has been no drama more

tremendous than the expiation of his sacrilege. To his soldiers the world was a vast space, peopled by those fantastic beings which are still seen on Gothic towers. These demons obeyed the monk of Rome, and his army, melting from the emperor under a nameless horror, left him helpless." Thus through magic, and not through force of arms, did Henry appear before the gate of Canossa "a penitent in white raiment standing in the dreary snow of three winter days," seeking the pardon of the magician who had defeated him.

In the twelfth century the miracle was the highest expression of force, especially in the north; but in the south a change was already taking form, and it was initiated by the Arab conquerors of Spain.

In 632, Mahomet died, and within twelve years of this date the Arabs reduced 36,000 cities, towns and castles in Persia, Syria and Africa, and thirteen years later, under the caliphate of Ali, learning had become the settled principle of Mahomedan culture. This rapid progress, the most wonderful in history, was due to the sword, for in wars of conquest, other than by barbarians, phases of existence are passed through with extreme rapidity. Crossing over to Spain, by the year 732 the Arabs had reached the centre of France, and at Tours were defeated by Charles Martel. "That battle," says Draper, "fixed the religious destiny of Europe."

To the Arabs Western civilization owes its present knowledge of science and industry. Their culture fertilized Europe, sowing the seeds of future grandeur in the blood-soaked fields of the Dark Ages. Nor was the spirit of Arabian organization and chivalry to be denied its influence on the superstitious religion and barbaric warfare of this period, for in the twelfth century the Benedictine Monastery of Cluny set out to model the Christian world on the lines of Islam, and from out of the Crusades sprouted a new doctrine of war. These were two of the most portentous events in European history.

The Dawn of the Renaissance

From the opening of the fourth until the close of the eleventh century the feudal system had taken form, sprouting out of several old Roman institutions; its eventual structure, always somewhat amorphous, was shaped by the weak having to seek the protection of the strong. By the close of the eleventh century many of the families of the old robber chiefs had settled down and become local overlords, offering protection for service, and linked to what then passed as the central government by a very attenuated allegiance. Many of these petty despots, as well as followers of religious orders, had for years past undertaken pilgrimages to Palestine, not only to save their souls, but also to fill their pockets, for the trade in relics was a very lucrative business. The Mahomedans, not understanding the purport of these strange journeys, had on occasions maltreated the pilgrims, with the result that Peter the Hermit, who had witnessed certain barbarities in the East, began preaching his famous "Deus Vult." Urban II, a French Pope, then embroiled with Philip of France, in order to extricate himself from his entanglement, in 1095, at the Council of Clermont, proclaimed the first Crusade, the assembly being convinced that it was the will of God, on account of a shower of shooting stars which took place on April 25.

Amongst the primitive Christians, the fame of the soldier which illuminated the classical age had been replaced by the holiness of the ascetic. The coming of Mahomet reversed this change, and from 1095 onwards war became the duty of Christendom, the cross as a symbol of the forgiveness of sins being replaced by the sword, on the cruciform hilt of which the crusader swore to retake the Holy Sepulchre. In the first Crusade some 500,000 persons perished, but its main result, increasingly accentuated by those which followed it, was to enable the Papacy to seize the resources of Europe—in fact, financially Europe became tributary to the Pope, who soon had fiscal agents in every capital.

The changes which now swept over Europe were extraordinary to a degree, the most powerful being, economic revolution, loss of faith in miracles, and a return to military art, all three of which were interdependent. In the East the veil of barbarism was lifted, and what astonished the Crusaders most was that God could be so kind to the heathens. From the East came the silkworm, the mulberry, the plum, wind-mills, refined sugar, glass, silk, carpets, brocades and Damascus steel. Not only was it soon discovered that miracles were bad tactics, but that profit could be made out of other things besides relics and talismans. The Crusaders left Europe crude fetish-worshippers, they returned, at least some, vastly enlightened. Simultaneously the culture of the Moors crept into Sicily, Southern Italy and over the Pyrenees, the rebirth of European literature dating from the songs of the troubadours.

The Crusades caused a steady stream of money to flow into Italy, and with money came leisure, and then culture. Culture, in its turn, began to loosen the bonds of serfdom, municipal liberties were founded, the population increased, and labour lost some of the stigma so long attached to it. All these things and many others date from the beginning of the twelfth century, the general result being that the idea of war as national suicide began to take form. This reacted on military art and organization; discipline, hitherto unknown, was established in the idea of chivalry. The art of engineering rapidly advanced as wealth increased. Military Orders were established, such as the Knights of the Temple and the Knights of St. John. In this monastic standing army may be seen the beginnings of an attempt to make the attack superior to the defence, without which taxes could not be collected or tranquillity maintained. The art of military engineering, learnt in the East, placed a formidable weapon in the hands of the Church, whereby she could reduce to submission the feudal nobles when they opposed her. "The whole burden of the war was thrown upon the

Church, and in all modern history nothing is more wonderful than the way in which the work was done."

Under Innocent III (1198) the Papacy reached the zenith of its power, but after the hideous Crusade against Constantinople, in 1204, it entered a rapid decline, the two main reasons being, the loss of faith in miracles and the increasing growth of trade. As early as 1134 people had been burnt in Languedoc as heretics, yet heresy increased as the power of miracles declined, and even the appalling Crusade against the Waldenses in the South of France could not stamp it out. Hand in hand with this intellectual revolution proceeded the economic one. From the middle of the twelfth to the thirteenth century Europe experienced great trade prosperity. Money now began to replace imagination, and as feudal power weakened, the communes combined not only for purposes of trading, but also for trade protection. In the early Middle Ages secular security had been based on physical force—the swords of the Barons and the spears which they commanded. As trade grew, by degrees it was based on money—that is, on the power to hire mercenaries, or police, for the burghers themselves were not of fighting stock. The mercantile mind is unimaginative, it is lacking in the martial spirit, so we find that as the development of scepticism in the thirteenth century led to the Reformation in the sixteenth, so also did the increase of wealth of this same century, more so than the adoption of firearms in the succeeding one, lead to the revival of infantry, and the replacement of cavalry by infantry in the same century which witnessed the work of Luther.

As the Papacy turned from miracles to money, it lost its power of attacking the morale of its turbulent subjects. Such magical attacks as those of Gregory on Henry in 1076, and of Innocent III on Philip in 1200, had lost their power; this is clearly shown in the quarrel between Philip of France and Boniface. The Pope excommunicated the King and anathematized his posterity to the fourth generation. But what was

the result? On September 7, 1300, the Vicar of God was attacked by hired banditti at Anagni, and whilst his cardinals escaped through a sewer, he was strapped face to tail, on a miserable horse, and led off to prison. The attack by magic was at an end.

The influence of money now became more and more pronounced. The ceaseless persecution of the Jews had caused them to discover the art of making gold invisible by bills of exchange. This had a tremendous influence on war, because its sinews, now that mercenary forces could be bought and sold, might instantaneously be moved from place to place. The magical attack on Philip having failed, the Papal hierarchy was paralyzed by fear, and Clement, who succeeded to the Papacy in 1305, consented not only to the taxation of the clergy, but also to the seizure of the property of the Templars. In 1314, Jacques de Molay, Grand Master of the Order, was burnt alive—the spoliation of the Church had begun, and another world revolution was initiated.

The Renaissance and the Reformation

- For a moment to recapitulate. Since 410, when the centralizing power of Rome came to an end, Europe had been unconsciously striving to re-establish it. Out of brutal chaos the Papacy produced a magical cosmos cemented by the fear of hell. Then came the Crusades, and locomotion, as it always must, resulted in intellectual development. In its turn, this development at one and the same time weakened Papal power, and turned men's minds towards the gaining of wealth. The destruction of the feudal system by the Papacy left the communes supreme once the Papacy itself entered its decline. Modern democracy was now born, and the arm of a democracy is not an army of nobles but an army of the people; not knights in armour, but men on foot; not soldiers to pillage but a police force to prevent pillaging. Once this force came into being, all that was necessary was to discover a weapon which

would render the attack stronger than the defence—then, and only then, could internal tranquillity be established and centralization take form. This weapon was gunpowder.

Gunpowder, as Carlyle writes in *Sartor Resartus*, "Makes all men alike tall . . . at last, is the Goliath powerless, and the David resistless ; savage Animalism is nothing, inventive Spiritualism is all." *Par excellence*, gunpowder is the democratic weapon, the weapon of the people ; consequently Condorcet, in his *Tableau Historique des Progrès de l'Esprit Humain*, rightly connects the rise of infantry with the rise of democracy. Gunpowder, by restricting brigandage, enabled law and order to be established ; and as it rendered the attack overwhelming, the general adoption of firearms was rapidly followed by centralized control and the rise of modern kingdoms.

Henry VII of England made the possession of artillery a royal prerogative, and Oppenheim, in his *International Law*,¹ says :

"The evolution of the laws and usages of war could not have taken place at all, but for the institution of standing armies, which date from the fifteenth century. The humanizing of the practices of war would have been impossible without the discipline of standing armies ; and without them the important distinction between members of armed forces and private individuals could not have arisen."

As gunpowder was one of the many gifts Europe received from the Arabs, so also were the mariner's compass and the art of making paper ; these also had a profound influence on European culture, and, through culture, on the history of war. The discovery of America changed the channels of commerce, and Vasco da Gama's rounding of the Cape, six years later, in 1498, dislocated the economic foundations of Europe. The printing press and the manufacture of paper, with-

¹ Fourth edition, p. 136.

out which type-setting would have been almost useless, gave expression to the freedom of thought of the day, and stabilized language. Henceforth the pen was to be mightier than the sword. The discovery of the mines of Potosi, in 1545, flooded the world with silver, utterly corrupting Spain. Sunk in superstition and ignorance, the wealth of the imaginative Spaniards soon passed into the hands of the economically-minded peoples of the Reformation—the English, the Dutch and the Swedes, for in the silver of Potosi, quite as much as in the thunder of Luther, is to be sought the cause of the religious wars which devastated Europe from 1562 to 1648.

From the religious point of view the Reformation was a decomposition rather than a revival. From the twelfth century onwards the Papacy had steadily lost control, and this control was never re-established by the Protestants, who frayed away from the central idea of religious liberty into innumerable and generally hostile sects. The leaders of the Reformation, and particularly Luther, were as opposed to intellectual freedom as was the Papacy; Luther himself denounced both Rome and Reason as “Die verfluchte Huhre Vernunft.” The mainspring of the entire movement was neither religious nor intellectual, but economic; it was a strike against indulgences—in fact, against the Papal financial system of the day. The Religious Wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were at base economic struggles wrapped up in the same idea which inspired religious persecution. They were wars of money, of financial control, and freedom from it in its centralized form. In 1555 a patchwork religious settlement was arranged at Augsburg.

The influence of wealth on society was the pivotal condition of this age. During the feudal period the strength of the Barons lay in men, and not in money; there was no capitalist class, and therefore no competition; consequently society was all but stationary. The increasing wealth of countries, and of England in particular, had the same influence as it had had on the

Roman Republic in the first century B.C.—it tended towards the elimination of the yeoman class and the consolidation of land in the hands of a new economic nobility. England during the Middle Ages had been peopled mainly by farmers, who supplied the Barons and the King with excellent infantry; yet in Henry VIII's reign this class was rapidly becoming extinct. To control the Church, the Tudor sovereigns robbed it, and to control the people they enslaved it, using the clergy to preach not the infallibility of the Pope, but the divine right of the King. Money now began to take its ultimate form in the idea of a standing army—that is, of a police which could enforce the word of the clergy as dictated to them by the King. The landlords of the sixteenth century were protected by State mercenaries—police—the monied nobility feared the farm population and did their utmost to exterminate it. It was at this time, particularly in England, that the hatred of the soldier by the *nouveaux riches* took form, and has endured to the present time in the fear of the monied classes of a standing army other than a police force to protect their interests.

The Foundations of Modern Europe

The rapid replacing of the martial by the economic spirit in the sixteenth century had a remarkable influence on the destiny of England, and through England on the destiny of the world. During the period of the great landlords—that is, from the Reformation until 1688—the dearth of great soldiers in England is more than a coincidence. The fact is that they were not tolerated by the economic class which now held the reins of power, the only noted exception being Cromwell, of yeoman stock; all others, such as Drake, Frobisher, Raleigh, and later on Clive, sought free scope for their energies on or overseas. After the Battle of Flodden Field in 1513, no opening at home was left for English soldiers and adventurers, so we find that the discontented nobles took to piracy and founded the

Empire, whilst the new nobility, such as the Dudleys, Boleyns, Cecils and Howards, men of the economic spirit, gained possession of their lands, and took care that their former owners should be allowed no voice in public affairs. Curious as it may seem, this terror that the soldier should speak his mind on politics still governs the British Army, for in it freedom of speech is rigorously suppressed.

The wealth captured by these freebooters was immense, and when the time came for England to support Gustavus Adolphus in the Thirty Years War we find that it consisted in money, and not in men. This support she has without fail rendered her allies in every great war since the days of the Tudors down to 1919. Lack of military strength could be made good only by establishing allies on the continent, and though the idea of the balance of power as a means of maintaining peace is a very old one, it was not until after the Treaty of Westphalia had been signed that it took its full and modern form as the keystone of British foreign politics.

The origins of the Thirty Years War were largely economic. The Wars of Religion in France and in the Netherlands which preceded its outbreak were quite as much contests between two theories of human progress as between two religious schools of thought. The Catholics represented the old conservative and imaginative society, and the Protestants the economic and progressive. It was during the Reformation that, as Ulrich von Hütten says, "Men began to awake and live." Spain and Portugal, bloated with the wealth of the New World, were blind to the awakening intelligence of the North. There, not only was the reformed faith gripping the hearts of the people, but the command of the Baltic was daily fostering hostility between Netherlander, Dane, Swede and Pole. The *Dominium Maris Baltici* became the question of Northern politics. In 1561 Sweden acquired Esthonia, and by this annexation became a continental Power. Behind Poland stood the forces of Catholic Europe; Spain, Austria

and Denmark ranging themselves on her side, whilst James I of England, canny and cautious, hesitated whether to support Swede or Dane. The Baltic Question soon became a European problem, and it was this problem, quite as much as the religious controversy between Catholics, Lutherans and Calvinists, which shaped the course of strategy which from the death of Gustavus Adolphus, in 1632, onwards, more and more was directed by the economically minded Richelieu. The will of this extraordinary man moulded the destiny of France, for it was not so much the vanity of the French as the centralized administration he established which caused France to become from the days of Louis XIV the war irritant of Europe.

The Peace of Westphalia, in 1648, not only closed the Wars of Religion, but also closed the European Age of Faith, and so rendered wars of religion impossible. It is from this date that modern Europe emerges from its amorphous stage and definitely takes form. The economic spirit had irrevocably triumphed, reason had replaced faith as the alembic of human destiny. War now entered upon a new path—the path of wealth in place of religion. The frequency of wars declined. Whilst in the early Middle Ages the whole of Europe was swamped by brigandage and individual conflicts, and whilst in the later, these conflicts took the form of feudal forays and raids, after the Peace of Westphalia wars more and more were waged, not by the people, or the nobles, or the priests, but by kings rendered mighty by gunpowder and gold.

The growth of commerce and industry is not possible in a nation perpetually at war ; hence, it was obvious to all men that neither Pope nor Emperor was capable of exercising any form of centralized control ; to check the greed of kings and soldiers the only persuasive was that of the law of nature, the *jus naturale* of ancient Rome. In 1598, Alberico Gentili published his book *De Jure Belli*. He was followed by Richard Hooker, who was the first to make use of the term "law of nations." At length appeared Grotius (1583-1645),

the founder of modern international law. The influence of Grotius and his *confrères* has been immense, and is still steadily gaining power. "What we have to notice," writes Sir Henry Maine in his *Ancient Law*, "is that the founders of International Law, though they did not create a sanction, created a law-abiding sentiment. They diffused among sovereigns, and the literate classes in communities, a strong repugnance to the neglect or breach of certain rules regulating the relations and actions of States. They did this not by threatening punishments, but by the alternative and older method, long known in Europe and Asia, of creating a strong approval of a certain body of rules." The centralizing force was therefore sought through moulding opinion rather than by the threat of physical conflict or religious terror.

From the days of Gustavus Adolphus onwards the political influence of gunpowder grew rapidly, equipment became costly, warfare more complicated, and the invention of the bayonet gave infantry supreme power on the battlefield. A separate military profession became indispensable, and consequently the military spirit of the mass of the people was curtailed. Large numbers of men were weaned from their warlike habits, and, ceasing to be occupied by war and theology, turned their activities towards trade and commerce. Though trade and commerce are antagonistic to war, yet we find, once gunpowder has established internal tranquillity, so ingrained is conflict in human society that commercial jealousy becomes a cause of war. Mill, writing on this subject in his *Political Economy*, says :

"The feelings of rival tradesmen, prevailing among nations, overruled for centuries all sense of the general community of advantage which commercial countries derive from the prosperity of one another ; and that commercial spirit, which is now one of the strongest obstacles of wars, was during a certain period of European history, their principal cause."

The political economy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was mainly directed towards diminishing the wealth of neighbouring states, the belief being that the wealth of a country consisted in gold, and if one country could drain all others of the precious metal, it would obtain unlimited power. This idea, still prevalent amongst ignorant people, was the cause of most of the wars of the eighteenth century, and not a few of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The Rise of Nationalism

Whilst the religious conflicts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were reducing European nations to human pulp, under cover of this agony, which nevertheless freed thought from persecution, intellectual development silently but surely crept forward. Whilst the medieval world, the world of imagination, was foundering, the world of reason, built by such men as Bruno, Copernicus, Galileo, Helmont, Kepler, Boyle, Bacon, Descartes, Gassendi, Halley, Pascal and Newton, rose like a phoenix from the ashes of a burnt-out epoch. The Peace of Westphalia all but synchronized with the execution of Charles I in England, and in Whitehall, on January 30, 1649, died not only the King of England, but the divine right of kings. A new England was born—the England of the rising middle class. Under Cromwell the Dutch Wars followed. Beginning in 1652, intermittingly they dragged on for sixteen years. Their cause was purely economic, and they ended by handing over to England the undisputed command of the seas. From 1688, as Brooks Adams says :

“ The momentum of England suddenly increased. . . . Almost instantly she entered on a career of conquest unparalleled in modern history. Of the hundred and twenty-five years between the Boyne and Waterloo, she passed some seventy in waging ferocious wars, from which she emerged

victorious on land and sea, the mistress of a mighty empire, the owner of incalculable wealth, and the centre of the world's exchanges."

On the continent of Europe the results of the Thirty Years War were that Austria and Spain, holding on to a world theory now obsolete, passed into decadence; France, centralized under Louis XIV, entered upon a period of foreign conquest, Condé endowing war with audacity, Turenne with rapid movement, and Vauban with skill in reducing fortresses. From now on to the middle of the nineteenth century the attack becomes the stronger form of war. Germany lay stunned, and was not to arise from her sickbed for nearly a hundred years, when, under Frederick the Great, refreshed by her long sleep, a youthful giant, she strode over Central Europe, astonishing the nations and preparing the dying epoch for the coming of Napoleon.

Meanwhile, intellectual development, poured as it was into a worn bottle of medieval thought, caused a strange fermentation. New cults, doctrines, dogmas and heresies sprang up like mushrooms in the twilight of approaching dawn. Philosophy was mixed with necromancy, and science with witchcraft. Faith was replaced by scepticism, a doubt without a bottom, through which ideas percolated and were transmuted into the strangest of superstitions. Then towards the middle of the eighteenth century appeared the man, a soldier, philosopher and sceptic—Frederick the Great—who added intelligence to the audacity of Condé, to the craft of Marlborough and to the mobility of Turenne. Till now peoples had fought peoples, but the greatness of Frederick lay in the fact that he measured his small kingdom against a continent. The Seven Years War (1756-1763) was the first of the European World Wars since the Crusades, for it embraced Europe, India and America. The main result of this war was to prepare Europe for economic civilization, which in its military form was heralded by the rebellion of the New England Colonists.

Essentially a farming population bred from an adventurous military and religious stock, they refused to be taxed. In England the social revolution had resulted in a steady destruction of the yeoman class. Between 1710 and 1760, three hundred and thirty-five thousand acres of common land were absorbed by the State, and in the following eighty years no less than seven million acres in addition were enclosed. The social difference between the English at home and the English in New England was already marked—they were virtually two races, the one controlled by men of thought and the other by men of action. The priests and the nobles of the Middle Ages as paramount social factors had disappeared, and were now replaced by legislators on the one side and by pioneer farmers on the other. When the clash came, the result was foregone. The more martially spirited backwoodsmen and yeomen defeated the police and mercenary forces of England. The spirit of American freedom detonated the theories of the social philosophers in France, who had largely drawn their inspirations from English sources. Louis XVI was beheaded in 1793, and France, threatened by Europe, rushed to arms, and by so doing gave definite form to the as yet amorphous idea of nationalism which, since 1648, had been struggling against kingship to manifest.

At the Battle of Valmy (1792) the people of France passed through their national fire baptism, the thunder of the guns, as heard by Goethe, announcing the advent of the epoch in which we live. The armies of the Revolution were the apotheosis of infantry, the arm and military expression of democracy, the arm of the nation in arms. Chaotic, undisciplined, panic-ridden, audacious and ecstatic, France, a nation of *sans-culottes* led by citizen generals, defended herself against the skilled soldiers of emperors and kings. A totally new spirit was thus given to war, and this spirit found its focal point in Napoleon, who by ploughing up the decaying feudalism of Europe prepared her for the seeds of the Industrial Revolution, fertilized by the gold of Bengal.

It was Indian gold which sent Napoleon an exile to St. Helena, and it was Indian gold which financed George Stephenson at Darlington.

Napoleon's method of war was the absolutism of nationality shaped by the absolutism of a despot. Conscription made France one in body, and the autocracy of her Emperor one in soul. The strategy of Frederick was expanded on a vast scale. Theatres of war replaced battlefields, and entire countries theatres. Frederick had endowed warfare with intelligence. Napoleon instilled into it a fiery enthusiasm. At Jena, in 1806, he pulverized an epoch; after Jena he pulverized himself. Centralization seized him by the throat, and from a breaker of prison bars he became a forger of shackles. In other words, as he swept along his giddy course he passed out of the nebulous idea of the Revolution into the azimuth of a universal monarchy. Like Alexander, his great prototype, though he failed to accomplish his end, his end accomplished itself—a second Hellenistic age was about to manifest in Europe.

CHAPTER VII

ECONOMICS AND MODERN WARFARE

Birth of Internationalism

WHILST the ebullitions of triumphant nationalism were sweeping over Europe, unperceived the spirit of internationalism was reborn. In the economic world, the world of to-day, the Industrial Revolution stands a counterpart to the Reformation in the spiritual world of four centuries ago. The latter released the spirit of nationalism, the former that of internationalism, and it is the contest between these two forces which shaped the events of the nineteenth century, and is still shaping those of the century in which we live.

In the history of this greatest of revolutions, which taught man how the "mechanism of nature" can be applied to his many needs, the influence of war was overlooked, just as the influence of the revolution itself upon war has since been overlooked, and is only now beginning to be grasped. In 1757 Clive won the Battle of Plassey, militarily a small affair, for Clive's army numbered but 3200 English and Indian soldiers, and his losses were twenty-two men killed! Yet Plassey was the most epoch-making battle since Hastings, compared with which the destruction of Napoleon's army at Waterloo sinks into insignificance. How was this?

Since the days of Pizarro, who had murdered the Inca Atahualpa for his gold, Spanish bullion had largely been squandered in war, and had steadily flowed from Europe to the East, where from time immemorial it has been hoarded, for, as Jevons says, Asia is "the great reservoir and sink of precious

metals." These century-old savings of rich and poor Clive now fell upon and transported to London. Macaulay in his essay on *Lord Clive* writes :

"As to Clive, there was no limit to his acquisitions but his own moderation. The treasury of Bengal was thrown open to him. There were piled up, after the usage of Indian princes, immense masses of coin, among which might not seldom be detected the florins and byzants with which, before any European ship had turned the Cape of Good Hope, the Venetians purchased the stuffs and spices of the East. Clive walked between heaps of gold and silver, crowned with rubies and diamonds, and was at liberty to help himself."

Through this curious and distant channel the treasure of the Incas of Peru passed into British hands, and through this wealth was the destiny of Europe changed, as the destiny of Greece was changed when Alexander seized the gold of Persepolis and Ecbatana, and the Romans laid hands on the spoil of Greece, Egypt and Pontus. This wealth, coupled with the inventive genius of James Watt and the sword of Napoleon, founded a new order in Europe.

Then came Warren Hastings, and as Macaulay tells us, "The object of his diplomacy was at this time simply to get money." The effect of this wealth was instantaneous—in 1760 the Industrial Revolution was born. In this year the flying-shuttle appeared, and coal began to replace wood in smelting. In 1764 Hargraves invented his spinning-jenny; in 1768 Watt perfected the steam-engine; in 1779 Crompton contrived the mule, and in 1785 Cartwright patented the powerloom. "In themselves," as Brooks Adams points out in his *Law of Civilization and Decay*, "though these machines served as outlets for the accelerating movement of the time, they did not cause that acceleration. In themselves inventions are passive, many of the most important having lain dormant for centuries, waiting

for a sufficient store of force to have accumulated to set them working. That store must always take the shape of money, and money not hoarded, but in motion. . . . To the capitalist, then, rather than to the inventor, civilization owes the steam engine as a part of daily life."

From the narrower point of view of social morality, the spoliation of Bengal was a crime unrivalled since Alexander laid his hands upon the treasuries of ancient Persia. From the broader world point of view, it was one of the most beneficial acts ever accomplished ; for, from this point of view, hoarding of wealth is a crime against humanity. The hoarders were the real criminals, and not Clive and Hastings, from whose spoliation the modern world arose ; for the gold of Bengal was the blood of the Industrial Revolution, which has paid back to India a thousand-fold the extortions made.

In 1756, when Clive went to India, the British National Debt stood at £74,575,000 ; in 1815, it was increased to £861,000,000, and the difference between these two figures is a fair measurement of the economic progress of the intervening sixty years. Europe, nationalized, became the market of Great Britain, and fifteen years after Waterloo England ceased to be an agricultural country, for her key industry was manufacture.

Steam-Power and Politics

At the opening of the Seven Years War, in 1756, every kingdom in Europe was self-contained, and socially little affected by war as long as its frontiers were defended. War was not so much a national as a royal business, for public opinion, in the modern sense of that word, was scarcely born. Then, in 1760, three years after the Battle of Plassey, came a change. A complex system of credit sprang up in England, just as it did in Germany after the Franco-Prussian War, and in both countries the reason was the influx of bullion, in the one case from India, and in the other

from France. Borrowing on a large scale was now facilitated, agriculture and industry were rapidly centralized, and not only was the small farmer pinched out by the great landowners, but as steam-power took form—as it did towards the end of the eighteenth century—the yeomanry abandoned the land and concentrated in the towns. By 1830 international trade was almost entirely British. If all nations of the world had gone into alliance against Great Britain, as Napoleon attempted to force Europe to do when he introduced his Continental System, Great Britain would have been ruined, for she was literally a nation of shopkeepers. This, however, did not happen; instead, the integrity of the British islands, as well as the incessant turmoil on the continent of Europe, enabled industrialism to take deep root in the one before it could sprout in the other.

As the bulk of the world's trade was British, by economic pressure and resistance Great Britain could make the life of any one of her larger buyers, who daily were becoming more and more dependent on her goods, so uncomfortable that this pressure and resistance became the guarantor of European peace. Opposed by no competitors, there was no necessity for her to protect herself against competition; consequently her economic policy was based on free trade, and her foreign policy on the maintenance of peace, because war is antipathetic to trade.

After 1830, agriculture as the key industry in the greater European nations began to decline and give way to manufacturing. The influence of this change was profound. For twenty centuries and more European nations and communities had depended on agriculture; each country was self-supporting, and, being so, was autonomous; commerce was almost entirely local, and foreign trade little more than an accident. During war-time, as long as the enemy could be held beyond the frontiers, it was impossible to starve a nation into submission. To-day, what do we find? That no nation, except the most barbarous,

is economically independent. This transformation, which was effected in less than a century, is beyond dispute the most stupendous in history.

Steam-power changed the face of the world. In less than three generations it liberated the serf and the labourer, and has endowed both not only with citizenship, but also with luxuries and comfort formerly undreamt of by kings. As the cost of production fell, wealth unknown in any former age was accumulated, and went to finance machines and still more machines. Railways linked country to country, and steamships continent to continent. The introduction of iron vessels, in 1850-1860, revolutionized the price of navigation, and the general adoption of machinery compelled all industrial nations to exploit undeveloped lands, an undeveloped land frequently being synonymous with a country devoid of coal, or the power to purchase coal. Coal now became not only the driving force of peace, but the backbone of war; this was seen but dimly, if at all, by soldiers of this period.

Though between 1830 and the end of the nineteenth century the entire structure of civilized society was changed out of all recognition, political theory and thought remained as they were before the Industrial Revolution set in. Governments, which are established for two main purposes—namely, the maintenance of law and order and protection against foreign invasion—became involved in economic problems which did not in fact concern the nation as a separate and individual unit, but as one of a group of units intricately set together in a single immense economic world-machine which depended for its smooth running and general utility on the maintenance of the law of supply and demand, which no one government could alone apply. To see that factories are properly managed and that the workers are justly treated is the rightful duty of government, but to interfere in world trade by the establishment of tariffs and economic frontiers affects not only the people of the country concerned, but all nations trading with

them. From internal philanthropy to international economics is a step which cannot be taken by a single government without the risk of war, and war in the present economic epoch of world history is a totally different problem from what it was in the agricultural age of a hundred years ago. Then every civilized nation was self-contained and autonomous ; but after the Industrial Revolution set in nations became economically interdependent. Government represented the nation and the national point of view, but economics were international—that is, they belonged to the world as a whole. Unfortunately for the welfare of the world, the Industrial Revolution did not take place simultaneously in all countries. For instance, whilst Great Britain was highly industrialized by 1830, the main industrial epoch of Germany did not open until after the Franco-Prussian War.

After the Napoleonic Wars, Germany, then an entirely agricultural country, turned to the doctrine of absolute war as practised by the great Emperor and preached by his high prophet, Clausewitz. In it she saw the clue to victory in future conflicts, and, hemmed in as she was by powerful nations, her position continued to be a precarious one. She was right in her decision as long as the economic world remained as it was, but so obsessed was she with the idea of physical force as the answer to all political arguments, that when Darwin, in 1859, published his *Origin of Species*, her leaders accepted his theory of survival through conflict, so applicable to the agricultural age, as their gospel of national progress. Not only did Treitschke and Nietzsche and others draw their inspirations from this epoch-making book, but Karl Marx elaborated from it his system of social warfare as laid down in *Das Kapital*, which has formed the backbone of socialistic philosophy to the present day. As Delaisi says in his *Political Myths and Economic Realities* :

“ For the vertical division according to nationality was substituted the horizontal division accord-

ing to class. Between the two internationals of rich and poor, the nations were eliminated. Peace could not be attained by the violent and world-wide suppression of one class by the other."

During the whole of this period what neither politician nor socialist could see was that economic interdependence had become the law of nations, and that, consequently, political independence based on the idea of economic autonomy is a sheer impossibility in this industrial age. Had this been recognized, both would have seen that neither foreign war nor social war could solve economic problems, for warfare, whatever its nature, though it may cleanse a society and flush an epoch, can no longer render nations prosperous. To remove gold from the pockets of the rich and place it into those of the poor, or to remove the credit of one country and hand it over to another, is no longer a rational solution to financial difficulties. When agriculture was the key industry, all others depended upon it, and when each nation was self-supporting, robbery was frequently profitable; but to-day, when industries are specialized and every country depends on its neighbours, to rob another nation is to dislocate, if not to kill, the source of one's own wealth. It has truly been said that "commodities have no country," and Great Britain, realizing this, has protected the frontiers of her vast empire far more effectively by her policy of free trade than she could possibly have done had she doubled her navy and quadrupled her army. Free trade, as I have already explained, stands for universal peace, as no restraint is placed on the economic energies of any one nation by another. Conversely, protection stands for war, because any modification of a customs tariff between two countries reacts upon all other countries. If a country grant to another favoured treatment, and refuse it to a third, then to all intents and purposes an economic alliance is established—that is, a coalition against the third party, which, to save itself from

economic ruin, may prefer to declare war. As an example of how international the world has become, when, in 1920-1921, trade relations were hampered by the fluctuations in the rates of exchange, England was burdened with two million unemployed, the United States with three million, in Austria people were dying of starvation, whilst in Kansas and Dakota farmers were using corn for fuel, as they were unable to sell it.

Economic Foundations of the World War

Before these colossal events took form, and in the year which witnessed the Declaration of American Independence (1776), Adam Smith published his *Wealth of Nations*, in which he based political economy on the natural selfishness of man, and showed that man, "by pursuing his own interest . . . frequently promotes that of society more effectually than when he really tends to promote it." The theory of protection as applied to commerce he attacked, also the doctrine that the wealth of a country consists of its gold, and that, consequently, as has already been noted, the sole object of trade is to drain other countries of the precious metal, which time and again in the past has led to devastating wars. He placed on a scientific footing the theory of barter, showing that if commerce is allowed to be free its profits will be shared by every country engaged in it, and that consequently the benefits of trade are reciprocal. Further, he showed that nations most devoted to industrial enterprise are not only the wealthiest and the most pacific, but the most likely to wield the greatest power in war. This is the main condition which differentiates ancient from modern societies. When war depended on valour, a rich nation frequently fell victim to the virile barbarians surrounding it. "Since, however," writes Lecky, commenting on this idea in his *Rationalism in Europe*, "the invention of gunpowder and the elaboration of military machinery, war has become in a great measure dependent upon mechanical genius, and above

all upon financial prosperity, and the tendency of the balance of power is therefore to incline steadily to the nations that are most interested in the preservation of peace."

These are facts which cannot be contradicted, yet it is impossible to blame the nations for what now took place, for as nations their independence depended upon the fostering of industrial power, and in a competitive world order this is not possible unless young industries, like young children, are protected.

As the American Rebellion heralded the French Revolution, out of which modern nationalism arose, so did the American Civil War precede by an equal number of years the economic revolution in Germany, out of which eventually emerged the World War. The Civil War destroyed State autonomy, no State was allowed to enrol a separate army or to erect a separate customs tariff; but to protect the rising industrial interests of the country tariff walls were powerfully strengthened, and from behind them an economic war was opened on Europe, and more particularly on Great Britain.

Next came the Franco-Prussian War, which was followed by a rapid change in the economics of Europe. On September 1, 1870, the Battle of Sedan was won by Prussia, and in the history of modern economics it ranks in effect only second to that of Plassey, for the outcome of Sedan was not only the consolidation of the Germanic States into an Empire, but the sudden influx into Germany of £200,000,000 of French gold. In a few years, Germany, following the course trodden by Great Britain, passed from an agricultural to an industrial footing, and soon became Great Britain's chief competitor.

Once Germany became industrialized the result was a dislocation of world markets. Not only did competition take place between her and Great Britain, but also between all manufacturing countries. These, to protect themselves against what was called "peaceful penetration," resorted to protective tariffs and

customs. Thus did protection—that is, economic pressure and resistance—become a diplomatic weapon. Strictly speaking, it is no weapon at all, because trade is not national, but international, and for its health depends upon interdependence, and not upon independence. When in the pre-industrial period a nation decided to go to war with another, the war was a duel between the two nations, and all other nations were onlookers. But when a diplomatist exerts economic pressure by raising or imposing a tariff, he influences all countries, some more and some less, and not merely the country he intends to coerce. The result is immediate—it is a hostile international feeling.

Had the Industrial Revolution taken place simultaneously throughout the world, the probabilities are that industries would have become specialized according to local conditions, and universal free trade would have resulted, in which case economic pressure would not have been used as a weapon. This, however, did not take place, and consequently each country as it became industrialized protected its infant industries until home consumption was satisfied. For example, to-day the United States is surrounded by a tariff wall because her home markets are still considered sufficient to absorb the products of her industries.

The result of this was that, from shortly after the Franco-Prussian War down to the outbreak of the World War, the law of economic interdependence was constantly infringed. Trade, which for the prosperity of all nations should be freely exchanged, was dammed up and restricted by political action. To circumvent protection the 'eighties witnessed a frenzied search after new markets and new sources of supply. The uncivilized world was rapidly divided up among the competing Powers. Germany, then controlled by the nationally minded Bismarck, was a bad last in this land-grabbing race, and by the time her growing industries had satisfied her home needs, there was little left for her to grab.

Governments acted as they did because they were

the representatives of public opinion—the political part attempting to swallow the international whole. By which I mean: When each country was self-supporting, each, politically and economically, was autonomous, but now that every industrial country depended on the economic world as a whole, each was so intricately interwoven economically with the other that all save political autonomy was shared in common. This not being realized, a solution to all economic difficulties was sought through political power, just as in years gone by the Papacy, a religious organization, attempted to solve temporal problems by spiritual power. The result of this earlier intermixture of two incompatibles was a series of devastating religious wars, and so also, from about 1890, the attempt to solve an international problem by political means resulted in a series of economic wars which eventually embroiled the entire civilized world in the War of 1914-1918.

No sooner had the uncivilized world been partitioned between the greater industrial Powers, than a scramble took place in China. In 1894 Japan burst through China's front door, and showed how feeble the Celestial Empire was. The United States then went to war with Spain in order to seize the Philippine Islands, and so gain a naval base in the China Seas. In 1897 Russia occupied Port Arthur, Great Britain Wei-Hai-Wei, Germany Kiao-Chau, and France Kwang-Ghow, and China was compelled to open her main ports to European trade. The results of these high-handed acts were, the Boxer Rising of 1900, which attempted to put an end to this "peaceful" penetration, and four years later the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, in which Japan regained the position she had lost through European pressure in 1894.

Meanwhile France and Great Britain quarrelled over Fashoda, and the latter country went to war with the Boers in South Africa, the cause of this war being an economic one. Germany, finding all possible markets and areas of supply occupied, set out searching

for pretexts which would enable her to seize ready-made ones. The result was not only the building of a vast navy, which threatened British frontiers, but the explosion of one crisis after another, each one more warlike than the last. An extension of economic control in Asia Minor was aimed at, and the complications arising out of this stimulated the two Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. Meanwhile the Agadir incident took place, which led to Italy seizing Tripoli before Germany could do so. Thus it happened that the World War of 1914-1918 was the culminating act of a war period which in itself was symptomatic of the economic friction and chaos produced throughout the world, during the preceding generation, by statesmen attempting to solve international problems by national means. Even so astute a politician as Joseph Chamberlain did not understand the folly of all this. For half a century British free-trade policy had, by minimizing economic friction, protected the frontiers of the Empire far more effectively than a doubling of the navy and quadrupling of the army could possibly have done. Yet, in 1902, this noted statesman, in order to stimulate home industries, sought to introduce a system of preference which not only would have abolished this security, but would simultaneously have irritated every foreign nation trading with us. It was not the growth of armies and fleets which caused the World War, but the persistence of politicians of the Chamberlain type in attempting to solve economic world problems by national and political means. Since 1870, economic pressure, in one form or another, had been used as a weapon, or tool, to accumulate wealth. The same spirit was manifest as possessed the Vikings of the early Middle Ages. The wisdom of Adam Smith was forgotten. In place these politicians fell back on the worn-out doctrine that the wealth of a country consists of its gold, and that consequently the object of trade is to drain other countries of the precious metal. From about 1870 an economic war was declared throughout the industrial world, the sole object of which was

individual, or national, profit at any price. Wages were kept low, and the result was social unrest ; protective tariffs were imposed, and the result was international irritation. As things were, the civilized world was riding for a fall—a World Revolution or a World War. As politicians and statesmen naturally dread the former most, since it would have meant their overthrow, when economic pressure could be carried no further they appealed to the guns, and from 1894 to 1918 artillery seldom ceased its thunder.

Internationalism and Military Force

When war was declared in 1914, each nation blamed the other for its outbreak. This was natural enough, but what none could see was that a war between any two great industrial nations must rapidly evolve into a world war, and directly influence every civilized man and woman. For years past the citizens of each separate country had been proud to consider themselves as nationals ; the war very soon produced conditions which showed them that, in spite of their patriotism, the world was an economic whole, and that economically they were even more international than national. Stocks fell and people became bankrupt ; food grew scarce and rationing had to be resorted to. The Englishman, glorying in the fact that he was English to the backbone, for year after year had sat down at his dinner-table entirely oblivious that on it was daily placed before him the spoil of five continents, and that nearly everything he ate and drank came from every other land save his own. The very foundations of his life were international, yet he was delighted when he heard that Germany was nearing industrial ruin.

From the military point of view it was the same. In August 1914, the war was proclaimed in the name of nationality, each nation controlling its own army as if each were a self-contained and autonomous unit. The British Army when it landed in France was actually

ordered not to involve itself with the French—it was British and had nothing whatever to do with France. So the war dragged on until the law of economic interdependence could no longer be resisted. Then everything was pooled—raw materials, foodstuffs, ammunition, and even the higher command. The Allied Powers, who had entered the war in the name of nationality, ended it by becoming completely internationalized.

“If anyone wants an unanswerable defence of Free Trade,” writes Sir Hugh Bell, “he may get it from the experience of the war. Britain alone of all the contending nations adhered to its fiscal policy. Everyone of the other combatants modified theirs in the direction of Free Trade.”¹

From start to finish the war was an economic struggle, for military action was entirely subordinated to economic pressure. The main battlefields were in the industrial areas, and the main weapon was blockade, in one form or the other, which prevented these areas being supplied. The war opened as a contest of armies and ended with the destruction of factories, victor and vanquished being equally impoverished by their loss. It was not a glorious war, but an infamous war, since no sooner did it conclude than all nations, having learnt nothing from its ruin, returned to their political conceptions of 1914, and attempted to solve the intricate international problems of peace by national politics—in fact to reconstruct a shattered world on the old agricultural idea of autonomy.

If the Europe of 1914 was diseased, the Europe of 1919 was no less so. To-day every old complaint has assumed an accentuated form, and the only reason why peace is maintained is the physical, moral and economic exhaustion caused by the war.

¹ “Great Britain’s Interest in Free Trade,” *The Nineteenth Century and After*, November 1930, p. 604.

Internationalism and World Outlook

Thus by another path I arrive back at my starting point in Chapter I, and, from that starting point, in Chapters II, III and IV, I examined the chaos into which the entire world has fallen ; here I will take a bolder outlook, and, setting aside the present turmoil, will show what alternative courses face European nations to-day.

Three possibilities would appear to confront them. The first is, that when they have recovered their strength, the World War will be continued, passing out of its present economic phase into another military one, just as the economic war of 1871-1914 eventually passed into the stage of the World War itself. This is a probable eventuality unless France drastically modifies her present policy. The second is, that the League of Nations will evolve into a European Economic Council, and that this Council will create, if not a sanction, at least a sentiment, which by degrees will bring public opinion to realize that problems of international trade cannot be solved by politicians whose very status depends upon national electorates. The third is, that the United States will modify its tariffs, and possibly adopt a free-trade policy. Should she do so whilst protection still reigns in Europe, Europe is likely to become a satrapy of America.

Of these three possibilities, the first, which would constitute a war of rectification, a war to undo the injustices perpetrated by the peace treaties, would appear to be a most irrational method of disembarassing the world of its present toils. It would mean a complete chaos and a slow revival. Further, there is little to justify us in supposing that another peace of vengeance would not be imposed, and everything to fear, that this second World War would end in a general Bolshevization of Europe, as I will show in the next chapter. There are signs that public opinion is beginning to realize this.

Turning to the League of Nations, though it possesses little actual power, it is a potent symbol of Europe's discontent with pre-war political conditions ; further, the insistent harping upon the horrors of the next war and the demand for disarmament show that many people are deeply concerned in the prevention of a second conflict. Further, I feel that though to attempt to eliminate foreign wars through disarmament, which is purely a national restriction, is to delude ourselves into believing that the maintenance of peace can be based upon other than international foundations, its discussion may at length lead to the discovery of the true foundations of war-economics and finance. As I have already shown, there are signs of this being realized, for under the auspices of the League an International Economic Council has been established, the object of which is to collaborate with the International Chamber of Commerce and the International Labour Office, and so arrive at a general understanding on economic questions.

In spite of the little so far accomplished, this is a welcome sign, for it shows that the breakers ahead have been seen, so that those who are in command of the mixed fleet of European States can, if they possess wisdom, change their course before the political winds drive Western civilization upon the rocks of another war. If they swing their helms, or if even by discussions on disarmament the next storm can be averted for a generation, I see no reason why the second or the third possibility should not become the greater probability. These two may be considered together, since the end of each is the same, though the means of attaining this end differ.

Internationalism and Federation

The goal of European peace is internal national tranquillity and absence of foreign wars. The first is a political question, and the second an economic one. The confederalization of European States can solve

neither of these problems, and must end as all confederations have ended, namely, in war, *e.g.* Ancient Greece and Modern America. Federalization, which may be the alternative, can only be of slow growth. When nations as firmly believe in the economic unity of Europe as they now believe in their individual autonomy, federation may be possible, but not before. Nations must therefore be considered as remaining politically independent, which means that they must continue to control their own armed forces without which law and order cannot be maintained, and without law and order there can be no autonomy. A few years back, at the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference at Geneva, the Russian delegate, Litvinoff, like all Russians, possessed of a childlike naïveté, proposed the total abolition of armies and fleets. Obviously, could this proposal be carried out the result would be revolution and mob rule throughout Europe, *i.e.* one of the present aims of Russian foreign policy.

As I have already pointed out, the establishment of peace is to be sought in quite another direction—namely, through the application of the law of economic interdependence. The question is, consequently, How can this law be brought into general operation? The answer is a two-fold one : Either by the will of Europe, or by outside pressure—the will of America.

There are many signs that the age of the great industrial magnates, such men as Henry Ford, is coming to an end. This may at first sight seem to be an unqualified assertion, seeing that to-day international trade largely depends on their work. Passing events, however, show that the power of individuals is rapidly being swallowed up by immense business syndicates and co-operative companies. During the last five hundred years changes in power have been definite. The Barons of the Middle Ages were replaced by the economically minded landed aristocracy of the sixteenth century ; in the nineteenth century these men were ousted by the industrial magnates ; who in their

turn, so I infer from present-day world conditions, will be replaced by financial despots who will control the great business syndicates which are now rapidly arising.

If this deduction is correct, then Europe and America are to-day on the threshold of a period of financial centralization, a period which may be compared with the rise of the Roman financiers during the first century B.C. In 90 B.C., Lucius Marcius Philippus estimated that there were only 2000 wealthy families in Italy. This was before the First Civil War; after it and the second, financial centralization became far more pronounced. Macaulay, in his preface to *Virginia* says: "The ruling class in Rome was a monied class, and it made and administered the laws with a view solely to its own interest. Thus the relation between lender and borrower was mixed up with the relation between sovereign and subject." From many hands wealth passed into a few hands, and then, ultimately, financial control of the Empire passed into the hands of one man, and what Cæsar with all his wealth had schemed, Augustus carried out, and by dissembling his autocracy under republican forms he imposed an absolute despotism upon 120 millions of people.

• Once the financial centralization of the Empire had been established, Augustus reorganized the army, replacing the mercenaries of the Civil Wars by a permanent police force. The Prætorians, hitherto mainly recruited from Italy, Spain and Macedonia, were replaced by barbarians, who, Dio Cassius informs us, were repulsive to the Romans and terrible to look upon. For four hundred years this corps of hirelings crushed revolt within the Empire. The Roman fiscal system was, however, based on usury, it was an "engine for working bankruptcy," and ultimately, when bankruptcy took place, this all-powerful police force could no longer be paid, and the result was the destruction of the Empire and the eclipse of European civilization. Then, as I have shown, for a thousand years warfare was the staple industry of Christendom.

I do not suggest that these events are going to repeat themselves in detail ; but looking at the world as it is to-day, it is possible, even probable, that their tendency will once again manifest. In the past, financiers have made great fortunes out of fluctuations in trade—through gambling and rigging markets. But once they fully realize (many so I think do) that far greater fortunes can be made through enslaving industry—by turning the entire industrial world into one vast smooth-running machine—the interest they will draw on their loans will be enormous. To such men war will be anathema, and being from necessity divorced from the ideas of nationalism, they will through financial power establish a period of peace. To do so they must be able to convert this power into physical force, as Augustus transformed the power of gold into the force of his Prætorians. The question now arises, How is this to be accomplished without centralization of political power, as it was centralized under the Cæsars ?

To-day each government maintains internal stability by a national army : a conscript force, such as in France ; a militia, such as in Switzerland ; or a regular and professional army, such as in Great Britain and Germany. In war all these military organizations can be expanded to include every adult man of fighting age, as happened in 1914-1918, and all are based on infantry, which is *par excellence* the arm of democracy. Nevertheless, since the last war, a tendency towards the replacement of infantry by mechanized troops, such as tanks, armoured cars and aircraft, has taken form, which is the logical outcome of the influence of the second industrial revolution—oil-power—on military organization. At present this transformation is in its infancy, and it may take fifty or more years to attain manhood. That it will fail to do so is unlikely, seeing that military force has always been based on the main industry of its day. This question I will examine in Chapter IX.

When this transformation takes place, the result will

be that agricultural nations, and industrial ones lacking coal and oil, will be unable to engage in foreign wars ; consequently the power to wage such wars will become centralized. Wars will therefore become less frequent, and as financial centralization increases, economic frontiers will vanish, and trade becoming freely internationalized, a period of peace and prosperity is likely to be established, during which public opinion will be transformed. Nations will still retain their political autonomy and control over their individual police forces, which will probably consist of militias, since these are cheap and sufficient for maintaining law and order. Economically, however, nations will cease to exist as autonomous units, and should any one nation attempt to upset the balance of trade, the mechanized forces of the great industrial Powers will at once cross its frontiers and bring it to heel.

What is presented to us here is a return to the Prætorian system of Augustus ; for though each of the greater industrial Powers will possess its own mechanized army, the number of these Powers cannot be other than small. It is not stretching the imagination too far to suppose that at some future date two alone will confront each other ; for example, Great Britain and Germany, or Europe and Asia, or Europe and America. Should such a condition be established, then any serious difference between these two Powers must end in a war, which will be fought out for the financial Cæsarism of Europe or the world. Then, and only then, will a prolonged period of peace be established, its duration depending on the ability of the financial despotism to eliminate all causes of revolution. If this despotism, this oligarchy of bankers, follows in the footsteps of Rome, then its ultimate overthrow is assured. But should it in place learn from Rome a lesson which the Cæsars were unable to learn, because they had no precedent to guide them, that justice is even more powerful than economics, then may Western civilization accomplish the dream of Alexander—the Conquest of the World.

CHAPTER VIII

THE NEXT WORLD CONFLICT

The War of Rectification

THE last chapter ended on a highly speculative note, and yet one which echoes back to Julius Cæsar. In the thoughts of the historically-minded reader, this note may have set vibrating the idea, that the last war between European nations was nothing more than a repetition of the Civil Wars which rocked the Roman republic during the first century B.C., and which led to its eventual transformation into an empire. This empire, under Augustus, did establish peace, yet a peace which was not free from disease. This disease I have called the soullessness of Rome, because the *Pax Romana* was material and mechanical; men were looked upon as parts of a vast peace-creating machine,* rather than as human beings; consequently Roman morality as well as economic policy became distorted. In its turn this distortion reacting on the social body opened the way for Christianity, which, as I have described, led to a spiritual war within the material empire, rotting it inwardly, until a mere shell was left to be crushed into powder by the outward pressure of barbarism.

Such a possibility faces Western civilization to-day. Inwardly we see humanitarianism, rotting the nations physically and morally, allied to a gross materialism, which, having destroyed religion, is to-day rapidly destroying economic law by gambling on future prosperity. The results are cretinization and pauperization leading to centralization of authority through State Capitalism,

under which the control of industry, of finance so necessary to industry, as well as an elaborate and ever-increasing system of pensions, poor reliefs and doles, are rapidly transferring individual initiative to the State.

To expand this process of centralization, so that it may embrace all European nations, depends on the freedom of trade, for in the realm of ideas there are no restrictions, science having become as universal as once was religion. Freedom of trade means economic interdependence in its widest form, and this can only be attained by voluntary co-operation between the nations, or by such a war as I have already mentioned, namely, a war of rectification. That is a war to rid the existing condition of peace of its economic diseases ; to get back, as it were, to the last war, and to conclude it as it should have been concluded, that is by establishing peace on its leading lesson.

I have shown that the war was won through the interdependence of military forces based upon the economic interdependence of the group of nations concerned. So it would appear that the true foundations of peace must be sought in the economic interdependence of nations during peace time, industry in all its forms becoming as free as science is to-day. Then will Western civilization, having attained intellectual and economic liberty, be confronted by the supreme problem of adding moral liberty and so attain to a complete freedom.

Will this rectification be accomplished by reason or by force ? This is the immediate European problem, and all the tendencies to-day point to the second solution. America will not abandon her claim to war debts, and France will not give up reparations. These may seem small affairs, yet they are pivots upon which world chaos is to-day revolving. In a sane world they would be abandoned at once, seeing that economically they are totally unsound ; but in an insane world where the highest statesmanship depends upon the vocal unthinking masses, economic sanity is no more understood than religious sanity was during the Middle Ages.

In July, 1931, the idiotic wrangling over the debt suspension proposals was like a racing cloud in a thundery sky. It showed clearly in which direction Europe was drifting. The settlement arrived at was idiotic in the extreme, it did not attempt to cure the disease, for all it did was to give the patient a small dose of financial oxygen in order to maintain his strength for yet another year.

What will happen next? Though it would be foolish to prophesy, it is by no means foolish to weigh up possibilities, for rectification is a growing force, it is an explosive one, and the more it is tamped the greater will be the eventual upheaval.

The following courses are offered to the world, as it were by a blind Providence :

First, an American-European Round Table Conference to relay the foundations of Europe. The unlikelihood of such a conference succeeding, even if it could be assembled, is remote, because the United States wants her gold, France her pound of flesh, and Russia her idealism.

Secondly, a European coalition against France and her allies. This would mean a union of England, Germany and Italy, which unless strongly supported, by the United States would be unlikely to carry sufficient weight, and would probably precipitate a war.

Thirdly, the replacement of the present German government by a dictatorship, or a revolutionary assembly, which establishing an entente with Russia will revoke the peace treaties and at once re-arm. Such a change-over may come suddenly, or in stages. In either case France and her Allies can do one of two things—threaten or strike.

As regards the second : Suppose France again marched into the Ruhr and was opposed by a desperate people, it is not impossible to see a Polish army advancing on Berlin, a Czechoslovakian on Breslau and a Russian on Warsaw. Should the Poles be swept back by the Russians, not an unlikely eventuality, it is not impossible to see the whole of the Balkans in flames, the

Italians bombing Toulon, Marseilles and Lyons, and the battle of the nations once again taking place in the neighbourhood of Leipzig. Nor is it impossible to see a second Lenin smuggled into Paris, and the eventual expansion of Bolshevism from Kiev to Lisbon. Drastic though this process would be, it would in all probability settle the tariff war once and for all. It would rectify Europe, or if Russia were hurled back it would simply mean that rectification would be postponed, or that dissolution would solve the problem.

Europe and Asia

The picture I have just outlined is not an encouraging one, yet the problem embedded in it is not the main military problem which faces Europe to-day, and which has faced her for over two thousand five hundred years. Rectification will mean nothing unless it truly rectifies, that is changes and straightens out, and does not merely leave things as they were, or attempt to get back to the conditions of 1914. The supreme military problem is not the prevention of another European civil war, but the consolidation of Europe to meet Asia. When to-day we think of war, we think of a European conflict, and though the League of Nations is supposed to be a world organization, it is ninety-five per cent. a European league, with no influence whatsoever upon Asia, and the most attenuated upon Russia and the Americas.

This attitude of mind is but a continuation of the psychology of the war, because our present state of so-called peacefulness is in itself but a continuation of the war. From our minds has been obliterated the fact that the constant problem of Europe has been the Yellow Peril in one form or another, and that this peril has never been more threatening than when European nations are quarrelling. Greek dissensions enticed Persia over the Bosphorus, then arose the super-man and Persia was obliterated, and the road opened to Rome. Rome was eventually confronted by Vandal, Goth and Hun, and in her turn was obliterated. Then

Christendom emerged and marched against Arab and Turk. Crusade followed Crusade, interlarded with internal quarrels between European potentates, and the hordes of the Great Khan deluged eastern Europe and swept onwards when the storm was checked at Leignitz, in 1241. Constantinople fell, in 1453, and eventually the Turks camped under the walls of Vienna. In fact from the days of the first Crusade until less than two centuries ago the European problem was how to keep Asia out of Europe, and since Russia, in 1917, separated herself from the comity of European nations and turned towards Asia, her ethnic home, this problem once again confronts us.

From the battle of Plassey onwards for a hundred years, the white races of Europe established a moral ascendancy over Asiatic peoples, which for ever must remain one of the most amazing spectacles in history. They came to a continent still asleep, like a lamp thrust into a bedchamber closely curtained. They dazzled those within, and through their valour and the strength which the Industrial Revolution gave them, they simultaneously enslaved Asia and awakened her.

The dream began to pass with the Indian Mutiny and the Taiping Rebellion, and, between 1857, just a hundred years after Plassey, and the close of the nineteenth century, Asia emerged from her trance. By the date of the Boxer Rebellion an infant Hercules lay strangling serpents in the cradle of the East; but Europe did not see him, for in its turn the white race had been hypnotized by its successes, and as it dreamed of its unchallengeable superiority, reality sank from under its feet leaving it floating in a cloudland spangled with falling stars.

Europe came to Asia to trade and then to conquer, and once again the conflict of barter and of strife fertilized an epoch. What the followers of Mahomet had once given to Europe, namely, the will to centralize, which is essential if resistance is to withstand pressure, the followers of James Watt now gave to Asia. Weakness coagulated and solidified into strength,

Asia became conscious of herself, and through herself of her past, and through her past of her future. From the West she learnt not only the might of materialism, but its blight as well. She did not struggle against it so much as struggle with her own history which had petrified around her. She set out upon a magical quest, not to destroy the West but to absorb the strength of the West into her own being. Thus she rose from the ashes of a thousand years not a phoenix only but a vampire as well. To-day, though weak, war-ridden and disunited she is infinitely stronger than she was thirty years ago, and fifty years hence she may have grown into a giant.

Nearer to us lies Russia, never an essential but rather an accidental part of Europe, for the Russian is a semi-Asiatic. Here we see much the same process at work. The strength of Russia lies in the fact that she is possessed of an ideal. The weakness of Europe is that she has no ideal, but is possessed of intestinal squabbings. Russia's strength is founded upon minority sway, Europe's weakness on majority rule. Russia, down and out in the war, wrecked by revolution, racked by famine and pestilence, and crushed under the heels of a tyranny as overwhelming as that of Dionysius or Agathocles of old, to-day, fourteen years after the revolution, can defy the world. Fourteen years after the French Revolution France was able to do the same, yet the rest of Europe could exert pressure against her. To-day, Europe is all but impotent.

To-day, the nature of the Russian ideal is obvious. It is the urge outwards of Peter the Great intensified manifold. It is the urge towards the establishment of a Universal Empire such as was all but attained by Jenghiz Khan. It is essentially an Asiatic impulse, the same in a different form which for thousands of years has driven wave after wave of Asiatics over the borderlands of Europe. At its foundations lies the amazing prolificness of Asiatics, a factor which will increase in potency once Asia becomes industrialized, as in the course of time she must, for within her frontiers lie most

of the remaining untouched sources of mineral wealth. There is nothing speculative about the fact that long before Asia has reached the present industrial efficiency of Europe, her thousand million people will be doubled, and directly over-population is felt she must either burst her geographic bonds or reduce her numbers by civil war. Armed as she will then be with the latest weapons of the day, it is scarcely to be doubted which course she will adopt.

In Chapter I I have shown that since the close of the World War, Russia has been at war with Europe. That this war has been mainly a psychological and defensive one, a war to upset the social equilibrium of European nations whilst Russia regains her physical strength. It is a passing phase, a skirmish of souls which is likely at no very distant date to be replaced by a clash of bodies. Already may be seen certain changes in her economic system which must influence the problem of war. These I will examine later on in this chapter. The point here to note is this : As long as Europe remains in chaos so long will she bare herself to moral attack, and as long as this attack continues it will be impossible for her to centralize her strength.

It is true that to-day Russia is incapable of waging a war of the first magnitude. Her railways would at once defeat her. She realizes this full well, and she knows that peace is essential to her, and doubting how long peace will last she is hurrying onwards, cost what it may, with her economic plans. This should not blind us to the fact that Russia is mobilizing for a tremendous struggle, that her spirit is essentially Mongolian, and that consequently behind her stands China where to-day an endless battle is being waged against her past history.

The danger of China is that she possesses an essential unity which is totally wanting in India. The foundations of nationalism lie embedded in her present chaos, whilst in India they do not. Communism is also an indigenous product, and has throughout her history again and again appeared in virile form. For instance,

as long ago as 8 A.D., when Wang Mang overthrew the Han empire and founded the Hsin dynasty, his ideal was "to abolish poverty and establish a communistic heaven on earth."

When we think of this problem in its entirety, namely, the emergence of Asia as a reborn continent, European difficulties over war debts, reparations, customs unions and disarmament seem somewhat petty, as it were the chattering of monkeys heard against the distant roaring of a lion. When we think of a world league of nations we are simply dreaming of the millennium, and are gambling with our imaginations, just as financially we are gambling with cheques on no account. Even the Abbé St. Pierre when he worked out his scheme for a perpetual union of Christian sovereigns showed his common sense by excluding the Russian Czar. He also saw the danger which lay in the East, for in Article VIII of his Project he wrote: "The *European Union* shall endeavour to obtain in *Asia*, a permanent society like that of *Europe*, that Peace may be maintain'd there also; and especially that it may have no cause to fear any *Asiatic* Sovereign, either as to its tranquillity, or its Commerce in *Asia*."

The truth would appear to be, that beyond the petty squabbles of man a general world movement is taking place, a movement which is tending not as yet towards world unity, but towards continental unity. The foundation of three great groups of nations each infused by its own spirit of internationalism, namely, the European, Asiatic and American groups, each of which will coalesce not so much around a central power but a central doctrine, which like yeast will leaven the lump. What the Asiatic doctrine is likely to be is to be discovered, so it seems to me, in the idealism of Lenin.

The Gospel of Lenin

Russia is now passing through her Reformation and at top speed. *Nichevo* (it does not matter) is being stricken from her vocabulary, and though her peoples

that is the means of co-ordinating power, concentrating it, and by it transforming society. He says : " I can see how science will leave her home in England, France and Germany, and come for some centuries to live with us." He was in short the political expression of science, science which hitherto through industry had separated races into classes, into sects, into castes, was no longer going to separate but politically unite them. " In his eyes," writes Valerin Marcu, " the old system of wage labour was the Beast " ;¹ it reduced labour to a commodity, it materialized it. This Beast was the Devil of his Apocalypse, a devil he would slay by absorbing labour into the State, by not paying for human energy but for human results, and by producing such tremendous results through co-operation in place of competition that the labour required would grow less and less until the worker would live in a land of leisure, in which his labour was the price he paid for such a life. Eight, seven, six, five, possibly four or three hours of actual work a day when the vast machine had got up steam and was running smoothly.

Few great ideas are ever fully realized, but it is of their nature to set up strange fermentations which shape the human dough into unexpected forms. Their strength lies in the faith they generate. Thus, the early Christians had so great a belief in the Gospel of Christ, that they were not only willing to eschew the good things of this world for what they believed to be the better things of the next, but considered any other action the height of evil. To the cultured Romans such faith not only appeared to them unnatural but subversive of the order of society. To them it was extravagantly absurd, yet its very absurdity appealed to the immense slave population of the Empire as well as to many of the barbarians within and without its confines. Any man, or group of men, willing to sacrifice not only wealth and happiness but life for an ideal, has throughout history possessed a magnetic force over ignorant people. It was for this reason that Lenin destroyed the

¹ *Lenin*, p. 393.

Russian intelligentsia, for being educated this class was insulated against his magnetism, and when once out of the way an unobstructed magnetic field could be created by his will.

Though the Russians, like all Asiatics, are long-suffering people, it amazes us to-day that they do not revolt against the iron tyranny which has gripped them. Yet why did not the early Christians revolt against the spiritual tyranny of the Church? The answer is: They could not, for ignorance is impotent to organize and to lead. Should Bolshevism be overthrown, this will be accomplished by a revolt of the new intelligentsia and not by the masses. The masses never revolt, for one wolf can always put to flight a thousand sheep. A social paradise must be built, and to desire happiness here and now is to be a bad citizen. Such is the pith of Lenin's doctrine, and to fertilize the ground for its reception, he destroyed every form of freedom, creating an inert human mass, a lump of well-kneaded dough in which his will would provide the yeast. He was a man of courage.

The strength of his doctrine lies in the fact that communism is an Asiatic culture, just as despotism is; for despotism is inseparable from communism. Lenin saw clearly that "seventy per cent. of the population of the earth" was potentially Bolshevistic, that is ignorant, subservient, discontented and impotent. If this mass could be electrified, as he himself said: "No defects can prevent the success of our mission," which was, "to bring to triumph the cause of the . . . World Revolution, to create the Soviet Republic of the World."

"The will of hundreds of tens of thousands," he exclaimed, "can be incorporated in a single will. . . . More discipline, more scope, more dictatorship are needed. . . . A new war is now beginning, a war without bloodshed. March now to victory over famine and cold, over typhus and economic collapse, over ignorance and devastation." Such were his battle cries as he pressed onwards after the dream of Alexander.

"The Bolsheviks would set the proletarians in motion, the proletarians the poor peasants, the poor peasants the 'middle ones,' the middling ones the rich—and this machine, built up of man, would function like a gigantic workshop for Socialism. Dictatorship was the leather-belt that would link up the wheels and keep them in motion."¹

The Five-Year Plan

Bolshevism in its first lap was a grim failure. There was no world revolution, and no world dissolution. Revolts in foreign countries were crushed, the proletariat remained inert, and the bourgeoisie omnipotent. Russia alone sank into chaos.

Then on this void a new countenance was reflected. If the proletariat refused to rise, could not the bourgeoisie be turned to account? "Our enemies," said Lenin, "international capital, must help us to build up our State and create our weapons against them." How could this be accomplished? Only through credits, that is through trade. From Karl Marx, ironical though it may seem, Stalin, Lenin's successor, turned to Henry Ford, not to accomplish what Ford had accomplished, that is prosperity for its own sake, but power by which the freedom of the masses from wage-slavery could be attained. "That is to say, the Five-Year Plan is a means towards something greater than its own success. The whole thing has been glorified because of its function. Mills are not merely to grind out gold that will go to make more mills to grind out more gold; and so on until the mills are choked with the profusion of their own output; they are to make possible a society whose motive force is something other than private greed and ambition. Russia is trying to use capitalism to destroy capitalism; to make business so big that it includes everyone and therefore is feared by no one. To achieve this end it employs a ruthlessness of method which no purely capitalist state could

¹ Lenin, Valerin Marcu, p. 370.

employ and which most people in this country find horrifying." ¹

"We are going full steam ahead through industrialization toward Socialism," said Stalin, in 1929, "leaving behind the age-old Russian backwardness. We are becoming a land of metals, of automobiles and tractors ; and when we put the U.S.S.R. into a motor-car and the muzhik into a tractor then let the revered capitalists who pride themselves on their 'civilization' try to catch up with us. It is still to be seen which country will then have to be considered backward and which advanced." ²

Though this is a warlike challenge, the introduction of the Five-Year Plan has for the time being created a more pacific atmosphere ; for obviously it is impossible to turn Russia into an immense workshop and simultaneously wage either moral or physical war against capitalism. Compelled to maintain the peace, the Third International has grown less bellicose, and this in itself may produce curious and unexpected changes, for unless Russian morale is fed on the idea that a desperate war is being fought, it may cease to enthuse the Soviet cause. So far the assumption of outside capitalist pressure has engendered heat within, if this assumption is dropped will the heat continue ? It is because this is doubtful, that every effort is being made to push on the Five-Year Plan.

Will this plan succeed ? It is impossible to say, for an answer to such a question does not depend solely upon Russia, because Russia is part of the world. One thing, however, is certain, that to-day Russia is advancing whilst the rest of the world is falling back, and in spite of credits this advance will accelerate in proportion as Europe falls back. The fact remains, that

¹ *Manchester Guardian*.

² Quoted from *The Five-Year Plan of the Soviet Union*, G. T. Grinko, p. 338.

there can be no solution of the world's problems without Russia ; that Europe is a small continent wedged between America and Russia which includes half of Asia ; that if the Five-Year Plan does succeed, or even only partially succeeds, Europe with its tangle of tariffs will be placed between two enormous free trade areas, and economically will be crushed like a nut between the jaws of a nut-cracker.

It is openly admitted by the promoters of this plan that it is an instrument of world revolution, and that its object is to undersell capitalist countries, and so destroy the foundations upon which they rest. Shortly before his death Lenin said : " You will not be able to avoid a clash with the West." The clash is inevitable whatever happens. Failure means civil war, and a still further separation of Russia from the world markets. Success means foreign war, either actual invasion or the erection of tariff walls which in the end can only lead to the same eventuality. Whatever way we look, war gleams on the horizon, a war of continents and a war of civilizations.

The Consolidation of Europe

The hordes of Ogdai are once again looming out of the East, eager as ever to celebrate their " carnivals of death." They met their fate at Leignitz, yet their forefathers under Attila entered Rome. When they advance who is to stop them ? This is the question which Europe must answer, and all other questions are insignificant when compared to it.

The eastern frontier of white Europe is the Vistula, the region of the old Teutonic knights, whose castles and swords long shielded Christian Europe from barbaric Asia. There on this same river to-day we see a disarmed Germany faced by an ever-arming Russia whose aim is to establish an Asiatic League of Nations, and simultaneously rot the foundations of Western civilization so that no European League can oppose it. Should Russia succeed in her aim, then Europe will be swept

by Oriental culture ; if she fails, then the world is likely to be divided between three leagues of nations, namely, the European, Asiatic and American, and wars will be between leagues, that is between continents and not between nations.

To-day the bewildering fact is that though the present chaos in Asia has seriously affected the trade of the Western world, this world has not yet gauged its spiritual significance. It can still quarrel over debts and frontiers, Polish corridors and such like things, and talk of peace and disarmament and international police forces, as if Europe were the whole world and nothing but the world. If it could only see itself as a comparatively small peninsula jutting out from a great continent containing a thousand million human beings stirred with strange longings, it might realize the smallness of its quarrels. Western civilization is now at the parting of the ways ; it can either commit suicide or muster its forces for the next great struggle.

War, during the last twenty thousand years or more, has steadily progressed from the individual duel to the international conflict, and the inference is that before its creative and destructive forces are exhausted, transformed, suppressed or sublimated, it will yet have to wend its way through yet another cycle—strife between leagues of nations, or groups of races. Had the founders of the League of Nations been less visionary and more common sense, they would have realized that a stepping-stone firmly set in the torrent of war, even if it did not enable us to cross immediately, was a far more practical piece of work than an attempt to span a stream, the far bank of which is not even in sight. Since its inception the work of the League has been insignificant, because its object has been too all-embracing. To-day, China is a member of it, yet at times it is extremely doubtful whether her representative has any idea to what party in China he belongs.

This may be considered incidental, and in a way it is so, yet behind this incident stands the fact that the day has not yet arrived when it is possible to mix the

vintages of Asia and Europe and so produce an aperitif which will whet the world's appetite for the feast of perfect peacefulness. The mere fact that the League of Nations is concerned with such insignificant problems as those already mentioned, whilst Asia is in open revolt, and Russia experimenting with a system which may change the entire economic structure of society, is a strange and significant picture.

What is wanted in Europe to-day, and I will repeat it again, is not a League of Nations but a League of European Powers. Not a body of ammunition experts, social reformers and arbitrators, but, to begin with, a committee of wise and just men. Cannot ten or twenty such sages be discovered amongst three hundred million Christians, or is Europe a second Sodom and Gomorrah? Though such a committee must sprout out of the trunk of its greater and already rotten counterpart, for the establishment of an entirely new organization would be an impossible task, it should be denationalized, possess no sanctions, interfere with no government, or trouble itself with judicial decisions. What then should it do?

It should attempt to rectify the moral outlook of Europe by creating a European public opinion based on what its members believe to be the truth, and so counteract the consistent political lies upon which the peoples are fed. It should examine causes of friction, strife, discontent and decadence and what is likely to happen unless these causes are removed. In brief, its aim should be to endow Western civilization with an ideal to live up to, and as regards things temporal, it should leave these to statesmen and politicians to wrangle over.

What Europe wants to-day is a new Papacy, moral in place of spiritual; she does not want speculations about the next world but *truth about this one*. She requires truth which will guide her through darkness and daylight, like a pillar of fire and a cloud of smoke. When truth takes hold of the people, and I for one do not despair of humanity, then can a league be formed which through

public opinion will be able to defend its judgments by interdict and excommunication, just as the medieval Pope defended Christendom by these powerful weapons. To overcome such a power a greater force must be created. It was not gunpowder which shattered Christendom, but the will of Luther, whose ideal became the Protestant faith.

From the above I think that it will be seen, that the materialistic conception of fighting force must undergo a drastic change if force is to maintain internal tranquillity and frustrate external pressure. It is not physical force in itself which is wrong, but physical force applied to conditions which it cannot rectify. It is in the change of conditions that the solution to the problem of force is to be sought. To-day the governments of Europe look upon their fighting forces as sufficient to fulfil their protective requirements, because normally in the past they were sufficient. The present war with Russia, and with Asiatic idealism generally, a war now fourteen years old, should have convinced them that physical force is but one of several means of protecting national existence, or if needs be, of carrying the national will over the frontiers of hostile peoples. To-day Russia is possessed of an ideal, whether good or evil matters no whit, an ideal with which she can attack her real or imaginary enemies, who possess not only no ideal wherewith to attack her, but no ideal wherewith to defend themselves against her attacks. We see much the same in India ; when Mr. Gandhi proclaims a non-co-operative or passive resistance campaign our shells are unfuzed and our cartridges uncapped.

To-day bloodshed is still with us, yet beyond the physical struggle stands the moral struggle, which cannot be fought with rifles, cannon and tanks. Europe now sunk in a gross materialism will be destroyed by her own inventions when Asia learns how to make and how to use them, unless she can reinforce them with weapons which shed no blood and destroy no property, weapons which attack souls. The psychological, moral,

economic and financial realms of war have scarcely been explored, yet from them may be created new and potent weapons, forces, which can be used offensively and defensively. Whatever organization is evolved it should be closely affiliated to that of existing fighting forces, for though the means differ, the object of all forces in war is identical—the establishment or the maintenance of a state of prosperous and contented peace. Above all, nations must realize that there is no dividing line between peace and war, and that all such lines in the past have been purely hypothetical. Peace is war without blows and bloodshed, and war is peace with them ; therefore, their instruments of war must be such as can control strife in both these spheres of human activity. This I look upon as the line of direction towards evolving an ideal which will morally federate Europe against Tartarus.


BOOK III

CALLED

PAX

THE INFLUENCE OF CIVILIZATION
UPON WAR

In which Book it is related how War fulfilling
its Destiny will leave Man free to
choose between the Empire
of the Heart and the
Peace of the
Grave



CHAPTER IX

THE PROGRESS OF WAR

Progress and Civilization

"PROGRESS" and "civilization" are vague words, which I think demand definition, for they are used in many senses. As applied to the human race, the one means nothing more than reliance upon intelligence in place of instinct, and the other the establishment of a social order in which man is freed from danger to life and limb, can work in peace and is at liberty to express his opinions. If to these conditions are added culture in the forms of science, literature and art, then civilization may be reckoned as of a high order. In brief, the one is power to change intelligently, and the other to produce a stability in which changes can take place without cracking the social substance. Consequently, a civilization is well ordered when it can support change and badly ordered when it cannot. A civilization without change is moribund, and one in which every change produces a violent upheaval is anarchic. In contradistinction to civilization, barbarism may be defined as a state in which anarchy prevails, that is one in which man is perpetually at war with his natural, social or intellectual surroundings.

The reason why human society differs so largely from all animal societies, is, that whilst animals rely upon instinct, man, the most defenceless of all the animals, is compelled to rely upon his wits. Through his faculty of reason he struggles with his surroundings, and whilst the animal is subservient to the dictates of nature, he enters into alliance with her, and discovering her

secrets and how to make use of her many parts, turns them to his own use. That man throughout his history has been struggling against nature is a misnomer, for he has been struggling *with* nature in order to overcome the defects in his own nature ; his struggle is really with himself, just as Jacob's wrestling with the angel at Peniel was a self-struggle, a conflict which ended not in a victory but in a blessing.

Seeking the aid of nature, as a tool-making animal, man raised himself to lordship in the kingdom of life, and his first tools were weapons, consequently the first order of society was the profession of arms. War has been the moving principle in his history, as I have shown in previous chapters. War was waged seemingly against nature, but in fact between man and man ; for no sooner was a society of men founded than a clash occurred between the self-interests of its members, and should argument or magical spell fail to maintain authority blows inevitably followed.

To Immanuel Kant, this mutual antagonism in every society is the means which nature employs to develop human reason. He calls it the "unsocial sociableness of men, that is to say their inclination to enter into society, an inclination which yet is bound up at every point with a resistance which threatens continually to break up the society so formed." It is the clash between self-preservation which demands unity, and consequently government, and self-interest which demands freedom ; between stability and mobility, between what is fixed and what is fluid in human nature. On the one side stands instinct which urges men to coalesce, on the other reason which demanding change is for ever urging separation. Kant further says :

"Without those, in themselves by no means lovely, qualities which set man in social opposition to man, so that each finds his selfish claims resisted by the selfishness of all the others, men would have lived on in an Arcadian shepherd life, in perfect harmony, contentment, and mutual love ; but all

their talents would forever have remained hidden and undeveloped. Thus, kindly as the sheep they tended, they would scarcely have given to their existence a greater value than that of their cattle. And the place among the ends of creation which was left for the development of rational beings would not have been filled. Thanks to the nature for the unsociableness, for the spiteful competition of vanity, for the insatiate desires of gain and power! Without these, all the excellent natural capacities of humanity would have slumbered undeveloped. Man's will is for harmony; but nature knows better what is good for his species: her will is for dissension. He would like a life of comfort and satisfaction, but nature wills that he should be dragged out of idleness and inactive content and plunged into labour and trouble, in order that he may be made to seek in his own prudence for the means of again delivering himself from them. The natural impulses which prompt this effort—the causes of unsociableness and mutual conflict, out of which so many evils spring—are also in turn the spurs which drive him to the development of his powers. Thus, they really betray the providence of a wise Creator, and not the interference of some evil spirit which has meddled with the world which God has nobly planned, and enviously overturned its order.”¹

Such is the opinion of one of the most profound of thinkers, and it may with advantage be compared to that held by Henry Maudsley as quoted in Chapter V. “Man's will for harmony” and his “unsocial sociableness” are “the spurs which drive him to the development of his powers,” these are the positive and negative currents within him. Nature, in the unintelligent world works by trial and error, as it were by the everlasting shaking of a dice box; man in the intelligent world can

¹ *Idea of a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View*, Proposition

4. Caird's translation in *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*, II, pp. 550-51.

speed up nature's process, for through reason he can replace the dice by the mathematics of probabilities. Nature may take ten million years to create a race-horse ; man, through his reason, does so by selection in a few generations. Were it not for the desire to attain, which in itself is discontent with something existing, man would have remained an animal, and being weak among animals would long have vanished from this earth. Rational discontent is the mainspring of human progress, that is, changes in the harmony of life. During its life history progress passes from the stage of an idea to that of a thing acquired, or a state accomplished. This passing, or transformation, is struggle, conflict and war. The birth of a new harmony is like that of a child ; there is the quickening and the travail, and as the second of these by the use of anaesthetics can be rendered painless, so possibly may man discover a way of mitigating and even eliminating the suffering and destruction of war.

Civilization and War

Man is surrounded by nature and her mechanism, that harmony of cause and effect which, according to Kant, works through his "self-seeking propensities," either by trial and error or by rational thought, leading him slowly or speedily towards the "empire of right." An empire which is not an unchanging millennium but a state of correct living ; not so much a state of harmony as of active economy. This transition, not from the imperfect to the perfect, but according to conditions from the less to the more suitable, is generalized in the law of evolution, which, when applied to man, simply means that those who adapt themselves the more suitably to the intellectual, moral and physical changes in conditions, suffer less discordant shocks than those who do not, and if these shocks are in any way lethal the fitter are more likely to survive them.

In the life history of military organizations it is the same : There is a law of military development in which

civilization is environment, and armies must adapt themselves to its changing phases in order to remain fitted for war. In early times this was easy enough, for weapons were simple and in many cases mere agricultural implements; in modern days this is becoming increasingly difficult, for special weapons are required, such as cannon, torpedoes, battleships and tanks, which possess no commercial usefulness. Nevertheless, the motive power of an army, or fleet, must be that of the civilization it serves. Thus, to maintain a navy of sailing ships would be absurd in these days of steam, because on the outbreak of war any tramp steamer armed with a gun would be a more powerful vessel than any type of sailing ship. Similarly in land warfare, the time has already arrived when any untrained civilian equipped with a machine gun and mounted in a motor-car is a more formidable fighting man than the present day infantry soldier. Consequently, armies to maintain their fighting power will have to be equipped with vehicles which for purposes of war are superior to those in commercial use.

When civilization largely depended on brigandage, in place of what to-day we call commerce, as it did during the Dark Ages, and when roads were few and generally unfit for wheeled traffic, military power was founded upon mounted troops. When this epoch was succeeded by a more stable agricultural one, infantry became the predominant arm; and to-day because manufacture has become the staple industry of all great countries, and because it is based on science and invention, it follows that infantry will gradually be replaced by mechanized troops; for it is inconceivable, as long as armies are required by civilized nations, that existing military organization will be maintained.

Life, like war, is largely a turmoil between unknown quantities, and though what we call progress should consist in determining their nature, its history is negative rather than positive; for, throughout the ages progress has been effected far more through the elimination of imperfections than through the fostering of

the seemingly perfect. Yet, in the cycles of the rise, decline and fall of civilizations may be traced one constant, namely, the desire for peace, that is the will for harmony in man. This constant is the urge of war, for the aim of war is to establish peace, to maintain it, or to change it according to the desires of man.

Throughout history, there have been three forms of war—private wars, or feuds ; social wars, or revolutions, and foreign wars, or invasions. In the first, man is the natural enemy of man ; in the second the minority is the natural antagonist of the majority, and in the third, one nation is the potential enemy of the other. As far as history can guide us, from the fragmentary knowledge we possess of the great civilizations, amongst which that of ancient Rome is the most perfect, it would appear that the constant of peace is sought along an invariable path : First, private wars are eliminated, and social tranquillity established ; next, social wars are eliminated, and a national stability is formed ; and lastly, the elimination of foreign wars is aimed at through a general federation of nations.

In Christian Europe, the publication of the Decree of Eternal Pacification, in 1495, abolished private wars, or rather affirmed the fact that they had been eliminated through gunpowder and cannon. Since then, peace has been maintained between the citizens of civilized countries by police forces. To-day in Great Britain, the ratio of police to population is approximately one to 700, whilst in France it is one to 500, so it will be seen that these forces are considerable.

As regards the second category of war—social wars—police forces are seldom sufficiently powerful to deal with them, and standing armies, or militias, have to be employed. To estimate the actual strength of these is not possible except in the case of Germany, where 100,000 soldiers are maintained for this purpose ; but it may be accepted as a rough guide that these forces are in strength not less than the police forces ; consequently, in so peaceful a country as Great Britain one man out of every 350 people is required for the purpose

of maintaining law and order, which means that barbarism is not eliminated but only suppressed.

The intermediary step between the abolition of private and foreign wars is obviously the abolition of social wars, or revolutions. These to-day have not been abolished, in fact they have seldom been more active, and when the abolition of foreign wars is discussed, it is generally overlooked that social wars should first be eliminated. It is a curious and interesting fact that since private wars ceased, each 100 years has witnessed a great foreign war, or series of foreign wars, and a great revolution, or series of revolutions. Thus, no sooner was the Hundred Years War at an end than the revolution of the Renaissance began, and in England was waged the Civil Wars of the Roses, 1455-1485. This was followed by the French invasion of Italy, 1494-1516. Then came the civil wars of religion in France, and the revolt of the Netherlands, a long period of revolution lasting from 1562 to 1609. Next came the first of the modern great wars, namely, the Thirty Years War, 1618-1648, followed by an epoch-making revolution in England, 1642-1649, the Fronde, 1649-1652, its sequel the war with Spain, 1653-1659, and the English revolution of 1689. No sooner had the seventeenth century run its course than the war of the Spanish Succession, 1702-1714, was declared, and a simmering war period followed until 1740, when the war of the Austrian Succession broke out, and eventually plunged Europe into the Seven Years War, 1756-1763, the great war of the eighteenth century. This war was followed by the birth of the Industrial Revolution, the revolt of the American Colonies, 1775-1783, and the French Revolution, 1789. Out of these emerged another great war which, fired by the genius of Napoleon, lasted until 1815. Directly this war was concluded another revolutionary period began, embracing the independence of South America, the release of Greece from Turkish rule, ferment in the Moslem world, the political revolution in England, in 1832, the overthrow of the monarchy in France,

prolonged agitation in Spain, the emergence of modern Italy, later of Japan, the general ferment of 1848, the Mutiny in India, and the American Civil War of 1861-1865. Meanwhile another great war period was entered; the war in the Crimea, 1854-1856, the Austro-Prussian War, 1866, the Franco-Prussian War, 1870-1871, the Russo-Turkish War, 1877-1878; the colonial wars of the 'eighties, the Spanish American War, 1898, the war in South Africa, 1899-1902, the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905, the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913, and finally the World War of 1914-1918. Out of this last war emerged the Russian revolution, a large number of other revolutions in Europe and South America, the establishment of dictatorships, widespread revolt in Ireland, Egypt, India and China, and a general economic collapse.

From the above brief and very imperfect summary of nearly 500 years of conflict, it would appear that unless man can radically change his nature and improve his civilization, he is destined to spend much of his time in civil and foreign wars. The main point of interest, however, is, that the idea of the elimination of war is quite valueless if it embraces foreign wars only. It would appear that as peacefulness is the normal desire of mankind, if elimination is to be made effective, it is wiser to begin with the elimination of the causes of civil wars and revolutions, that is the excision of social imperfections in place of aiming at ungraspable ideals. If such a state of social healthfulness and happiness can be established as will render all men and women contented with their lots, as a consequence foreign wars will disappear, for it is "unsocial sociableness" which begets them.

Absolute and Limited Warfare

I will turn now to the spirit of war in relation to the spirit of civilization.

The influence of industrial civilization upon war has not been grasped by soldiers. The changes introduced

by the French and Industrial Revolutions, as I have shown, compelled Great Britain and then one nation after another to turn not only from agriculture to industry, but from absolutism to democratic government. Absolutism was based on gunpowder, democracy on steam-power, in less than a century-and-a-half following the improvement of the steam-engine by James Watt, the outlook of Western civilization was completely changed, yet the means of waging war were in idea but little changed, and the outlook on war still less so ; even to-day it is much as it was in the age of Napoleon.

In wars of the past, violence was mainly directed against groups of armed men, and punishment was meted out by death, robbery and enslavement. The result of this was that destruction, in one form or another, became the one aim and object of the soldier. Even to-day he does not see that though these means were perhaps legitimate during the agricultural period, and may still be so against feudal or tribal peoples, they are no longer legitimate when wars are waged between industrial nations, because these nations are so interwoven ethically, intellectually and economically that to destroy life and property weakens the ultimate victor. Ethically it weakens him by rendering him barbarous and vindictive, economically by loss of markets and general dislocation of trade.

If history be consulted it will at once be discovered that not only the destructive effect, but the destructive instinct of the soldier rises in direct proportion to the size of armies. Horde armies are always more brutal than aristocratic ones. When a horde invades an enemy's country a Jenghiz Khan spirit at once manifests. This may be witnessed during the Thirty Years War, and the destructions wrought during it so horrified Europe that after the Peace of Westphalia successful attempts were made to place fighting on a gentlemanly footing. During the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, the horde once again appeared in the form of the conscript army. Limitations were cast

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aside, and the absolute method of war again took form ; that is, war was waged not to create a better peace, but utterly to destroy the enemy. After these wars had shown the defects of this system, in spite of these defects, Clausewitz, a general of the agricultural age, elaborated this method in his book *On War*, which became the military Bible of Europe.

If an example is required to show how antiquated this method of warfare is, then all we need do is to turn to present-day Europe and look at her. The desire of every rational man is to establish a contented and prosperous continent, that is, a better state of peacefulness than now exists. Yet the existing state is not only the result of a war which was controlled by the ideal of Clausewitz, but the offspring of the international neurosis which this war induced. This condition, as I have shown, and not the will of any individual, or group of men, fashioned the peace treaties, treaties redolent with envy, selfishness and vindictiveness. Morally it was a throw-back to agricultural times ; worse, for weapons of twentieth-century manufacture were wielded by men possessed of eighteenth-century minds. It has not given to us a more perfect peace, but a less perfect peace ; consequently the object gained has proved illegitimate.

How are we going to change this sorry state of affairs ? What must we do to raise war out of the democratic cockpit and place it on an aristocratic footing ? How are we going, not to abolish, but to industrialize war and so modify its destructive nature ? These are the supreme military problems which to-day confront the nations, and if they are not solved before the next cataclysm engulfs Europe, Europe will once again be bled white ethically and economically, and will be polluted intellectually, consequently we are not likely to be any better off after the next peace treaty than we are to-day after the last one.

The first point we must make certain of is, that it is totally useless attempting to convert the masses of mankind by logic, for the masses remain stably unintelligent,

cowardly and brutal. Yet they possess one great virtue—they are prone to imitate, and imitation in the intellectual struggle for existence is what adaptation is in the physical. From this comparison we can deduce an important fact, namely, that it is environment which will effect the change.

The stupendous social upheavals which have created modern democracy were not caused by the masses, but by ideas engendered by such men as Voltaire, Condorcet, Rousseau and Marx, on the one hand, and Watt, Fulton, Stephenson and Marconi, on the other. These two groups of men of thought and men of action revolutionized the nineteenth century ; they produced an environment which to-day has so saturated us that we can scarcely think a political thought or touch a tangible object, the source of which is not traceable to the ideas and work of these illustrious few.

Now turn to war. Napoleon, the Mahomet of modern military thought, was never the true child of the Revolution. Up to the battle of Jena he was the instrument of the Revolution, after this battle he threw back to the tyrants of antiquity. He was an absolute monarch, and his method of war was absolute also.

If now we wish to change the nature of war and rid it of its destructive tendencies, we must first set the ideal of absolute war aside. We must dethrone Napoleon the prophet and his high-priest Clausewitz, and must breathe into war the spirit and energy of science, and so militarily try and catch up, by a process of rapid transformation, with the position industry has arrived at to-day. War must be industrialized, and what does this mean ? It means that it must first be given a new instrument.

In the last war we saw armies even larger than the fabulous hordes of Xerxes and Darius—we saw millions and millions of men ; such was its main characteristic. We saw the total impossibility of leadership exerting control over these masses. We saw the insuperable difficulties of supplying them. We saw their enormous vulnerability to fire power, and we saw that, like

swarms of locusts, they not only destroyed the enemy's country, but devoured the resources of their own. I cannot understand how any nation, now or in the future, if faced by similar forces, is going to attain the legitimate object of war with the present instruments of destruction.

Turn back 2250 years, and examine what happened to the horde armies of those days. At Issus, Alexander, with 35,000 men, routed Darius, with 600,000 ; at Arbela, with 47,000, he again routed him, and this time Darius is reputed to have had 1,000,000 ; at the Hydaspes he destroyed 45,000 Indians under Porus, with 14,000 men. The scientifically organized, well-armoured, superbly disciplined, highly offensive and wonderfully mobile *little army* invariably destroyed the *horde*. Numbers and mass are worth nothing when pitted against sound leadership and an instrument which *one man* can wield.

What then is the lesson ? It is this : If in the next great war a country of the size of Belgium can produce an able and scientifically trained leader, and can provide him with an instrument as superior to the modern horde army as Alexander's army was superior to the Persian and Indian droves, this country will be able to rout an army similar to the one Germany possessed in 1914, or 1918, and drive it over the Urals ; and though the radius of war will be vastly increased, its destructive effects will be vastly diminished.

The Constant Tactical Factor

I now come to a question of extreme importance to the soldier and the military organizer, a question which man has been attempting to answer by trial and error, ever since human warfare began, and to which he is only now beginning to apply reason. In nature "selection" is but another reading for "protection," for natural selection from a stick caterpillar to a rhinoceros is nothing more than natural protection in one form or the other. The impact of danger on animal life re-

sults in an unconscious elimination of danger through physical alterations ; in human life these alterations are represented by the weapons manufactured by man—they may be offensive, or protective, or mobile.

With man the only difference is that he has a conscious desire to protect himself, and urged on by his "self-seeking propensities" he has ransacked the "mechanism of nature" for an answer. As civilization takes form, the law of military development, as it impinges on his instinct of self-preservation, begins to operate, and a guiding principle is born which I will call the constant tactical factor. It is this : Every improvement in weapon-power (unconsciously though it may be) has aimed at lessening terror and danger on one side by increasing them on the other ; consequently every improvement in weapons has eventually been met by a counter-improvement which has rendered the improvement obsolete ; the evolutionary pendulum of weapon-power, slowly or rapidly, swinging from the offensive to the protective and back again in harmony with the speed of civil progress ; each swing in a measurable degree eliminating danger. Thus, in the days of the stone age, when progress stood almost at a standstill, weapon development was proportionately slow, and may be said to have been always up to date. To-day, conditions are diametrically reversed, civil progress being so intense that there is not only a danger but a certainty that no army can in the full sense be kept up to date. This means that in war time evolution will be extremely rapid, and consequently that the army which is mentally the better prepared to meet tactical changes, will possess an enormous advantage over all others.

At the foundations of this evolution lie will and instinct ; the one urges man to close with his enemy and destroy him, the other urges man to keep away so that he himself may not be destroyed. During war time, on account of the presence of danger, instinct at once manifests and man thinks protectively, during peace time as danger is absent he generally thinks offensively,

consequently when war breaks out he is normally indifferently equipped, and the more indifferently he is equipped, other things being equal, the longer the duration of the war.

Until some years after the opening of the nineteenth century, that is until the Industrial Revolution was beginning to penetrate the dense walls of military and naval thought, weapon evolution was slow. In fact from 1704, the date of the battle of Blenheim, to 1815, that of Waterloo, weapon-power remained much the same, though the tactical use of weapons was developed. From about 1850 onwards, as I will show in the next chapter, evolution became bewildering. Here I will only strike a comparison.

A hundred years ago the armies and navies of all civilized nations were much as they had been one hundred years before that date; fifty years later—that is at the time of the Russo-Turkish War—they are totally different, so different that one battleship of 1878 would have destroyed a whole fleet at Navarino in 1827; or a single division of the same date the entire army which took part in the siege of Silistria in 1829. To advance yet another fifty years, a present-day battleship, or a present-day division, would be almost incomprehensible to Ibrahim Pasha and General Diebitsh, were it possible to raise these men from their graves. Yet casualties in proportion to combatants has steadily decreased, the number of killed is not only fewer, but the number of died from wounds is vastly fewer, and the reason for this is that the most dangerous form of war is the primitive hand-to-hand battle, and the constant tactical factor urges man to avoid it. Further, it would appear that no rational thought regarding the future of war is impossible so long as it is governed by the law of military development and it follows the path of the constant tactical factor.

From 1850 onwards the reader will find, if he studies the history of the evolution of weapon-power, that, unconsciously as it often was, each military invention adopted is directly traceable to the influence of the

constant tactical factor. In other words each belligerent in turn has attempted to eliminate the danger threatening him, either by directly countering it or by increasing it to the detriment of his opponent. Once this is realized, a tactical *clairvoyance* can be cultivated, and mistakes which otherwise become inevitable may in the greater part be avoided. Thus, whilst in the American Civil War ironclad ships were built mainly to ram each other, from 1865 onwards, for some ten years, millions of pounds were squandered by all naval Powers in attempting to develop this idea—when, had the constant tactical factor been understood, its fallacy would have at once become apparent ; for the counter-agent to armour is the gun, and by hypothetically increasing its power, and equating this hypothesis with the limitations of armour, a fairly clear vision of future warfare might have been obtained.

Strange to relate, soldiers fell into a similar error in 1919. As in 1862-1865 the original ironclads were built to ram their like in order to free the rivers and seas for the movement of mercantile ships, so in 1916-1918 the original tanks were invented to ram the enemy's earth armour, that is to punch a hole through his defences, so that the infantry—the normal fighting troops—might attain freedom of movement. In both cases the underlying tactical idea was the direct assault. In the former, as I have just shown, it eventually proved fallacious ; and that this was unnecessary, because it was possible to elaborate a hypothesis which would have demonstrated that this must inevitably be the case. The possibilities in the use of the steam-driven naval gun rendered the assault at sea more and more unlikely ; and equally, so I am of opinion, the possibilities underlying the petrol-driven field-gun and machine-gun will eventually render the direct assault on land less and less likely—even now it is the exception and not the rule.

The crucial tactical problem has always been “ how to give blows without receiving them ” ; that is, how to equate will and instinct. The one says, “ Clinch

with danger and destroy it"; the other, "If you do, it may destroy you." Such is the vital force in weapon evolution, and no powerful weapon of war has ever been abandoned until a more powerful one was ready to replace it.

Science and War

The validity of the law of military development cannot be doubted, for the history of war shows clearly that its infringement has always resulted in inefficiency; consequently science, being the fountain-head of civil progress, is equally the fountain-head of military progress, therefore its importance to military organization and equipment cannot be exaggerated. As a matter of fact this is so obviously true that, throughout the history of war, applied science, even in the crude forms to be found in the work of blacksmiths, armourers, sword and powder makers, has always constituted the foundations of weapon-power. To this I will return in my next chapter.

Laboratories are to-day as important to armies as arsenals—even more so, because arsenals would be valueless without them. To talk of the prostitution of science to war, as many people do, is to talk nonsense; because as long as war exists science will support it. For the common folk to do so is excusable, seeing that they have common minds; but when such men as Albert Einstein,¹ Professor Soddy² and Sir Edward Thorpe³ urge that the scientist should not assist the soldier, not only do they urge something illogical, and, consequently, nonsensical, but they show themselves to be men of very limited outlook, men who, though they may be eminently skilful in rearranging the entire universe on a different system every few years, utterly fail to understand the world in which they live. Though the mechanism of nature is their playground, unlike the

¹ *The Sunday Times*, August 2, 1931.

² *Nature*, November 4, 1920.

³ *Proceedings of the British Association*, 1921.

great Kant, a profound director of thought and not merely a departmental manager in higher mathematics, etc., they are too short-sighted to see that the only possible end to war is not to deny scientific support, but to provide it full-heartedly.

When a man like Sir Edward Thorpe pronounces the use of gas in war to be "one of the most bestial episodes in the history of the Great War," and proclaims "against the continued degradation of science in . . . augmenting the horrors of war!" however well-intentioned his anathemas may be, all he is really doing is to barbarize war, by laying its evolution under interdict. Could a cessation of improvement in weapons have taken place, let us suppose at the time firearms were introduced, and these weapons were as strongly opposed in their day as lethal and vesicant gases are to-day, then armies would still be equipped with bows and arrows, pikes and battle-axes. Incidentally, Western civilization would never have crept out of its feudal chrysalis and to-day there would be no modern science—in place witch burnings and baronial forays. Progress would have stopped dead.

To endow the soldier with power to hit directly at the civil will is now, by such men as those I have named, considered an insult which cannot be tolerated, just as it once was considered an insult for the knave to gain power over the knight. As late as 1626 we find a certain Mr. Monro writing :

"It is thought that the invention of cannon was found first at Nurenberg for the ruin of man . . . how soone the trumpet did sounde, the enemy was thundered on, first with those as with showers of hailstones, so that the enemies were cruelly affrighted with them, men of valour being suddenly taken away, who before were wont to fight valliantly and long with the sword and lance, more for the honour of victory, than for any desire of shedding bloud ; but now, men are martyryzed and cut downe, at more than half a

mile of distance, by these furious and thundering engines of great cannon, that sometimes shoote fiery bullets able to burn whole cities, castles, houses, or bridges, where they chance to light, and if they happen to light within walles, or amongst a briggad of foote or horse, as they did at Leipsigh, on the grave fon [graff von] Torne his briggad, spoiled a number at once, as doubtlesse the devilish invention did within Walestine, his leaguer at this time.”¹

Monro was wrong, and to-day Einstein, Soddy and Thorpe are wrong. Gunpowder humanized sword and lance warfare, and it is quite conceivable that when the true value of gas as a weapon is grasped, men may once again fight “more for the honour of victory, than for any desire of shedding blood.”

The fact, however, remains that we cannot put the clock back. Faraday harnessed electricity, Wilbur Wright invented the first practical aeroplane, Marconi vastly improved wireless transmission, and Haber discovered how to extract nitrogen from the air. These men were not soldiers, neither were they directly employed by soldiers, yet their delvings into the mechanism of nature have changed the whole outlook of war. Why? Because peace and war are one and the same activity in two different forms, they are two conceptions of one and the same idea, for war is an isotrope of peace.

The supreme danger in war is not that the scientist will cease to help the soldier, but that the soldier will cease to understand the scientist, and, bound as he generally is to the old methods of war, will be unable to evolve new and more economical methods out of the new and more economical devices science provides him with. Nothing is more depressing than to look back upon the last War and watch general after general, through misuse and opacity of mind, throw away one invention after the other, or attempt to apply new

¹ *Military Antiquities*, Francis Grose, I, p. 408.

weapons like old ones, and consequently sacrifice tens and hundreds of thousands of lives unnecessarily. Even to-day, years after these events, the use tanks were put to by the British Higher Command is a picture so illogical that one is compelled to believe with Schiller that against stupidity the gods fight in vain. Millions of pounds worth of machines were hurled into the mud and thousands of lives sacrificed, and this 600 years after Bannockburn was fought—a battle which clearly showed that armour will not float on water.

Bloodless Warfare

As the legitimate object of war is a more perfect peace, then, supposing that we are unable to charm war away by magic, black or white, it logically follows that a legitimate object of peace is to devise less destructive forms of war. In fact this is what, unconsciously, has happened. Of gunpowder Carlyle says in *Sartor Resartus*: "This logic the Hyperborean understands," for "it makes all men alike tall. . . . Hereby, at last is the Goliath powerless and the David resistless; savage animalism is nothing, inventive spiritualism is all." The discovery of gunpowder was a triumph of mind over body, of intellect over instinct; occultly it opened a path towards peace, and consequently towards the elimination of war. Gas as a weapon will do likewise.

In my book *The Reformation of War*, published in 1923, I called gas "the weapon of the future." It is in fact a molecular bullet, and the only true new weapon discovered since the rifle bullet and the cannon ball. Tanks, aeroplanes, etc. are not weapons, they are mountings for weapons, and even a machine-gun is nothing more than a quick-firing rifle, and a torpedo—a self-propelled shell.

The idea of gas as a weapon is very old in the form of smoking out or suffocating.¹ In modern times its use

¹ A chemical attack of a particularly noxious kind is recorded by Varillus, a seventeenth-century writer: "At the ineffectual siege of

was suggested in 1812, and again by Lord Dundonald in the Crimean War. During the American Civil War, on June 10, 1864, General Pendleton, Chief of Artillery, wrote to Lieut.-Colonel Baldwin, Chief of Ordnance, Army of Northern Virginia, suggesting the use of stink shells. In his letter he says: "The question is whether the explosive can be combined with suffocating effect of certain offensive gases, or whether apart from explosion such gases may not be emitted from a continuously burning composition as to render the vicinity of each falling shell intolerable. It seems at least worth a trial." The answer he received was: "... Stink-balls, none on hand; don't keep them."¹

None were made as far as I have been able to ascertain, yet, this same year, a Mr. B. W. Richardson, considering gas warfare, went so far as to write:

"The question is, shall these things be? I do not see that humanity should revolt, for would it not be better to destroy a host in Regent's Park by making the men fall as in a mystical sleep, than to let down on them another host to break their bones, tear their limbs asunder and gouge out their entrails with three-cornered pikes; leaving a vast majority undead and writhing for hours in torments of the damned?"²

Here is a startling idea, as startling as the idea which arose out of the explosion which drove the pestle out of Friar Bacon's hand and sent it whirling up to the ceiling of his cell.

From 1915 onwards to the end of the World War gas

Carolstein in 1422, Coribut caused the bodies of his soldiers whom the besieged had killed to be thrown into the town [by means of trebuchets, a form of catapult] in addition to 2,000 cartloads of manure. A great number of the defenders fell victims to the fever which resulted from the stench, and the remainder were only saved from Death by the skill of a rich apothecary who circulated in Carolstein remedies against the poison which infected the town."—*Projectile-Throwing Engines of the Ancients*, Part IV, Sir Ralph Payne-Gallwey.

¹ *War of the Rebellion*, vol. lxix. pp. 888-889.

² *Popular Science Review*, III, 176 (1864).

was used as a weapon, and though crudely used and brutally used it proved its humanity over gunpowder. In the American Army the total number of casualties resulting from all causes was 274,217. Of these 74,779, or 27·3 per cent., were due to gas. Of the gas casualties only 1400, or 1·87 per cent., resulted in death. Of the remaining 199,438 casualties, resulting from bullets, shell fire, etc., 46,659, or 23·4 per cent., proved fatal. As regards blinding, four men were blinded in both eyes and twenty-five in one eye by gas, lethal or vesicant.¹

In spite of these figures, which speak for themselves, it was decided, in 1921, at the Washington Disarmament Conference to prohibit "the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases, *and all analogous liquids, materials or devices*. . . ." The italics are mine, and what these words really mean is that all lachrymatory and such like gases are forbidden. On November 5, 1918, foreseeing that such gases would prove invaluable in quelling civil riots and tumults without loss of life, I wrote an official Memorandum entitled: *Bloodless Means of Quelling Civil Disturbances*, which, had it been acted upon, would have resulted in the saving of hundreds of lives. In India there would have been no Jallianwalabagh massacre, in which 359 Indians were killed and 1200 wounded, and no Cawnpore massacre, in which over 1000 Hindus and Mahomedans were brutally done to death. The American and French police have for long now been equipped with gas guns and gas bombs, and have used them with great effect and little damage. In Great Britain and India the police still charge crowds and fire upon them, and yet we consider ourselves to be an intelligent and highly civilized nation.

Gas, especially in its non-lethal forms, is the ideal weapon, because its production does not detrimentally affect prosperity; it is simple to manufacture; its nature can be kept secret; it can incapacitate without killing and it does no permanent damage to property.

¹ See *The Reformation of War*, p. 110.

Chemical science introduced not only humanity but efficiency and economy into surgery, and I believe that it can do the same in war. I believe that gas as a weapon is the instrument which will humanize war, and consequently civilize it. I do not believe that it will end all suffering and destruction, or that it will abolish war any more than chloroform and prophylactics have ended human suffering or abolished amputations or surgery. But I do believe that it will mitigate the destructive propensities of war.

The immense superiority of gas as a weapon over lead and steel is that it can wound without killing, and soon, so I believe, it will be able to cause insensibility without wounding, because the constant tactical factor will thus be more completely fulfilled.

The object of war demands the imposition of will on the enemy. The imposition of will does not necessarily demand the destruction of the enemy's body, yet this has been the consistent ideal of the soldier from the earliest ages until to-day. It is a curious fact that whilst in so many qualities man has outgrown the animal stage of evolution, as regards war he still fights with his enemy, on the battlefield, as two dogs fight in the street. Yet it is still more bewildering to see those who pride themselves on being furthest removed from animals damning chemicals as weapons and persisting that, as war cannot be abolished, soldiers must continue to mutilate and slay each other with shells, rifles and bayonets.

To paralyse an army by chemical action is surely more beneficial to humanity than blowing it to pieces ; to send a city to sleep is surely preferable to bombarding it or starving it into surrender, and even to burn a man's skin with mustard gas is surely more humane than digging out his entrails with a bayonet. Yet these humane methods are not the ideals of the humanitarians ; to them, if war is to continue, then blowing to pieces, starving and mutilating are the rightful methods of war.

That gas, in spite of all prohibitions, will be used in

the next great war is a certainty, and that it will be used as a brutal lethal instrument is probable ; but that it possesses the power of being used as a humane instrument of war is its supreme virtue ; for in spite of human stupidity, little by little the human brute will discover through self-interest that it is more economical to impose his will on his enemy with the minimum of destruction in place of the maximum. The instrument will change him if he will only change the instrument, because the instrument will create a new environment. Man is very largely the reflection of his surroundings. In the early stages of his evolution, before he became a rational animal, he was influenced by his material and physical environments. Though he can never shake these off entirely, by rational thought he can modify their influences. In all his activities, with the one exception of war, he has done so. He has conquered climate and distance, disease and discomfort ; or rather, he has modified their evils, and this we call progress. In war he has not done so—he has stood still, or nearly still ; but when he does step forward intellectually, and one day he will, then the progress of war will recompense him in full.

CHAPTER X

THE CYCLES OF WAR

Man and Nature

THOUGH I believe that man is a free agent who can work out his own destiny, I nevertheless believe that his work is closely circumscribed. For example, an artist can paint any type of picture he likes, yet his work is not only circumscribed by the materials he uses, but also by the science of his art—perspective, proportion, light and shadow, those things which do not change. If he does not keep within this science, though his artistic ideas may be remarkable his art will not be of the highest order. So we see that though science does not determine his work, it predetermines the foundations upon which its perfection must rest.

With man and nature it is the same. Nature does not restrict man from making mistakes, his freedom to do so is unbounded ; he can walk on his feet, on his hands, roll along the ground or turn head over heels. Nevertheless she circumscribes him at every turn by a mysterious and hidden perfection which she will not reveal to him, but which he is perpetually obtaining glimpses of in his work and because of his errors. As it were he is the centre and she the circumference, infinite it seems to us ; his will, his thoughts, his ideas and eventually his actions radiate in innumerable directions towards her ; yet according to his object there is some one direction which *in the circumstances* is more suitable than all other directions, and this he must discover for himself. Huxley I think it was who said that given infinite time, an ape and a typewriter, this

animal unintelligently playing upon the keys would ultimately reproduce the entire works of Shakespeare. This is nature as chance, nature as a web of infinite possibilities, but unfranchised by consciousness.

In his turn man is in himself an atom of nature, a microcosm as it were within a macrocosm, possessing, one cannot but feel, though one cannot know for certain, all nature's possibilities, and besides them all the franchisement of consciousness ; also, as it were, an atom of God, a divine spark glowing in the very centre of the material sphere. The man Shakespeare is something more than chance, than an ape and a typewriter, for in him we recognize intelligence. Such is the divine hypothesis upon which the hope of mankind is based, and this hope is the lamp of the future.

To turn from this little excursion into the realms of fundamental philosophy to the subject at hand. In Book I I examined force as an ingredient of human nature ; in Book II the influence of force, in the form of war, upon civilization, and in the last chapter I attempted to outline a law of military development, and from it I deduced a principle, the constant tactical factor, which I believe to be incontrovertible—danger is the impulse of military progress, and in it lies such rational hope as we may possess that war will one day be eliminated. From this principle as my centre and with the history of war as my circumference I intend, from the radii of historical action which in the past have proceeded from the one to the other, to work out a theory.

In life it is not difficult to know what men ought to do, but it is exceedingly difficult to get them to do it. If the world were governed by an all-powerful senate of genius it might be possible to stop war by simply saying—"Wars shall cease." But in a world governed by crowd instincts, a compound of exalted ideals and mercenary desires, it is impossible thus to act ; yet the idea of the cessation of war though submerged is not obliterated ; again and again it rises to the surface of the stormy and war-swept waters called history, and reveals to us that it is still there.

We know that water will not run uphill, but suppose we did not know this, and for years, even centuries, we attempted to make it run uphill, in the end nature would win and we should win also ; for through our errors we should ultimately discover that we were attempting the impossible, that there was a law of nature which prohibited such a movement.

Now, when we set out to abolish, or eliminate, war, perhaps, so to say, we are trying to force water uphill, perhaps we are attempting something which nature interdicts. Perhaps, even, we are unconsciously seeking to destroy in place of preserve the human race ; for *Pax Perpetua* is a fitting motto for a churchyard.

In his arrogance and his self-interest man proclaims his right to live, and never more so than to-day ; yet has he such a right ? In a state of nature the answer is surely " No " ; for there is no morality, no question of good or evil in nature. In such a state he has the *might* to survive, if he can.

Man, however, possesses the right to think, because if he wills to think nothing can stop him thinking. This is his sole right, something which takes him out of a state of nature, and from this right innumerable other rights emanate. When water will not run uphill, though nature's interdict blasts his might in attempting the impossible, his reason rises above the impossible, and delving into the mechanism of nature he invents the pump. Though he has not overcome a natural law, once he has discovered it and learnt to understand it, by this law and other laws he overcomes his difficulty and solves his problem.

Surely in warfare, which is but one of man's many activities, it is much the same. In nature conflict is constant, but in history we know that it is not so—in fact in history the normal desire, if not the normal condition, of human society is peace and not war, and already man has limited war not through might but through his right to think. Should the absence of war be the most suitable condition in a given set of circumstances, this condition will one day be attained by

chance, that is by trial and error, or by reason, that is through science. Science is based on observed facts, and to the war-like facts of history I will now turn, and by extracting from them a theory will elaborate a hypothesis showing that circumstances are likely to be such that in spite of the slow process of trial and error war quite possibly is nearing its end.

The Cycles of War

In examining history the student is always confronted by a two-fold difficulty. First the capricious human element preponderates, and secondly facts and fictions are so entangled that false conclusions are easily drawn from them. History is, as it were, a universal encyclopædia in which everything can be found except truth, yet it is the only book we have to guide us, and each event is more or less a symbol of truth.

Turning to the recorded history of war, it will show that there have been two grand military cycles in Europe—the Classical and the Christian. The first began about 1100 B.C., endured in all approximately 1500 years, and ended in the *Pax Romana*. It was followed by two and a half centuries of chaos and anarchy, out of which the second grand cycle began to emerge. Each of these grand cycles passed through three tactical cycles, namely, the shock cycle, the shock and projectile cycle, and the projectile cycle. Thus we see the constant tactical factor at work. The will of man is to fight, and in a primitive society, his weapons being primitive, fighting is hand-to-hand. Then, as civilization advances, it gradually passes out of this stage until hand-to-hand fighting becomes all but unknown. Hand-to-hand fighting is represented by cavalry charging or by infantry assaulting, and projectile fighting by the elimination of both these operations and the substitution of bombardments in their place. Each of these tactical cycles passes through three stages of development, namely, germination, an indefinite period, experimental evolution, or transition, and

full growth, which is followed by a slow or speedy decline directly the next cycle enters its experimental stage.

In the Classical grand cycle the three tactical cycles are obscure and confused, but one fact is certain, shock tactics were the earliest form of war, especially so in Greece, the fountainhead of European military art. Then about the time of Alexander the Great, a change-over took place, projectile weapons finding an organized place on the battlefield. Lastly, when a commercial and industrial age was entered, and this I will examine later on, projectiles largely ousted shock weapons and warfare became more and more mechanized.

In the Christian grand cycle we find a similar tactical evolution, and though dates of initiation are always difficult to decide on, because historical periods slowly emerge one out of the other, probably the most satisfactory date to select as the birthday of the shock cycle is the middle of the seventh century. Then it was that Moslem pressure began to focus world thought on the East, and was about to draw Europe out of anarchy and consolidate her forces. To fix the end of the shock cycle is not so difficult, it ended about the middle of the fifteenth century, that is when gunpowder began to transform war. In all it lasted 800 years, the first four hundred of which, that is from its initiation to about the date of the first Crusade, constitute a period of transition.

The shock and projectile cycle definitely took form about 1450, the date of the battle of Formigny in which gunpowder played an effective part, and lasted approximately until 1850, that is roughly the date of the introduction of the muzzle-loading rifle as the infantry weapon. After this date, as can clearly be seen during the American Civil War, the first of the great rifle wars, scientific inventions, such as steamships, locomotives, the telegraph and rapidly improving weapons, began to change the nature of tactics. Its transitional period ended about the middle of the seventeenth century—the period of the Treaty of Westphalia and of the intro-

duction of the bayonet which by the opening of the next century ousted the pike.¹

Accepting these figures as sufficiently correct to speculate with, we arrive at the following conclusion : That the shock and projectile cycle was in duration half the length of the shock cycle, and that their periods of transition were in like proportion. If now the Christian grand cycle is destined to end in a period of prolonged peace, as did its Classical counterpart, and should it, and this is little more than guess-work, attain an equal length, namely, 1500 years (650 A.D. to 2150 A.D.), then the present war period has from now (1932) on a little more than 200-years to run. Accepting this figure as an hypothesis to work on, and also remembering that the shock and projectile cycle was in length half the shock cycle, then the existing projectile cycle, which began to take definite form about 1850, should last 200 years, that is to 2050, completing its transitional stage by 1950. This will leave 100 years over for a fourth and final cycle to round off the hypothetical 1500 years' total duration.

Turning back to the law of military development, and remembering that the present tendency of civil science is towards the existence of an electrically constituted universe, and that industry and civil life are becoming daily more influenced by electricity, and the many applications of this energy, it is conclusive that military organization will follow suit, and will develop what I will call, for want of a better name, the "robot" cycle. The weapon may be primarily a land one, or a sea one, or an air one ; but more likely it would seem that it will be one which can equally well operate on land, at sea and in the air. It may be chemically propelled and electrically directed, but all such possibilities are purely speculative, and the only solid fact we

¹ Treaty of Westphalia—1648. At Ypres, in 1647, daggers—*bayonnettes*—were fixed into the muzzles of muskets. These "plug-bayonets" were issued to French fusilier regiments in 1671 and to the English Royal Fusiliers in 1685. In 1687 Vauban equipped several French regiments with a socket-bayonet.

can build upon is, that as danger is unpalatable to the soldier, the soldier will as far as possible eliminate it ; which in the end means the elimination of the soldier, or rather of the bulk of soldiers. Then we shall be faced by the seeming paradox that the army which contains the fewer men is the more likely to win, because inversely the fewer the men the more perfect will be the machines. If this cycle follows, what I will call, the normal course, it will be initiated about 2050, pass through its transitional stage by 2100 and cease to be useful in 2150, when, hypothetically, the Christian grand cycle of war will come to an end, and following in the footsteps of the Classical grand cycle, a world peace will be established permanently, or for a period.

The Classical Projectile Cycle

In the remaining sections of this chapter, I intend to examine the last of the Classical and the first three of the Christian tactical cycles. In doing so I shall concentrate only on certain phases of each, namely, those from which we can deduce the most important lessons for the present and the future, and so gain a reliable background for the remaining two chapters of this book.

As regards the origins of artillery, the most important fact to note is that whilst thrusting and cutting weapons, and in some cases slings and bows, are the weapons of the field men, artillery is the weapon of the city dwellers, because these folk fear the brawn of the peasant soldier, live behind walls and are consequently imbued with a defensive spirit, and possess the wealth and the leisure wealth creates wherein to invent cunning machines. Jerusalem,¹ Tyre, Carthage and Syracuse, all wealthy cities, produced artillery in abundance. After Alexander seized the Persians' treasures, and his successors scattered their hoards of gold, we find Alexandria following suit ; and when the Romans laid hands on

¹ 2 *Chronicles*, xxvi, 15.

the wealth and trade of the East, a similar military development took place in Rome. Later on in Europe it was exactly the same. The increasing wealth of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries gave rise to the adoption of cannon in the fifteenth; and, in more recent times, the increasing wealth of the eighteenth century led to the Industrial Revolution and an enormous development of all manner of projectile-throwing weapons from thirty-inch mortars and eighteen-inch guns downwards.

The origins of artillery among the Greeks must be sought in Sicily about the year 400 B.C., when the tyrant Dionysius¹ employed *balistae* and catapults in large numbers, or in modern terms field guns and howitzers, for the first were used for low and the second for high angle fire. From Syracuse, about the middle of the fourth century B.C., these weapons were introduced into Greece, and though the Spartan Archidamus exclaimed, "O Hercules, the valour of man is at an end," they were at once adopted by that exceptionally broad-minded soldier Philip of Macedon. Alexander the Great, his son, not only made extensive use of them in his many sieges, especially that of Tyre, but employed them as true field artillery² and as ship's guns.³

The enormous hoards of gold seized by Alexander though squandered in civil war were not lost; for, as I have already shown, in a little over a generation after his death the western half of his Empire came under the control of three great dynasties, the Antigonids in Greece, the Seleucidæ in Syria and the Ptolemians in Egypt, and with them came into being a rich commercial and highly industrialized civilization known as the Hellenistic period. As civil life changed so did the nature of war, and though the records of this epoch are imperfect, we see a steady increase in the use of projectiles until battles became markedly modern in nature.

From now on we enter the epoch of the great Hellenistic cities, highly commercialized and industrialized like

¹ Diodorus, xvi, 12.

² Arrian, *Anabasis*, I, 6; iv, 4.

³ *Ibid.*, II, 23.

Alexandria, which became the London, or New York, of its day. Then gold-power was transformed into brain-power, and in these warring times brain-power turned to military mechanization.

In the hundred years which followed the death of Alexander the progress in mechanics was unrivalled for 2000 years. We still have accounts of the engines invented by Heron, 284-221 B.C., Philo, about 200 B.C. and Agesistratus, of the same date, who tells us that the artillery of his day could fire missiles up to a range of 800 yards. Dionysius, an Alexandrian, invented a *polybolos*, a machine gun which enabled a succession of arrows to be fired from a magazine.¹ And Ctesibius, another engineer of the same city, discovered a means of gearing to the bow arms of catapults pistons working in "carefully wrought cylinders" which were filled with compressed air.² At the battle of Mantinea, 207 B.C., Machanidas, the tyrant of Sparta, advanced with a large number of "carts carrying quantities of field artillery and bolts for the catapults,"³ but Philopoemen, the Achæan general, seeing that the enemy's plan was "by pouring volleys from the catapults into his flanks, to throw the ranks into confusion," brought forward his light cavalry and charged the engines.

In the Roman world a similar change set in mainly through contact with Carthage and Syracuse. At the siege of this last mentioned city, in 214 B.C., Archimedes, the greatest engineer of his age, astonished the Romans. Polybius says of him: "In certain circumstances, the genius of one man is more effective than any numbers whatever";⁴ and Plutarch writes: "all the rest of the Syracusans were no more than the body in the batteries of Archimedes, whilst he was the informing soul. All other weapons lay idle and unemployed, his were the only offensive and defensive arms of the city. . . . At length the Romans were so

¹ *Veteres Mathematici*, Thérevot, pp. 73, 74.

² Philo, iv, 78, 33.

³ Polybius, xi, ii.

⁴ *Ibid.*, viii, 5-9.

terrified that, if they saw but a rope or a beam projecting over the walls of Syracuse, they cried out that Archimedes was levelling some machine at them and turned their backs and fled."¹

These appreciations are worth considering, for it is seldom realized that in the art of war, as in all the other arts, the artist himself is the supreme factor ; further it has generally been overlooked that the next most important factor is the tools, or weapons, the artist uses. The combination of these two—the intellectual and the physical—has never failed to raise war to a high art. We see this during the campaigns of Alexander the Great, and once again during this siege of Syracuse, but with this difference : That whilst Alexander is a soldier, Archimedes is a civilian, the genius of the one manifesting through the use of weapons and of the other through their invention. The point to note here is, and we do not see it again clearly until after the Industrial Revolution, that directly projectile weapons become superior to shock weapons, more and more is the power to wage war economically influenced by the civilian inventor, by science and by industry, in place of by the soldier and his professional tactics. The result of this is, as we shall see in the next two chapters, first, that generalship is apt to fall behind inventiveness ; secondly, that fighting becomes more and more dependent upon invention and industry, until to attack these sources of military power is even more important than attacking the enemy's armies. Thus, through the improvement of weapons, is the object of battle shifted from killing soldiers and so unshielding the civil will, to killing, or terrorizing, civilians and so depriving an army of its economic as well as its moral foundations. It is a curious and unexpected development, and yet not only logical but inevitable.

To turn back now to the subject in hand : In 149 B.C., when Carthage surrendered, her citizens delivered up to the Romans 2000 catapults,² that is ten to every one thousand foot or horse soldiers in arms. From

¹ Plutarch's *Marcellus*.

² Polybius, xxxvi, 6.

then on we find a steady increase in artillery in the Roman armies, until at the opening of the Christian era every cohort was equipped with one catapult and every century with one *carroballista* (a field-piece mounted on a carriage), eleven soldiers being required to work this engine.¹ Consequently, a legion possessed an artillery train of 60 *carroballistæ* and ten catapults, that is 60 field guns and 10 howitzers, in all 70 engines. This corresponds closely to the number of guns in a modern infantry division ; but as the legion was seldom more than 6000 strong, frequently less, whilst in a modern infantry division the number of guns to infantry is about six per thousand, in the legion it was approximately double this number.

This astonishing progress from push of pikes to long distance fighting, the urge of the constant tactical factor, undoubtedly led to a deterioration of Greek and Roman morale ; not because increased weapon-power necessarily decreases the offensive spirit, but because the difficulty in moving the war engines reduced mobility, and "movement" has rightly been called "the soul of war." A still more potent influence was, and more especially so among the Greeks, that generalship did not keep pace with tactical inventions. Decadence can be traced to this cause, for the generalship which took no notice of inventions, and which used men against machines in the same way as they were used before their adoption, destroyed valour through stupidity.

The Shock Cycle

As remarkable as the growth of artillery was the increase in cavalry in the Roman armies, and this was due to the defensive policy of the later Empire, as well as to the fact that Pathians, Goths, Vandals and Huns, the enemies of Rome, employed masses of mounted troops. Under Diocletian, 243-313, cavalry rose from one-tenth to one-third of the infantry and numbered

¹ Vegetius, ii, 25.

160,000. This great mass of horse was for purposes of frontier protection withdrawn from the infantry, and in this separation may be traced the main tactical cause of the decline of Rome's military power.

The increase in cavalry continued, until by the reign of Constantine, 288-337, the Roman armies were virtually mounted forces, but all in vain. At the battle of Adrianople, 378, the Emperor Valens was overthrown by the Gothic horse, and in 535 the decisive victory of Tricameron was won over the Vandals in Africa by cavalry alone. A few years later, in the Gothic War, Belisarius found so little use for his foot soldiers that he mounted them to serve as light cavalry.

As chaos spread over the Western Empire two factors dominated the organization of armies, the one was the decay of the Roman roads, the other the increasing use of armour. The first, by eliminating the baggage wagon, demobilized infantry who could no longer maintain themselves in the field beyond a few days. The second, always costly, could be obtained only by the nobility, who denied the support of infantry and artillery were unable to seek perfection through tactics, and so attempted to gain superiority through improvement in armour. Armour now became the foundation of military power.

In 779, we find Charlemagne forbidding all merchants to export armour from his realm, and, if they were caught doing so, they were to forfeit their property. This order was again and again enforced, which shows that in spite of heavy penalties it was worth while smuggling armour out of the country so great was its demand. A few years later this same monarch forbade his nobles to possess more armour than they could provide men to wear it. Thus did the race for tactical protection by armour continue, until, in 814, we find a chronicler recording of Charlemagne and his men :

“Then appeared the iron king, crowned with his iron helm, with sleeves of iron mail on his

arms, his broad breast protected by an iron byrnie, an iron lance in his left hand, his right hand free to grasp his unconquered sword. His thighs were guarded with iron mail. . . . And his legs, like those of all his host, were protected by iron greaves. His shield was plain iron, without device or colour. And round him and before and behind him rode all his men, armed as nearly like him as they could fashion themselves ; so iron filled the field and the ways, and the sun's rays were in every quarter reflected from iron. 'Iron, iron everywhere,' cried in their dismay the terrified citizens of Pavia."¹

Though the roadless nature of Europe rendered foraging for supplies necessary, for little could be carried on pack animals, and though foraging led to pillaging, robbery, murder, destruction, and consequently barbarized war, battles, on account of the protection which armour afforded, were amazingly free from bloodshed. Thus, during the Crusades, at the battle of Hazerth, 1125, Baldwin lost 24 men whilst the Turks lost over 2,000 ; at Arsouf, 1191, amongst the Christians only one man of note was killed and 700 rank and file, whilst the enemy lost over 7,000, including 32 emirs ; at Jaffa, the same year, 2 Crusaders fell to 700 Turks. Again at the decisive battle of Tenchebrai, 1106, which gave Henry I of England the whole Duchy of Normandy, not a single English knight was slain.

The increasing prosperity of the thirteenth century led to the reintroduction of plate armour, which still further reduced casualties. Cavalry encounters became little more than wrestling matches ; thus at Tagliacozzo, 1268, Conradin's Ghibelline knights were so heavily armoured that Charles of Anjou's cavalry, after having exhausted them by repeated charges, rolled them out of their saddles by seizing them by their shoulders. And later on, at the battles of Zagonara, 1423, and Castracaro, 1467, the fighting which took

¹ Quoted from *The Art of War in the Middle Ages*, Oman.

place may be compared to that between the *Merrimac* and *Monitor* in 1862. Concerning the first of these battles, Machiavelli writes: "In the great defeat famous throughout all Italy no deaths occurred, except those of Ludovico degli Obizi, and two of his people, who having fallen from their horses were devoured in the morass." The second was even less destructive of life, for he says: "Some horses were wounded and prisoners taken, but no death occurred."

Had changes in military equipment been restricted to armour, though wars would have continued and the civil population would have suffered as severely as ever, between the knights, excepting accidents, fighting would have become bloodless, victory and defeat depending on which side could last out the longer, or, conversely, which side was first exhausted. What then was the object of such engagements? A very practical one, namely, to capture your enemy, for a captured knight always meant a heavy ransom, whilst a captured camp follower was scarcely worth the trouble of cutting his throat.¹

Throughout this entire period the one great difficulty was the provision of efficient horse armour, and once the long bow and pike were introduced this difficulty led to so many knights being dismounted that they were compelled to fight on foot. This happened during the Crusades, and again at the battle of Crécy, 1346. Of the French knights at Poitiers, 1356, we find John de Bel writing "Tous se combattoient a pyé, pour doub-tance des archers qui tuoient leurs chevaulx, comme a la bataille de Crécy." Then came gunpowder. At the battle of Formigny, 1450, three small culverins threw the English archers into disorder, and at Morat, 1476, Charles the Bold of Burgundy was defeated by the Swiss who made good use of 6,000 crude hand guns.

¹ Captured camp followers were of no economic value, and if set at liberty would in most cases have become brigands, consequently their slaughter was often a moral necessity in order to protect the peasantry.

The Shock and Projectile Cycle

During the Dark Ages, as I have already pointed out, the ruin of the Roman roads rendered it physically impossible in so wet a country as Western Europe to move large forces of infantry. Yet there was another reason why they were so seldom used : Fighting was looked upon as an aristocratic pastime, and to employ the common folk in disputes between nobles was considered a degradation of war. Not until during the Crusades when the cities of Italy began to accumulate wealth, and, later on in the thirteenth century, also those of Northern Europe, especially in the Low Countries, do we find any organized attempt made to raise efficiently equipped infantry forces. Just as wealth was the hidden source of armour, so was it of infantry equipment, for once the cities grew prosperous they were able to raise armies of their own. This we see Pavia and Milan doing as early as 1057. Later came the English and Welsh bowmen, Genoese archers and Swiss pikemen ; lastly gunpowder which could destroy these three categories of soldiers as well as knights in armour, knights in castles and refractory burghers within their walled cities. In the second half of the Hundred Years War we find that it was the crude cannon of Charles VII more so than the visions of Joan of Arc which drove the English out of France, and a little later on, in 1494, Charles VIII of France entered Rome, and in the words of Machiavelli, " He conquered Italy with a piece of chalk." Arming a tenth of his infantry with the *escopette*, a species of arquebus, and accompanied by 140 heavy cannon and a number of smaller pieces, nothing could resist him, so all he had to do was to chalk off areas on the map to which he wished to go, and there he went. Machiavelli, who lived between the years 1469-1527, laid down that infantry was the real strength of an army. Of cavalry, he writes in his *Treatise on the Art of War* : " It is right, however, to have some cavalry to support and assist infantry, but not to look upon them as the main force of an army, and

though they are highly necessary to reconnoitre, to scour roads, to make incursions and lay waste an enemy's country, to beat up their quarters, to keep them in continual alarm, and to cut off their convoys, yet in field battles, which commonly decide the fate of nations, and for which armies are chiefly designed, they are fitter to pursue an enemy that is routed and flying than anything else."

The reason for this ultra modern view must be looked for, not only in the increase in firearms, but in their combination with " hedgehogs " (squares) of pikemen ; for as we shall see later on, when the number of pikemen was reduced, as was the case during the Thirty Years War, cavalry once again assumed their old importance, and held it until the end of the Seven Years War.

The transitional period of the shock and projectile cycles threw the art of Medieval warfare into the melting pot. At the battle of Ravenna, 1512, we find artillery forging ahead, and winning a victory for the French under Gaston de Foix ; at Pavia, 1525, fifteen hundred Basque arquebusiers commanded by the Marquis de Pescaire, according to Brantôme, " most wonderfully, though cruelly and villainously discounted with much ease the power of the French cavalry." Then came Maurice of Nassau, 1567-1625, the father of modern military organization, next Gustavus Adolphus, 1594-1632, a still greater military organizer, in whose two great battles of Breitenfeld, 1631, and Lutzen, 1632, cavalry played a decisive part. In England he was emulated by Cromwell—the battle of Grantham, 1643, was decided by the sword, so was Marston Moor, 1644, and so was Naseby, 1645.

Meanwhile infantry organization was developing rapidly. Tactically the struggle was one between pike and musket. In 1687, Vauban introduced the socket bayonet, and about the same time the fusil, or flintlock, replaced the arquebus. In 1697 the English and Germans abolished the pike and six years later the French did likewise, and with the passing of this weapon the transitional period ended.

The introduction of the flintlock and bayonet consolidated tactics, just as the introduction of standing armies had regularized and systematized military organization by turning war from an adventurer's into a gentleman's profession. Fire action now became supreme, not individual and irregular as it had been, but through volleys rendered possible by the flintlock. The skirmisher disappeared, the old loose formation of files merged into a dense line three or four ranks deep, and tactical perfection consisted in forming exact lines of battle and in maintaining them. Line held line whilst the cavalry manœuvred and generally decided the action, as happened at Blenheim, in 1704, and four years later at Malplaquet.

The shock and projectile cycle now entered its period of full growth, attaining perfection under Frederick the Great, which does not mean that improvements ceased, but that they became logical in place of experimental. He drilled his infantry to mechanical perfection, deprived his cavalry of firearms and taught them to charge boot to boot. Then, after Lowositz, 1756, where his cavalry were repulsed by gun fire, and, the following year after Prague and Kolin, where his infantry met a similar fate, he turned his attention to artillery. At Rossbach and Leuthen, in 1757, we find the preparation handed over from the infantry to the gunners, cannon being used to shatter the enemy's flank and howitzers to search the terrain in rear of him. At Leuthen he massed his guns, bringing a concentrated fire to bear against the enemy's left flank, and under this bombardment he advanced his infantry to the assault, whilst his cavalry manœuvred against the rear of the Austrians. Under his able generals, Seydlitz and Zeithen, cavalry reached their zenith, not because they proved themselves to be superior to infantry and artillery, but complementary to these arms. Out of twenty-two of his battles at least fifteen were decided by cavalry, because this arm worked in close co-operation with infantry and artillery.

As always happens, once perfection is gained a

reaction sets in, and this took place during the Seven Years War, 1756-1763. This reaction took the form of breaking away from the rigid infantry idea of massed volleys and united shock, and the gradual reintroduction of bodies of light infantry who depended upon fire alone. The value of these troops lay in their power to prepare the infantry assault, and to protect it when the artillery bombardment ceased. Though Folard had advocated the use of light troops early in the eighteenth century, and Marshal Saxe had successfully tried out Folard's idea at Lauffeld, in 1747, Frederick never grasped their power, and consequently made little use of them.

During the Seven Years War light infantry took definite form. In Europe, Moratz, Trenk, Nadasty and Frankini raised bands of Croats, Pandours and other ruffians who fought as independent riflemen, and in America, Bouquet, Rogers, Howe and Montgomery did much the same. The war of the American Rebellion was largely a light infantry war, and so were the wars of the French Revolution. So formidable became the sharpshooter, that, in 1794, an A.D.C. of the Duke of York was compelled to acknowledge that "No mobbed fox was ever more put to it to make his escape than we were."

Under Napoleon perfection began to shrink. Though a supreme strategist he was not always a good tactician. Sometimes he broke his enemy's centre as at Rivoli, 1797, Marengo, 1800, Friedland, 1807, and at Ligny, 1815; but normally he preferred a flank attack. He said: "It is by turning the enemy by attacking his flank that battles are won." This he attempted at Castiglione, 1796; Ulm, 1805; Austerlitz, 1805; Jena, 1806, and Eylau, 1807. If he did not succeed in a full attack on the flank, he contented himself with an outflanking movement.

Though at first he relied upon light infantry to open the way for the assault of his infantry columns, like Frederick, he eventually turned his attention to his artillery. After the battle of Aspern, 1809, except

for howitzer tactics, he grasped the full meaning of Frederick's system, and increased his guns from 2 to 3 per thousand infantry. He also created a central artillery reserve, and allotted a reserve artillery to each *corps d'armée*. After Wagram, 1809, "It is the number of pieces rather than that of battalions which henceforth serves as the measure of the relative strength of armies." He said: "The better the infantry, the more one must husband it and support it with good batteries. . . . The invention of powder has changed the nature of war; missile weapons are now become the principal ones: it is by fire and not by shock that battles are decided to-day. . . . The power of infantry lies in its fire. In siege warfare, as in the open field, it is the gun which plays the chief part; it has effected a complete revolution. *It is with artillery that war is made.*"

Yet Fate must have it otherwise, for once he decided that the gun was the decisive weapon, he was confronted by a general—Wellington—who proved, in a special case, that it was not.

The method adopted by the Duke was simplicity itself. He selected a covered position behind which his main force of infantry was deployed, and in front of it he extended a line of skirmishers trained on the system taught by Sir John Moore, in 1803-1805, at his Light Infantry Camp at Shorncliffe. The French advanced in columns covered by skirmishers, and were met by rifle, musket and artillery fire and severely mauled. When they reached their objective, the English rose from behind their cover, fired a volley, rushed forward lapping round the columns and charging them in front and both flanks. The battle of Busaco, 1810, is probably the most perfect example of these tactics. Again they were successfully applied at Albuera, 1811, and Salamanca, 1812, and finally at Waterloo, 1815.

The amazing thing is that had Napoleon, like Frederick, only grasped the power of the howitzer, he could have defeated Wellington and his generals every time; for literally he could have blown the English

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out of their covered positions by high angle fire. It is one of the enigmas of tactical history that with all his genius he did not see this very simple solution, as old as the battle of Hastings and beyond.

The Projectile Cycle

The supreme tactical lesson of the Napoleonic Wars was that the projectile in its three forms of musket balls, cannon balls and grape-shot, had become the superior weapon, consequently, to resist the shock was an easier operation than pressing it home. In the peace which followed these wars this lesson with many another was lost sight of, and no sooner had the Emperor been incarcerated in St. Helena than military thought fell into a coma. Artillery tactics were neglected, the infantry of the line were merged into the light infantry, and though their form was in part assumed their idea was not adopted ; whilst cavalry, which as a shock arm had lost much of its value, was maintained for shock purposes only. Nevertheless, in spite of the men of the rigid conventional military school, the Industrial Revolution swept on. Invention followed invention, and amongst these were two of supreme tactical importance, namely, the percussion cap, invented in 1814, and the cylindro-conoidal bullet, invented ten years later.

The rifle had been long known, but hitherto all rifles and muskets had been fired by a flint and steel, and in rainy weather frequently misfired. The percussion cap signed the death warrant of the cavalry charge, and the conoidal bullet revolutionized tactics. In 1839, a percussion musket was issued to the British infantry, and in 1851 they were equipped with the Minié rifle, a weapon with an effective range of 1000 yards. In 1815, cavalry, artillery and infantry were in close contact, and operated by the general-in-chief as easily as a company is to-day. The guns were frequently placed in front of the infantry, and the cavalry close behind them. All this was changed by the rifle. The cavalry can no longer attack infantry unless

they are completely broken. The guns are forced to retire well in rear of the infantry, and as the range of the rifle is increased so is the distance between the guns and the infantry they are supporting. None of these things were seen at the time, and, in England, General Sir William Napier went so far as to oppose the introduction of the rifle, as he considered that it would destroy the assault spirit by turning infantry into "long range assassins."

In the middle of the century the guns once again began to thunder, and the battle of Temesvar,¹ in 1849, was but a repetition of Ocaña² in 1809, for artillery decided both these battles. Then, in 1854, the Crimean War was declared, which through force of circumstances was mainly an artillery war, a war of mud and trenches. Next followed Napoleon III's campaign in Italy against Austria in 1859, in which it was relearned that massed artillery fire is required from the very opening of a battle. Lastly came the American Civil War of 1861-1865.

This war may be looked upon not only as the first of the great rifle wars, for the Minié rifle dominated its tactics, but the first of the modern wars; for though Federals and Confederates started from a tactical zero line, before the war ended science and industry dominated it. Not only did railways, steamships and the recently invented electric telegraph play leading parts, but the following weapons were used: magazine rifles, revolvers, a crude machine gun, torpedoes, land mines, armoured battleships, armoured trains, an embryonic submarine and grenades, as well as balloons and wire entanglements, and besides these noxious gases and flame projectors were suggested. Its leading tactical characteristic was, however, the predominance of the rifle in the defence. This fact caused the war from 1862 onwards to take on the form of an entrenched war, and against trenches held by rifles seven out of

¹ Hungarian Rising, 1849.

² Fought during the Peninsular War in Spain.

every eight assaults failed. Cavalry as an assaulting arm proved useless except against cavalry, and the bayonet, the weapon of the shock, was abruptly dethroned by the bullet; as to this there can be no doubt.¹ Surgeon-Major Albert G. Hart says: "I think half a dozen would include all the wounds of this nature [bayonet wounds] that I ever dressed."² This statement is corroborated by Heros von Borcke, chief of staff to General J. E. B. Stuart; he writes: "These accounts of bayonet-fights are current after every engagement, and are frequently embodied in subsequent 'histories,' so called; but as far as my experience goes, recalling all the battles in which I have borne a part, bayonet-fights rarely if ever occur, and exist only in the imagination."² The bayonet dead, the epoch of the shock expired and the projectile cycle passed out of its stage of germination.

Ever ignorant of war, in the next conflict, that between Prussia and Austria, in 1866, the professional soldier rediscovered again a host of well-worn tactical truths. In 1859, the Austrian tactics had been defensive, now they were offensive, and at Custozza they defeated the Italians under La Marmora who showed no initiative. In Bohemia it was otherwise, for the Austrian mass attacks, almost unprotected by skirmishers, were decimated by the Prussian rifle—the needle-gun. In their turn the Prussians had studied the French infantry tactics of 1859, but had overlooked their artillery tactics. They held the bulk of their artillery in reserve for the final act of decision. Thus at Trautenau and Nachod, both fought on June 27, the infantry were almost without artillery support, and the same thing happened at Skalitz the next day. After this battle the Prussians suddenly realized the value of artillery, and at Königgrätz guns in place of being held in reserve for some problematical decision were brought forward and the battle won.

¹ *Papers of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts*, xiii, 265.

² *Memoirs of the Confederate War for Independence*, p. 63.

In 1870, the Prussians possessed the superior gun and the French the superior rifle. The French, having watched the failure of the Austrian offensives in 1866, based their tactics on the defensive, and so Moltke was compelled to attack. At Spicheren, August 6, the Prussian tactics were methodical, reinforcements coming forward gradually. At Gravelotte, August 18, the battle was one of manœuvre prepared by an overwhelming artillery fire. Sedan, September 1, was essentially an artillery battle. In all the battles of this war, whenever the infantry fought in successive efforts, and were predominantly employed, the result was "the complete dissolution of the body of troops engaged, divisions as well as corps, and extraordinary losses."

To all who possessed the slightest tactical perception it was apparent that the leading lesson of this war was: That artillery had definitely become the backbone of the fight. Other lessons were: That in certain circumstances the defender can be so completely broken by gun fire that the infantry attack can be dispensed with; that infantry armed with the breech-loading rifle need pay no longer any attention to cavalry; that to initiate an attack, all the artillery must be brought into line as soon as possible, and must not only crush the enemy's artillery but prepare the infantry advance by a lengthy bombardment. Yet, in spite of this, as the war showed, fronts had become inviolable, for, throughout the war, neither the French nor the Germans succeeded in taking a single position by a frontal attack. The infantry breech-loading rifle phalanx was unbreakable, and though cavalry could still turn it, they were incapable of attacking it in flank or rear.

In 1870-1871 the French lost battle after battle, yet they came out of the war as oblivious to its lessons as did Frederick's mule after its tenth campaign. From 1875 to 1900 the French regulations maintained the complex system of firing line, supports, local reserves, and reserves in echelon. The infantry regulations do not even mention artillery, which is supposed to have

completed its task by the time the infantry attack is launched. The power of fire is recognized, and in order to develop it to the full, about 1895, whole battalions were moved forward in shoulder to shoulder single rank and were called "skirmishing lines"! Behind these walls of rifle fire "decisive attacks" were to be launched forward by brigades and divisions in mass! In an official report written in 1875 we read: "Troops massed in column, or in line in close order, can no longer manœuvre, fight, or even remain in position under fire." Twenty years later this lesson having been forgotten, the Regulations extol dense formations, not for marching and manœuvring only, but for the attack itself. *Troupes de choc* and *masse de manœuvre* and such like meta-tactical terms were invented. It was considered that well led troops *must* of their very nature overcome all obstacles. A veritable spell fell not only upon the army in France but upon all the armies of Europe.

The war in South Africa, 1899-1902, somewhat dispelled this hallucination. Artillery action was negligible, and infantry formations, which at first were dense, were thinned out into a line of men at ten to fifty paces between individuals. To command such a line was impossible. To those who could read tactics aright, the outstanding lesson was the power of the magazine rifle on the defensive. At Modder River, 1899, the British extended 3,000 men on a front of 7,000 yards; at Colenso, 1899, 4,500 on a front of 13,000 yards, and at Magersfontein, 1899, 5,000 on a similar frontage. Thin though these fronts were, they could not be pierced. Again, as had been learned in 1870, frontal attacks against even weakly held positions were no longer possible. The war ended through the gradual attrition of the Boers.

The Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905, did more than confirm the lessons of the South African War, for it demonstrated clearly the uselessness of the frontal attack, the power of the rifle and machine-gun on the defensive, and that, as Napoleon had said a hundred

years earlier, "it is with artillery that war is made."

This war is remarkable in that to-day we can see in it a small edition of the World War of ten years later. The machine-gun when efficiently handled by trained men added enormously to the defence. The artillery was driven further and further back by the bullet, until the gunners were compelled to seek cover by ground and cease firing over the gun sights. Trenches sprang up everywhere, not a single battlefield remained unentrenched, and whenever possible these trenches were protected by wire entanglements. Frontal attacks, except as holding operations, were out of the question, and at each great battle, and notably so at the Yalu, 1904, Liao-Yang, 1905, and Mukden, 1905, it was a Japanese threat of envelopment carried out by infantry and artillery, since cavalry had lost all offensive power, which compelled the Russians to retire.

The main lesson, however, was one which had been steadily maturing since Frederick massed his guns at Leuthen, it was the ever-growing power of artillery. Major J. M. Home of the British Army, attached to the Russian Army, saw this clearly ; in one of his official reports may be read the following :

"The great impression made on my mind by all I saw is that artillery is now the decisive arm and that all other arms are auxiliary to it. The importance of artillery cannot be too strongly insisted upon, for, other things being equal, the side which has the best artillery will always win. . . . So strongly am I convinced of the immense importance of artillery that it seems almost a question for deliberate consideration whether artillery should not be largely increased even at the expense of the other arms. . . . With the extraordinary development of artillery it begins to appear as though infantry fire action cannot usefully be employed at ranges beyond 600 yards, as beyond that distance the hostile guns

ought to be able to prevent infantry from using their rifles."¹

The war in Manchuria was brought to an end in 1905 not through tactical or strategical action, but by revolution and attrition. Both sides were virtually worn out, and Russia was threatened by rebellion and disaster. An ominous ending and one not to be overlooked.

¹ *Reports from British Officers attached to the Japanese and Russian Forces in the Field* (The Russo-Japanese War), iii, pp. 209-210.

CHAPTER XI

THE RESTRICTION OF WAR

Retrospect—400 to 1900 A.D.

BEFORE I examine the development of the projectile cycle further, as I intend to do in this chapter, I think it will assist the student of war if here I pause for a moment and summarize the tendencies which so far have restricted war, or certain forms of war.

Anarchy is abhorrent to man, because anarchy is the antithesis of the social order. A society may be peaceful or warlike, but it cannot remain a co-operative body if it is anarchic, for anarchy splits it up and disintegrates it. Such was the condition of the greater part of Western Europe on the dissolution of the Roman Empire. Then followed a period of reconstruction in which war was the implement of order, however imperfect this order may now seem. The few triumphed over the many, the strong over the weak, but above all the rich over the poor, because they could afford armour and could build strongholds. Feudalism was founded on castles and armour, the knight was invulnerable to the peasant's dung fork, or scythe, and each castle was the capital city of a tiny peasant nation. War was thus restricted, the public being largely excluded from taking part in it ; it became the private affair of earls, counts and barons, who, though constantly at war between themselves, did with the Church establish a form of order out of which gradually emerged a not altogether despicable civilization—the Medieval Age.

Gunpowder, as I have shown, first restricted and then

eliminated the feudal order, it abolished private wars, consolidated kingdoms, policed them, and with the merchant led to the emergence of another order and form of civilization—the Modern Age—a not altogether despicable one either.

Thus far, during this period which is still with us, every tactical invention has restricted an old form of war and given birth to a new form. Governed as they all have been by the constant tactical factor, a steady progress from shock to projectile has resulted, that is from a natural to a purely artificial method of fighting ; for weapon improvement has eliminated the hand-to-hand combat altogether.

The tussle between the pike, a primitive weapon, and the musket, a scientific weapon, led to the introduction of the bayonet, which not only modified the pike idea of hand-to-hand fighting, but by endowing every musketeer with moderate power to withstand cavalry detrimentally affected this shock arm and so began to undermine its power. Through the combination of bayonet and musket tactics were not only consolidated but war was rendered a little less barbarous.

The closer combination between artillery, cavalry and infantry, which reached its apex under Frederick the Great, made armies more professional and so separated them from the people. This state of perfection, in nature anti-democratic, was rapidly undermined, at first almost imperceptibly so by the reintroduction of bands of irregulars, non-professional troops, and then by the unprofessional hordes of voltigeurs, tirailleurs and chasseurs of the French Revolution. The result was the rapid replacement of purely professional armies by conscript armies, which carried with it the passing of military power from the kings to the people. This in its turn restricted and ultimately eliminated dynastic wars. Wars henceforth were between nations, consequently war was placed on a broader footing if a less honourable one.

The next restriction, as I have shown, was due to a series of inventions. The percussion cap virtually

eliminated the cavalry charge, and the cylindro-conoidal bullet the infantry assault. Thus these two simple improvements by rendering useless lance, sword and bayonet, went a long way to civilize warfare. This may seem an unfounded inference, seeing how sanguinary were many of the wars of this date, but an enquiry into their history will show that excessive bloodshed was caused not because the new weapons were more barbarous than the old, but because generals persisted in using them as they had used the old. It was the mind of the tactician far more so than the nature of his weapons in which barbarism is to be sought.

This misuse of weapons, particularly the rifle, at once reacted on the morale of the soldier, and to protect himself against the bullet he sought protection through earth "armour." This we see plainly during the American Civil War, and equally so in the Russo-Japanese War, when frontal attack becomes definitely unprofitable. Though, on the battlefield, this fact was patent to all, directly peace was declared the soldier refused to accept it. Had he done so he would have eliminated the frontal attack from his peace training, instead he based the whole of his training upon it, continuing to hypnotize himself on the bayonet's point.

As he refused to learn the simplest and most obvious lessons in the sternest of stern schools, so also did the statesman refuse to learn that though during peace time military power was still a sharp diplomatic instrument, in war time it had become blunt beyond belief. That with it an enemy's army could only be slowly ground to pieces, and that this process of fighting was as destructive to the grinder as to the ground. Only one man of note, as far as I have been able to discover, took the trouble to examine war scientifically; he was neither a soldier nor a statesman, but a Banker, M. Bloch of Warsaw, who, in 1897, that is two years before the outbreak of the South African War, and seven before the Russo-Japanese, wrote an elaborate treatise on war entitled *The War of the Future*, in which

he made the following remarkable prophecy as regards the next great war in Europe :

"At first there will be increased slaughter—increased slaughter on so terrible a scale as to render it impossible to get troops to push the battle to a decisive issue. They will try to, thinking that they are fighting under the old conditions, and they will learn such a lesson that they will abandon the attempt forever. Then, instead of a war fought out to the bitter end in a series of decisive battles, we shall have as a substitute a long period of continually increasing strain upon the resources of the combatants. The war, instead of being a hand-to-hand contest in which the combatants measure their physical and moral superiority, will become a kind of stalemate, in which, neither army being able to get at the other, both armies will be maintained in opposition to each other, threatening each other, but never being able to deliver a final and decisive attack. . . . That is the future of war—not fighting, but famine, not the slaying of men, but the bankruptcy of nations and the break up of the whole social organization. . . . Everybody will be entrenched in the next war. It will be a great war of entrenchments. The spade will be as indispensable to a soldier as his rifle. . . . All wars will of necessity partake of the character of siege operations. . . . Your soldiers may fight as they please ; the ultimate decision is in the hands of *famine*. . . . Unless you have a supreme navy, it is not worth having one at all, and a navy that is not supreme is only a hostage in the hands of the Power whose fleet is supreme." ¹

The difference between M. Bloch's outlook and that of the soldiers and the statesmen who followed the soldiers was this : His views were unprejudiced, and being a civilian no self-interest stood in his way ; he

¹ *Is War Impossible?* (English translation, 1899), pp. xvi-lvi.

examined war like a surgeon carrying out a *post-mortem* examination—his outlook was scientific. Theirs was traditional and democratic, quantity so easy to calculate replaced quality which is always so difficult to gauge. Two multiplied by two makes four, four by four—sixteen, therefore four men were more powerful than two men, and sixteen four times as powerful as four. Thus, theoretically, the art of war was reduced to an exceedingly simple multiplication table; all that the sixteen men, or the 1,600,000 men, had to do was to cultivate a fighting spirit and advance on the enemy's four men, or 400,000 men, and the battle must be won—it was a mathematical certainty!

There was one flaw in this argument—an army is not a machine, and though the nineteenth-century outlook on the universe was a mechanical one, man is not mechanical, he is human, he has his limitations, of which one is that he fears danger; another, that one man, according to his abilities, can control only a certain number of men, because his power to control, like all his other powers, is limited, it is not infinite. Such were the differences between Bloch, universally regarded as a pacifist crank, and the great general staffs as they sat in their War Offices with wet towels wound round their heads solving the problems of the next war.

Prospect—1900 to 1914 A.D.

"Human tonnage," such was the political and military battle-cry which echoed round the world as the twentieth century emerged from out of the nineteenth. It was the apotheosis of materialism, of gross numbers and of democracy. Agitation to add to the franchise increased and soon grew violent. In Great Britain, placations were, in 1909, thrown to the mob by Mr. Lloyd George in his "People's Budget." Electorates were bribed and hoodwinked by peace platitudes, whilst the wealthy classes were stigmatized as "idlers and brigands." Soldiers demanded an increase in

their muster rolls, Lord Roberts urging his countrymen to adopt conscription, and everywhere was there a call for man-power and more man-power. Democracy was made absolute, and in its footsteps war followed as it must, for armies and navies, like obedient hounds, keep well to heel of their political masters.

In Chapter IX, I showed how Clausewitz, a general of the agricultural period of war, hypnotized soldiers with his theory of absolute warfare, they in their turn hypnotized the politicians. Of this system Captain B. H. Liddell Hart in an illuminating lecture recently said :

“In advocating the principle of unlimited violence, Clausewitz asserted that ‘he who uses force unsparingly and regardless of bloodshed must gain his object, if his adversary does not do the like,’ and implied that limitation was due to ‘a feeling of humanity, the worst of all errors.’ It is curious that he here failed to consider that it might be due to political acumen based on wise self-interest. He ascribed the victories of the French Revolution to the fact that it ‘had thrown the whole weight of the people and all its forces into the scale.’ Foch in turn ascribed the defeat of France in 1870 to its neglect of the theory ‘of absolute war which Napoleon taught Europe.’ ‘To a people in arms, organised for conquest, invasion, a fight to a finish,’ France had opposed an army that did not embrace its whole manhood and an idea of war based on limited, or ‘diplomatic’ objects. In the eyes of Foch, as of Europe, the war of 1870 established Clausewitz’s theory beyond doubt.

“But did it? Has there ever been such a thing as absolute war since nations ceased to exterminate or enslave the defeated? XIXth century Europe had passed beyond the Mongol stage. If the term ‘absolute war’ has any meaning it is that of a fight until the capacity of one side for further

resistance is exhausted. In practice this may well mean that its conqueror is on the verge of exhaustion, too weak to reap the harvest of his victory. In other words, absolute war is a war in which the conductor does not know when to stop. It implies that the end is pursued regardless of what lies beyond. The conductor allows the fighting instinct to usurp control of his reason.”¹

Seldom has the theory of war, as held by European nations at the opening of the present century, been more clearly expressed. As democracy, in the form of one man one vote, was the final expression of the French Revolution, so was that of the nation in arms, one man one musket, the military expression of this same upheaval. Both, in the year 1900, were some fifty years out of date, for since 1850, as I have shown, the structure of Western civilization had completely changed. Hypnotised by an archaic arcadian theory, walking in a trance, the lessons of the wars in South Africa and Manchuria were entirely lost on the General Staffs of European armies. The enormous power of modern weapons on the defensive was overlooked. A new school, the Moral School of War, rose in the ascendant. In France Foch was its high prophet and Colonel de Grandmaison its fervent apostle. De Grandmaison's theory of war was simplicity itself; it was: “A man seized by the throat and who is occupied in guarding himself cannot attack you in flank or rear.” Therefore rush upon your enemy with all forces united and overwhelm him; or in his own words: “*Frapper fort, frapper tous ensemble.*”

The French *Conduite des Grandes Unités* of 1913 was based on this doctrine. It was pointed out that all past French disasters had been due to the defensive! That after the South African War the theory of the inviolability of fronts had been propounded, and had been given the lie direct in the Russo-Japanese War! That all could be overthrown by the offensive! That

¹ *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, August 1931, pp. 489-490.

the enemy's position must be taken with the bayonet ! That when once the battle is launched it must be pushed forward regardless of cost to the last man !

What a nightmare, what a Medusa head to gaze upon, and yet this is how the French, that "logical" people, saw the approaching Armageddon. I would ask the reader to compare the following words with those written by M. Bloch in 1897 :

"The war will be short and one of rapid movements, where manœuvre will play the predominant part ; it will be a war of movement. The battle will be primarily a struggle between two infantries, where victory will rest with the large battalions ; the army must be an army of personnel and not of materiel. The artillery will only be an accessory arm, and with only one task—to support the infantry attack. For this task it will only require a limited range, and its first quality must be its rapidity of fire, to admit of it engaging the manifold and transitory targets which the infantry will disclose to it. The obstacles which one will meet in the war of movement will be of little importance ; field artillery will have sufficient power to attack them. In order to follow as closely as possible the infantry to be supported, the equipment must be light, handy, and easy to manœuvre. The necessity for heavy artillery will seldom make itself felt ; at all events it will be wise to have a few such batteries, but these batteries must remain relatively light in order to retain sufficient mobility, which precludes the employment of heavy calibres and powerful equipments. A battery of four 75 mm. guns develops absolute efficiency on a front of 200 metres ; it is consequently unnecessary to superimpose the fire of several batteries. It will serve no useful purpose to encumber oneself with an over-numerous artillery, and it will suffice to calculate the numbers of batteries that should be allotted to the organi-

zation of formations on their normal front of attack."¹

The doctrine laid down in the German Training Manuals was almost identical to that in the French. Cavalry was to be used in mass : " No squadron should wait till it is attacked ; it should always attack first." " Artillery should enter into action almost like one blow, in masses." " The infantry of the main body should simultaneously make a united attack," and again : " The infantry should cultivate its natural propensity for the offensive. All its actions must be dominated by this one thought : *Forward, upon the enemy cost what it may.*"

Such was the frenzy which smote French and German tactics. The art of war was to be replaced by a dog-fight, each side was to spring at its antagonist's throat, and shake him to pieces. The whole process was mass insanity.

It was mad because the perspective of war had utterly changed and soldiers had not changed their mental optics. There was no idea that the shock cycle had long since vanished, that sword, lance and bayonet were weapons of the past, that on the battlefield cavalry were not an asset but an encumbrance ; that throughout history, and particularly modern history, infantry had seldom by themselves won a decisive battle, and that the tactical age in which they lived was an age of projectiles—of bullets and of shells. Even as long ago as May 18, 1864, during the American Civil War, Colonel Theodore Lyman had written :

" I had taken part in two great battles, and heard the bullets whistle both days, and yet I had *scarcely seen a Rebel* save killed, wounded, or prisoners ! I remember how even line officers, who were at the battle of Chancellorsville, said : ' Why, we never saw any Rebels where we were ; only smoke and bushes, and lots of our men

¹ *L'Artillerie*, General Herr, pp. 4, 5.

tumbling about,' and now I appreciate this most fully. The great art is to *conceal* men; for the moment they show, *bang, bang*, go a dozen cannon, the artillerists only too pleased to get a fair mark. Your typical 'great white plain,' with long lines advancing and manœuvring, led on by generals in cocked hats and by bands of music, exist not for us. Here it is, as I said: 'Left face—prime—forward!'—and then *wrang, wr-r-rang*, for three or four hours, or for all day, and the poor, bleeding, wounded streaming to the rear. That is a great battle in America."¹

Again he wrote on August 25, 1864: "Put a man in a hole and a good battery on a hill behind him, and he will beat off three times his number, even if he is not a very good soldier."² Of wire entanglements, which first appeared during this war, General Weitzel says on May 22, 1864: "The other seven regiments of my line did not move until after they had twice repulsed the enemy with terrible slaughter,—he being piled in heaps over the telegraph wire . . .", and General Farrar Smith adds: "that the enemy in falling over the telegraph wire were slaughtered like partridges."³

Step a little nearer to date. Of the massacre of the Prussian Guard, at the battle of St. Privat, 1870, the Duke of Württemberg says:

"During the action at St. Marie aux Chênes, Prince Hohenlohe, commanding the Artillery of the Guard, had collected 84 guns opposite St. Privat, and cannonaded the French position with great effect, at first at 2,640 paces, and afterwards at 2,000 paces. *About five o'clock in the afternoon the Commander of the Guard considered the enemy to be sufficiently shaken for him to risk an assault across the open and gently ascending ground. . . .*

"The effect of the enemy's fire, even at a dis-

¹ Meade's *Headquarters*, p. 101.

² *Ibid.*, p. 224.

³ *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, iv, p. 212.

tance of more than 1,500 paces, was so murderous that, according to the accounts received, nearly 6,000 men fell in 10 minutes, and the advance had to be immediately discontinued.”¹

Step nearer still, this time up to the Russo-Japanese War :

“ At Shen-tan-pu the enemy made no less than five determined attacks against our entrenchments and its machine-gun, and were repulsed each time. The machine-gun did great execution, and we have heard—but this is not yet verified—that there were a thousand dead Russians left before it. At Li-ta-jen-tun the enemy could make no headway against our machine-guns, and was beaten back each time directly he tried to advance.”²

Such are a few important facts drawn from forty years of modern warfare—entrenchments, wire entanglements, rifle and machine-gun bullets, and all were hocus-pocussed away by the General Staffs between 1904 and 1914 in their theory of the offensive.

The controlling factor was, however, neither “famine” nor “the unlimited offensive,” it was the Industrial Revolution, and it mattered not what was said or done by the soldier during peace time, in war the military forces of this revolution would break their bonds. Soldiers, blinded as they were, could not see this ; they could not see that science and industry were the controlling forces in the approaching war. They talked of morale, but forgot fear ; they advocated offensive action but neglected protective power. They studied history not to discover truth but to prove their dogmas. They could not see that since cavalry had been emasculated by the bullet, tactics as an art had been thrown out of gear, and had retrogressed to the

¹ *The System of Attack of the Prussian Infantry*, quoted in *A Précis of Modern Tactics*, Major R. Home, p. 71.

² *Reports from British Officers attached to the Japanese and Russian Forces in the Field*, ii, p. 56.

phalangial order. Further, they were oblivious of the fact that when phalanx met phalanx there would be no assault—for the assault was as dead as the charge. To hit at the decisive point, the enemy's rear, had become so difficult as to be practically impossible. The act of annihilation had vanished, the act of decision had vanished, all that was left of the old-fashioned battle was the acts of contact, of approach, and of demoralization. Therefore the war must be a war of attrition, of maximum slaughter and minimum profit ; therefore M. Bloch was right.

The War of Unseen Dimensions

"Adown titanic glooms of chasméd fears" slipt the Western world in August, 1914, to crash into a war of unseen dimensions, in which soldiers, sailors and air-men, statesmen, politicians and the general public were all one and equal in ignorance, fumbling with the problems of war like a small child with a new box of tricks.

After a few weeks of *real* warfare, the *offensive à outrance*, that high gospel of the pre-war manuals, was reduced to a wallowing defensive among mud holes and barbed wire. Armies, through their lack of foresight, were reduced to the position of human cattle. They browsed behind their fences and on occasion snorted and bellowed at each other.

The one problem which now confronted them was how to re-establish movement, for until one or both sides could move, there was no possibility of a decision by arms, and famine alone must become the arbiter of victory. Many recommended this course: A Great Wall of China to run from Belgium through France, Italy, Serbia, Asia Minor, Russia to the Baltic. A great wall to keep the barbarians within its confines, until they tightened their belts till they could tighten them no more, and amongst the howls and execrations of starving millions howled for peace.

Yet could the world support such a siege? Would

not the crack of doom swallow up besieger and besieged alike in the utter destruction which such an operation demanded? So above these whistling fears rose the shout for shells and more shells. Shells, projectiles and bullets by the hundreds of millions were to blast a road to Paris, to Moscow, to Berlin. A veritable blood and iron lust swept over the nations of Europe. And behind it, blocking the roads and absorbing more shipping and railway freightage than any other arm, stood masses of cavalry, with sword and lance, waiting for the ever expected break-through.

In 1863, Confederate Morgan had shouted out: "Here, boys, are those fellows coming again with their sabres; give it to them," and the saddles were emptied. In 1866, 56,000 cavalry took the field and could not even charge the broken Austrians at Königsgrätz. In 1870, 96,000 took the field, and one successful charge at great cost was actually effected. In 1914, the British cavalry and yeomanry numbered 42,000, by 1916, when trench warfare was at its height, they numbered 135,000, and even at the end of the war—74,000. In 1914, there were assembled on all fronts over 1,000,000 horsemen, an inundation of cavalry never before seen in history, not even in the days of Scythians, Parthians and Mongols. In Russia, the original 756 squadrons were raised to 1,277, an equivalent of 54 cavalry divisions,¹ without counting numerous corps and divisional cavalry allotted to infantry formations. So congested did the Russian railways become with the transport of forage, that in the end it was found impossible to feed the troops. This was one of the main military causes which led to the revolution. It was a war of many dimensions, for it was a war of many epochs and centuries.

The enormous demands made for all types of munitions of war brought into a clear light those economic foundations which in peace time had lain too deep to be noticed much by soldiers. So visible did these

¹ *With the Russian Army, 1914-1917*, Major-General Sir Alfred Knox, ii, p. 539.

foundations become, that it was not long before the contending General Staffs realized on the one side that the siege must be rendered absolute and on the other that it must be broken. The Allied Powers tightened their blockade, and Germany replied by launching on the high seas an unrestricted submarine campaign. Thus the war was carried into the economic vitals of the world, and a general enteric fever resulted. In this economic duel Germany suddenly emerged as the most destructive naval power in history. Lord Jellicoe says, in his book, *The Crisis of the Naval War*, that the submarine campaign was "The gravest peril which ever threatened the population of this country, as well as of the whole Empire." Fortunately for Great Britain Germany possessed only 28 submarines in 1914; yet, in spite of her unpreparedness for this type of warfare, between January 1915 and October 1918 she built on an average 6.5 a month, with the result that, according to Admiral von Scheer, between February 1917 and October 1918, 13,914,500 tons of shipping were sunk.

The underlying factor throughout the whole of this period was, that as the fighting forces are maintained by the country to which they belong, they can, under modern conditions, far more effectively be attacked indirectly by a direct attack on the nation than ever was possible in the past. With the introduction of steam-power as a world motive force, we see introduced simultaneously a physical world contraction and an intellectual world expansion. Whilst in the year 1800, the nervous system of a civilized nation was of a low and ganglionic order, by 1900 it had become highly sensitive and centralized, in fact, so much so that every civilized nation offered to its enemies an extensive moral target, which, if attacked, might lead to a complete paralyzation of the national will. The only outstanding difficulty in this attack was that the traditional weapons of war were not suited to operate directly against this target.

In traditional warfare, it was the rule that armies

attacked armies and not non-combatants. If this tradition were strictly adhered to, then the demoralization of the enemy could only be effected by the destruction of the enemy's army and fleet. This process proved a most bloody one, and adherence to it resulted in appalling slaughter. It should here be remembered that the less destructive a war is the more prosperous and contented will the peace be which follows it. For example, if during the recent war Germany could have been forced to disband her army and scrap her navy by a sudden and enormous loss of national morale, which entailed little bloodshed and small damage to her industries, would not the world to-day be a more prosperous and contented habitation than it is? There can be no two answers to this question, even if in the process a few thousands of German women and children were killed.

Air power offered the opportunity of striking direct at the civil will ; it opened a new dimension of war, at least new in modern times, by transferring danger from the soldier to the people, and though the war did not last long enough to put this form of attack into full force, it certainly proved its effectiveness.

As it cannot be less moral to bomb a town than to bombard it, does the immorality of an aeroplane attack lie in the fact that whilst in a bombardment the slaughter of women and children is but an unfortunate incident, in an air attack on a town the terrorization of its civil inhabitants becomes the main object? I believe that this is the popular conception, simply because the people have not yet grasped the fact that when nations go to war the entire population of each nation concerned is ranged against the other, and that the solidarity of their fighting forces is founded on the civil will. As long ago as 1915, Mr. Lanchester wrote :

“ It is futile to attempt to disguise the self-evident fact that a serious attack on the capital city of an enemy, containing in its heart the administrative centres both of the army and navy, in addition to

the headquarters of his Government, cannot be regarded as other than as a legitimate act of war. No international agreement or convention can make it otherwise. . . . There is really no escape from this. Unquestionably the destruction of a capital city, such as London, with the administrative centres aforesaid, would be a military achievement of the first order of magnitude ; it would be from an enemy standpoint an achievement of far greater potential value than any ordinary success or victory in the field of battle."¹

As on the sea and in the air the war was rapidly moving along its three-dimensional paths and thus creating forms of war never before seen, on the earth two-dimensional warfare was struggling with new ideas, urged upon men by the constant tactical factor. In 1914, when the war broke out, all sides had staked heavily on infantry ; was not this arm the Queen of the battlefield ? In 1915, a new tactical theory of war was propounded ; it was : " Artillery conquers and infantry occupies." The following year we see infantry playing almost a passive rôle in the great artillery battles. They follow the barrages, they do not fight ; if the barrage succeeds they occupy the enemy's position, if it fails they fail, and in both cases their casualties are colossal. Thus the battle of the Somme cost the British 475,000 men, and that of Verdun 350,000 casualties to the French and about 500,000 to the Germans. These were not battles but massacres.

In 1917, this elephantiasis of shell fire reached its zenith in the Third Battle of Ypres. To prepare this slaughter the British massed 120,000 gunners, who, in the initial bombardment, lasting 19 days, fired 4,283,000 shells, weighing 107,000 tons and costing £22,000,000. This battle lasted approximately three and a half months, and each square mile of mud gained cost the British Army 8,222 casualties.

Once the spade had beaten the rifle, as it did in the

¹ *Aircraft and Warfare*, p. 192.

autumn of 1914, in 1915 it set out to beat the gun. This, however, was not to be, for such a victory would have meant complete immobility, and an indefinite prolongation of the war, its dangers and destruction. In spite of the amazing stupidity of the bulk of professional soldiers, the constant tactical factor compelled a few to consider other means. Then on April 22, 1915, lethal gas became a projectile. Its one great advantage lay in the fact that it was only necessary to know that an enemy occupied an area in order to hit him, whether he was on the surface or below the surface of the ground. Its disadvantage was that a counter-agent, the gas mask, was soon produced, then gas, as a weapon, abandoned its lethal powers, and in the form of a vesicant it attacked the skin of the soldier and wounded him instead of killing him. To date, no counter-agent, outside a diving suit, has been discovered for mustard gas.

Thus far the projectile cycle had proved itself a grotesque failure, and why? Because grand tactics were at fault. In all these battles the central idea was to use artillery to blow a hole through the enemy's defences in order to facilitate the advance of the infantry, who were in their turn to facilitate the advance of the cavalry—this idea was a direct return to eighteenth-century warfare. It was this conception of tactical action, and not the gun which was to blame, because if a penetration had been effected, this in itself would not have rendered infantry and cavalry invulnerable to the bullets which would have been showered upon them. The problem was not to advance infantry and cavalry, but to advance the guns, and this demanded that their crews and teams should be rendered bullet proof. The problem was to produce a mobile armoured gun. Once produced it could advance and blow the enemy back, and behind it could follow the infantry to occupy the ground, and the cavalry to round up the prisoners. In brief, as the artillery barrage had replaced the old infantry firing line, the problem now was how to replace this barrage by a

moving line of guns and howitzers. This problem was solved by the tank, which first took the field on September 15, 1916. This weapon rendered mobile the projectile cycle.

In 1916, and during most of 1917, tanks were literally thrown into the mud to assist in impossible eighteenth-century battles. At Cambrai, on November 20, 1917, they were allotted the leading part, that is, they replaced the artillery barrage, and by working as self-propelled artillery the result was that as deep a penetration was effected in twelve hours as had been effected at the Third Battle of Ypres in 2,400 hours. At the battle of Amiens, August 8, 1918, the economy resulting from the use of this self-propelled artillery was remarkable in the extreme. The German front was penetrated to a depth of 14,000 yards in a few hours and at the cost of 1,000 British casualties. At the battle of the Somme, in 1916, the casualties on the first day were in the neighbourhood of 60,000. From August 8 onwards to the end of the war no British, or French, attack of any size or importance was carried out without tanks—mobile armoured artillery.

With the advent of the tank it became possible to re-establish the rear attack, the crucial problem of battle. As early as July, 1917, the British Tank Corps had suggested the construction of large tanks capable of carrying four or five infantry machine-gun teams in addition to the tank's crew. The idea was to deposit these machine gunners *in rear* of the enemy's battle front, and so cut it off from being reinforced whilst it was being attacked in front. In May, 1918, this form of rear attack was abandoned for a more effective one, again suggested by the British Tank Corps. It was, suddenly, under cover of night and smoke, to pass a large number of tanks through the enemy's front and attack his command headquarters and supply centres. Under cover of this attack was to be launched a tank attack on the enemy's armies now paralysed by being deprived of their command—divisional, corps and army. This tactical conception

was accepted by the British and French General Staffs as the leading idea in their projected 1919 campaign.

Had the war continued, this rear attack would undoubtedly have been carried out. The point of interest is not whether it would have succeeded or failed, but that it would have constituted an attack by mobile armoured artillery entirely unsupported by the older arms—cavalry, infantry and horse-drawn guns—which to keep pace with it would have had to be mounted in cross-country vehicles, just as Belisarius, in the sixth century, had been compelled to mount his infantry on horses so that they might keep up with his armoured cavalry.

Reaction and Restriction

No sooner was the war at an end than once again did politician and soldier turn a somersault, and gazing at the shadowy world of 1914 set forth to quest this illusion. They could not see that the whole social order had changed, that 1914 had vanished for ever, was almost as remote as 1814, and anyhow quite as unattainable.

In Chapter I I have shown what resulted in the peace treaties ; here all I will examine is the amazing military somersault ; for it might be thought that soldiers having for over four years been in the closest contact with war would at least have realized its meaning. They did not, in place they followed precedent to the letter. They saw that the military organization of 1918 differed considerably from that of 1914 ; in importance cavalry and infantry had steadily dwindled and artillery had rapidly come to the fore ; nevertheless, so conservative is the soldier, that, in 1919, all armies as quickly as possible reverted to the 1914 model. Lethal and non-lethal chemicals were interdicted, air attack on the civil will was anathematized, and guns and tanks exorcised and reduced on wholesale lines. More astonishing still, cavalry were re-endowed with all their former glory ; and infantry,

who during four years of slaughter had proved the fallacy of the before-war dogmas, were once again proclaimed the predominant arm. In the British Field Service Regulations, the so-called Bible of the British Army, republished in 1924, it was stated :

“Infantry is the arm which in the end wins battles. To enable it to do so the co-operation of the other arms is essential ; separate and independent action by the latter cannot defeat the enemy. . . . The rifle and the bayonet are the infantryman's chief weapons. The battle can be won in the last resort only by means of these weapons.”

Tactically the war had been fought in vain ; nevertheless, in spite of the war, and in spite of the conservative spirit of the soldiers, the law of military development in the end must win through. The projectile cycle has come to stay for its period, and there can be no possible doubt that armies will be motorized and mechanized.

On looking at the World War, as it appears to us to-day, that is at the distance of thirteen years, it must still be looked upon as a war of unrestricted magnitude and unbridled destruction. Wherein then does the restriction of war lie ? Where is to be sought the hope that wars, even at a remote date, will cease their troubling ?

Appearances are not necessarily realities, and the truth is that its restriction lay in its failure, for it in no way solved the problem it set out to solve. Victor suffered only a little less so than vanquished, and to-day in certain cases is suffering even more so. What the war proved was that, in the form it was waged, it was no longer a political instrument but an economic explosive. It could shatter but it could not create, it could impoverish but it could not enrich.

The military machines had proved themselves inadequate, because they were built for absolute warfare, and the age in which they were used was not an age of absolute governments, of separate agricultural king-

doms, but of nations closely woven together and economically interdependent. They could not even destroy each other except through mutual attrition. To them "savage animalism" was everything and "inventive spiritualism" nothing. In this war the horde unmasked itself, and proved itself a complete failure, as the implement of democracy the conscript army was worn out.

The naval machine also proved utterly defective. Immense battleships, costing £7,000,000, were in fact not so much weapons of war as instruments of national anxiety. So many eggs were put into one basket that the basket could not be taken to market for fear of accident on the way. The battleship in fact checkmated herself; she was kept within her closely protected harbour, only emerging under escort. Meanwhile, the submarine, a somewhat despised auxiliary, controlled the seas, striking blow after blow at economic prosperity, and so proving herself to be the most formidable of naval weapons. She, unlike the aeroplane, did not destroy the sources of wealth, for her power was restricted to highway robbery, the object of which was to strike at the hostile nation, by cutting off its food supply, without destroying either the sources of supply or the industries of the country.

Only a limited number of nations are, however, directly concerned in overseas trade, consequently they are invulnerable to direct submarine attack. The horde having failed we are left with the newer land arms—the tank and the aeroplane, and both these weapons can, as I will show in the next chapter, be used for moral attack, that is to establish terror in place of accomplishing destruction—to hit at the will of a nation direct in place of through the slaughter of its soldiers and the sinking of its ships.

The main restriction of war, which, though not put into effect during the World War, can be clearly deduced from its operations, was the passing of conflict from the physical to the moral and economic sphere. To destroy the enemy physically proved of little value,

to destroy him economically of less ; for both struck at world interdependence. To terrify him into surrender did not, and even to starve him into a similar condition was far more economical than demolishing his factories—the engines of his wealth. Yet when peace came, the two most civilized weapons, the aeroplane and the submarine, were placed under restraint ; the one was forbidden to strike at the civil will, the other at the civil stomach, though it is civilians and not airmen and sailors, or soldiers, who make war. Thus was war maintained on its barbaric footing. Had the nations been rationally interested in the maintenance of peace, and conversely in the restriction of war through shortening its length should another war occur, they would have banned the older arms and endowed the new, especially the aeroplane and the submarine, with legal authority to attack the makers of war and not the instruments directed by the will of these makers. Had they done so, they would have made the punishment fit the crime ; but in place, they preferred to maintain the old barbaric system of hanging the accessory and letting the arch-criminal go free. Nevertheless, I can see the horns of the Morning Star peeping over the horizon of this gloom. Perhaps, in some unimagined form, Satan is once again to incarnate and teach us that our true struggle is with the evil within ourselves and not against the evil we see in others.

As the nations failed to change the system of war—its soul, little encouragement was offered to the soldier to change the bones and the muscles of war. The value of armour and the motive power of petrol should have driven him beyond Napoleon, and his none too accurate interpreter Clausewitz, back to the armoured knight. Even Baron de Jomini, another interpreter, as long ago as 1836, saw more clearly than most present-day generals what war meant. He wrote :

“ The means of destruction are approaching perfection with frightful rapidity. The Congreve

rockets—the effect and direction of which it is said the Austrians can now regulate—the shrapnel howitzers, which throw a stream of canister as far as the range of a bullet, the Perkins steam-guns—which vomit forth as many balls as a battalion—will multiply the chances of destruction, as though the hecatombs of Eylau, Borodino, Leipsic, and Waterloo were not sufficient to decimate the European races.

“If Governments do not combine in a congress to proscribe these inventions of destruction, there will be no course left but to make the half of an army consist of cavalry with cuirasses, in order to capture with great rapidity these machines; and the infantry, even, will be obliged to resume its armour of the Middle Ages, without which a battalion will be destroyed before engaging the enemy.

“We may then see again the famous men-at-arms all covered with armour, and horses will require the same protection.”¹

This being so, I will turn back to the shock cycle and see what it can teach us.

The steady increase of cavalry, during the reigns of the later Cæsars, resulted in the trooper replacing the foot soldier. Though to-day we do not live in a sparsely roaded age, on account of the motor-car we are ceasing to be a walking people, and all civilized nations are in a similar process of transformation from boot-leather to oil and petrol. Remembering the law of military development, it follows that before very long the infantry soldier will be transmuted into the car-soldier, or motorized trooper.

Next, the constant tactical factor will come into play, and a proportion of the cars will be armoured. We shall then have two types of petrol driven cavalry, just as Belisarius had two types of horse mounted cavalry. He had armoured cavalry and mounted

¹ *The Art of War*, pp. 48, 49.

infantry, and we shall have tanks and infantry in motor-cars. In short the motor age is a return to the age of Goth, Vandal and Hun, in modified form. Both are mobile ages, and in both the soldier was and will be armoured and unarmoured.

The decay of the Roman roads eliminated infantry, so also for military purposes will the superseding of railways by cross-country machines vastly reduce the numbers of modern infantry, for, as I have shown, the horse army is the creation of the railway. Again, the reintroduction of armour will carry with it a similar influence, consequently the most destructive and easily destroyable arm in modern warfare will in bulk disappear. The iron host of Charlemagne will once again command the battlefield—"Iron, iron everywhere," cried in their dismay the terrified citizens of Pavia," and so in the wars of the future will other cities cry.

Nations will be forbidden to export tanks as once they were forbidden to export armour. Casualties amongst the armoured troops will become ridiculously small when compared to the casualties of unarmoured troops during the World War. Foraging for petrol, oil and grease by the car trooper will become as necessary as foraging was in the Middle Ages, though I hope less brutal.

The weapons of this armoured host will not be swords, lances and battle-axes, but projectiles small and large, and through them war will creep into the manhood of the second projectile cycle. The cities created the last, the cities are creating the present one. Projectile fighting eliminated shock fighting, which to-day lingers on in the shock idea. Will some other form of fighting in its turn eliminate projectile fighting? Will, at some future date, a projectile-throwing Archidamus cry again: "O Hercules, the valour of man is at an end!" I think so; for be it remembered: "All the rest of the Syracusans were no more than the body in the batteries of Archimedes, whilst he was the informing soul." Or, as Euripides said: "One wise man's skill is worth a world in arms."

CHAPTER XII

THE ELIMINATION OF WAR

The Rational Factor in Elimination

LOOKING back on what I have now written, there is no doubt in my own mind that war has very largely lost its utility. It is not a good or an evil force, but according to circumstances a necessary or unnecessary force. To propose to eliminate it as one might tear out a page from a book, or cast off a suit of clothing, is not rational, it is irrational; for to act rationally demands a close examination of the circumstances and then their modification so that they do not prove congenial to war. These circumstances are intellectual, physical, economic and moral, and the main difficulties in tackling such a problem as the elimination of war have always been that the majority of mankind does not rely on reason, but on force, and is swayed by greed and fear. This being so, it is a mere ploughing of the sands to attempt to solve this problem by rationally proving that to-day war is an evil.

What does this mean? Does it mean that we must abandon reason altogether, and leave mankind to seek a solution through trial and error, or what is more likely, leave the problem to solve itself. I do not think so. It means that the reasons we put forward should not be moral ones, for if they are, those who accept them will at once be thrown onto their emotions and become insane. They should be physical and economic ones, which in place of stimulating sentiment will stimulate self-interest. In other words, our rational conceits should take on physical and economic forms.

They should show that war is bad business in a business world ; that trade and war are incompatibles, and that trade if restricted leads to war. They should show that war has already been largely restricted, and that this restriction has steadily followed the path of weapon improvement, which however does not and cannot accomplish its full effect unless our theory of war changes as our weapons change.

What is wanted is not to lay war under interdict but under examination. To bare its history, to discover its changing causes, to probe its nature, and scientifically examine it with an open and unprejudiced mind. Not to fear pointing out when and why in the past it has proved beneficial or the reverse, and how in the future it may prove again beneficial as well as detrimental unless conditions of peace are changed ; for it is in these conditions which the origins of wars are to be sought.

We have the whole of history to appeal to and search, and so far, though there have been a number of monographs on the nature of war and the relationship of war and peace, there has been no one great scientific work on war and its relation to civilization, and there has been scarcely an attempt made to examine war scientifically. The professional soldier is a pure military alchemist, he dabbles in tactical and strategical magic, fashions charms and pentacles, burns incense before training manuals, and when on the battlefield, if he has ever studied military history, conjures forth the ghostly theories of past masters of war in order to solve the problems which there confront him. The politician is no better, for he knows nothing of war, and yet feels eminently capable to control a War Office or an Admiralty, or even to conduct a campaign. If surgery and medicine were still treated as war is now treated, we should to-day be using grated unicorn's horn and butcher's knives in our hospitals. For people to talk of the abolition of war before they have troubled to examine what war is, is an act of insanity.

In this book I have attempted to probe into war, because I firmly believe that there is a rational solution to this problem. My law, constant and cycles may be absurd, in any case they must be imperfect, yet they are honest attempts to examine war scientifically and not merely in a haphazard romantic way. If they are only partially right, I think they prove this : That we are approaching a period which in many ways is reduplicating the events of the later Roman world, and if so we have a precedent to guide us. The *Pax Romana* did for a period eliminate foreign wars, and suppress internal commotions, yet it was in no sense a *Pax Perpetua*, because though it suppressed it never eliminated the causes of war, and the ultimate result of its suppression was an explosion which shattered an epoch.

Obviously we do not want to reduplicate Roman history. Obviously, also, we are in a position of enormous vantage when compared to Rome. Both Roman and Western civilization were founded on war and trade, but where the latter entirely eclipses the former is in scientific knowledge and discovery. Thus, for thousands of years war was a blessing in that it kept populations within their economic limits, and that it fostered culture through the contact and intermingling of hostile peoples. To-day these blessings are finished with ; birth-control can solve problems of over-population far more effectively than war can ; and steamships, railways, aircraft, newspapers and telegraphy in its several forms, that is intercommunication, can mingle nations far more rapidly and effectively. In fact, war seems to-day to possess but one real blessing : It still prevents a civilization becoming comatose. Whenever a social order falls asleep and dreams that it is perfect, war rudely awakens it and clearly demonstrates that it is nothing of the sort. It brutally kicks awake sleepy autocracies, democracies and bureaucracies, and thus still constitutes the instrument of progress.

But man so hates thought that he is unlikely to see

these things unless they are fearlessly exposed to his mental gaze. Even then, the hypothetical 200 years I have predicted as the remaining duration of war in its physical and destructive forms, seems a ridiculously short period wherein he can learn how to dispense with its assistance. Therefore, I believe in the end that the road to wisdom does not lie so much in rational argument as in rational actions. That is, his surroundings will change him far more rapidly than can any word of mouth. Change the instruments and in turn will the craftsmen be changed. What are our new instruments of war? They are—the machine-gun, the motor-car, the tank, the submarine, aircraft and gas. “It is our duty,” said Kant, “to make use of the mechanism of nature for the realization of perpetual peace.” Here in this last chapter I will attempt to show how these six instruments may possibly accomplish this object.

The Elimination of Horde Warfare

To-day the physical factor still preponderates in war and the preparation for war, for so little was learned by the soldier from the last war, that, as I have shown, directly it was over his one idea was to return to 1914. Though the horde proved itself to be an unwieldable instrument, immensely costly, and amazingly ineffective, all the victorious nations, except Great Britain and the United States, have maintained the conscript system, and ironical as it may seem, the defeated nations have been forbidden to re-establish it, which not only relieves them of social and financial burdens, but encourages them to aim at quality in place of quantity.

The World War opened with hordes of bayonets, for military strength was then reckoned in terms of this most obsolete weapon; and it ended with hordes of machine gunners. To-day, in a British infantry battalion, and most continental battalions are somewhat similarly organized, there are 40 automatic weapons and 168 rifles in the machine-gun and three

rifle companies. In a minute the automatic weapons can fire 8,000 rounds and the rifles 1,680. An infantry division of 12 battalions can, therefore, if completely deployed into line, fire nearly 120,000 rounds a minute, and yet infantry are still equipped with the bayonet and are taught that their main duty is to close with the enemy and destroy him.

If this picture were not absurd enough, these swarms of human locusts not only require enormous trains of vehicles to supply them, but as they still maintain the most primitive form of locomotion, namely, marching, they can move only at the rate of about two miles the hour, and frequently less. That such a military organization should still exist in this age of motor vehicles is astonishing in the extreme.

What is the counter-agent to these Saurian masses? The tank and the aeroplane—true; but let us suppose that either these weapons are not used or are maintained on a small footing during peace time, which is certainly the case with the tank, is the next war then to plague us like the last one? Are armies going to advance at 20 miles the day from any one country into any other as they did in 1914? The answer is emphatically “No!” for the motor-car will stop them—the ordinary every day motor-car and the ordinary untrained civilian.

For a moment I will turn back to the war of the Austrian Succession, 1740-1748. In this war one of the most perplexing problems which faced Frederick the Great was how to protect his highly drilled and not very intelligent army from the attacks of partisan bands, who, though not drilled at all, were highly intelligent, quick and cunning. Though they were totally unable to carry out, or to meet, an organized attack, they compelled Frederick's men to be on the *qui-vive* day and night; they struck at any isolated party, and compelled all convoys to be protected by strong escorts. The French, when they entered the war, suffered persistent and severe annoyance from these bands. Captain Oré informs us that “The

first result of these tactics was to impose continual fatigue on our troops, which was accentuated by the deficiency of rations ; during one winter we lost 15,000 men out of 30,000." ¹

Turn from this picture to the present day. We know perfectly well the difficulty in dealing with the motor-car bandit in peace time. Multiply him by thousands, and then, for instance, picture what would have happened to the German right wing in 1914 as it was marching through Belgium. It would not have been destroyed by attack, but delayed by incessant sharpshooting and bursts of machine-gun fire. Its supplies would have been so reduced that strong forces of men would have had to be detached to protect its line of communications. It is quite conceivable that it would never have reached the Marne, and had it, that it would have been so reduced in strength that it would have been decisively defeated. Quite conceivably, 15,000 civilians, after having been put through a week's rifle and machine-gun training, mounted in 5,000 motor-cars, could have carried out such an operation, an operation very similar to that which destroyed Crassus in 53 B.C.

It may be said, that to-day things would be different, that the slow-moving infantry masses, or the faster moving ones, should they be carried in mechanical transport, will be well protected by tanks and armoured cars. The answer is, that they will not be. First, there will be nothing like an adequate number of these machines to deal with the motor-car guerilla ; secondly, it would seem ridiculously extravagant to dispatch large numbers of extremely valuable and costly machines after these folk. A better solution would surely be to do what Frederick did, and what later on the French did during the Revolutionary wars, that is to protect themselves by irregular bands ; to march within a cordon of *voltigeurs*, which by engaging the enemy's partisan bands relieved the regular troops of much anxiety.

¹ Fischer et L'Origine des Chasseurs, p. 16.

The influence of the Parthian cavalry and the irregular troops of the eighteenth century was, as I have shown, drastically to modify the infantry organization of their day. The Romans took to horse, and eighteenth-century infantry of the line dropped much of their rigidity. Will not the motor-car to-day lead to similar effects? Will not the horde begin to dwindle and the motor-car guerilla begin to increase, until armies of motor-car regulars are established? These, by the very nature of their means of transport, will be prohibited from assuming a horde order. Further, on account of the difficulties of petrol supply in an enemy's country, motorized armies will be at a far greater advantage when operating in their own. The fact that they are more suited for warfare within than without their frontiers will endow them with a defensive spirit. In brief, warfare is likely to become less offensive once the horde is diminished, or disappears, consequently wars will become less frequent.

The Elimination of Small Wars

In Chapter IX, when examining the constant tactical factor, I pointed out that as steam-power has eliminated the shock from naval warfare, so, in my opinion, will petrol-power eliminate it from land warfare. I have also, in Chapters X and XI, shown historically that for over a hundred years now the shock has been on the wane, yet in spite of this the shock-idea still lingers on, and utterly confounds present-day tactics.

Here, I will return to this comparison between naval and land warfare, not only because the evolution of a petrol-driven army is likely in the main to follow in the footsteps of steam-driven navies, but because petrol-power in land warfare is also likely to have the same restrictive influence on war as steam-power has had at sea.

First, it is interesting to note that naval tactics have passed through three phases, namely, (i) ramming and boarding; (ii) bombardment with intent to board,

and (iii) bombardment with the intent to sink at ever increasing ranges. Here once again we are confronted by our old friends the three tactical cycles—shock, shock and projectile, and projectile alone. The first applies to galley-fighting, and the last to present-day fighting, the intermediate period being covered in naval warfare between about 1550 and 1850. The change-over from the second to the third of these phases had an extraordinary influence, not only on naval operations, but on the relationship of naval warfare to civilization. The mechanization of the warship, if I may use such a term, has resulted in a definite restriction of warfare at sea. Piracy, or small wars at sea, so prevalent in sailing-ship days and universal in the age of the galley, has almost entirely disappeared, and battle fleets have become so costly that no small maritime power can possibly compete with the greater ones. The time is rapidly approaching, if it has not already arrived, when, with the exception of the British Empire, the United States of America and Japan, a naval war, other than a pure *guerre de course*, will become impossible, or so insignificant an implement of policy as to be of negligible value. Even if France and Italy are added to this list, naval warfare is restricted to five nations.

The most potent factor in naval evolution was of course steam-power; equally so will petrol-power prove itself to be the most potent factor in military evolution. Even before the days of the steamship, the wooden battleship was doomed by the introduction of the explosive shell; similarly, before the days of petrol-driven machines, the infantry soldier was doomed by the rifle bullet, and still more so to-day by the machine-gun bullet. The shell-gun at sea necessitated the introduction of armour, and steam-power rendered the carriage of armour possible. The rifle bullet had an identical influence on land warfare, and prior to the petrol age protection against it was more and more sought through earth armour, or entrenchments.

As it will be remembered, the crucial tactical problem of 1914 was to discover a mobile counter-agent to the bullet. Obviously this agent was bullet-proof armour, and as the soldier could not carry it a petrol-driven machine was constructed to carry it for him. The idea of the tank was but the idea of the *Merrimac* applied to land warfare. After the battle of Hampton Roads, March 8, 1862, the *London Times* said: "Whereas we had available for immediate purposes one hundred and forty-nine first-class war-ships, we have now two, these two being the *Warrior* and her sister *Ironsides*. There is not now a ship in the English navy, apart from these two, that it would not be madness to trust to an engagement with that little *Monitor*," and Sir John Hay added: "The man who goes into action in a wooden ship is a fool, and the man who sends him there is a villain."

What does this mean? It means that little by little the present-day conscript hordes will be replaced by mechanized armies, the true offensive weapons, and that when these armies invade an enemy's country they will be protected from local interference by motor-car guerilla forces, just as battleships are protected by destroyer flotillas at sea. These mechanized, or armoured, forces will be small, because they will prove extremely costly, so costly that the smaller nations and non-industrial Powers will not be wealthy enough to raise them, or to raise them in sufficient strength to be of much value. In brief, these nations, on account of the costliness of the new instruments of war, will be restricted from taking part in any wars in which they are used, and should they, with their old-fashioned armies and militias, indulge in war between themselves, such conflicts can at once be stopped by the great industrial Powers.

It will be said, and rightly, that the small war problem is not merely a question of small nations, but also of large undeveloped areas which are unsuited to the movement of cross-country machines. There is nothing new in this, for throughout military history

no army has been prepared, or organized, during peace time to meet every type of war ; instead armies have been, and are still organized and equipped to meet the most formidable type. Consequently, I am of opinion, that if small wars, which in their modern sense are really wars between or against non-industrialized nations, are excluded, minor operations of war, such as clearing an enemy out of mountainous or wooded country, need not perturb us.

In our own case we cannot, however, at present exclude the problem of the small war ; but is not this problem excluding itself ? For instance, if we examine the situation which faces us to-day on the North-West Frontier of India, is it not rapidly being solved by the pressure of industrialization ? The road, and not the rifle, is silently and surely conquering this frontier. The road means trade, trade means civilization, and civilization means a restriction of the warlike spirit which is the offspring of uncivilized surroundings. Failing a world cataclysm, such as universal Bolshevism, one thing is certain, namely, that civilization will conquer uncivilized areas, not because this conquest is a military but an economic necessity.

The same compulsion of circumstances applies to all non-industrialized countries, such as Afghanistan, Persia and China. The late King of Afghanistan having lost his throne through attempting to civilize his country, should not alarm us, for the mere fact that he made such an attempt, and not because it failed, shows that progress is percolating through the East. In China it is the same, for the revolt against Westernization is not a revolt against industrialization, but a revolt to remove it from Western exploitation. The coal-power of China is known to be enormous, and once law and order are established, as they must be some day, and native resources developed, China will become industrialized, and in consequence her main fighting forces will in time become mechanized.

The same evolution applies to most other at present non-industrialized countries ; and such as cannot

become industrialized, or are too small to develop sufficient wealth from their industries, and consequently too poor to afford mechanized armies, will maintain their land forces on a militia footing, that is, purely for the maintenance of internal tranquillity, and whatever money the more virile of these nations can afford for frontier protection is likely to be spent on fortifications and aircraft. Aircraft, as they can avoid hostile armies and fleets, will prove a useful reinforcement for such of the greater Powers who may come to their assistance. The same argument applies to small maritime nations and the submarine in naval defence.

Thus we see that whilst to-day we are faced by two forms of war, namely great wars and small, mechanization, that is weapon improvement, is likely to restrict the latter. Wars in barbarous regions and between the smaller civilized nations are likely to become less and less frequent, until finally they are altogether eliminated, as piracy at sea has already been. This leaves us with one problem, the great war at sea, on land and in the air.

The Elimination of Naval Warfare

Throughout the ages, the object of naval warfare has vibrated between highway robbery and highway protection, and since small wars and piracy have been eliminated, the predominant object of a fleet is to keep the ocean highroads open to military and mercantile traffic ; this is the full meaning of command of the sea. If the enemy is in possession of a fleet, this fleet must be destroyed, crippled, or blockaded, before this command can be assured. Thus, during the Napoleonic Wars, it was only after the victory of Trafalgar that large forces of British troops were sent overseas. If the enemy has no fleet, as was the case during the South African War of 1899-1902, then a fleet is objectless ; but should the enemy possess no surface fleet, instead a powerful fleet of submarines, the whole problem of former times is changed. First, a battle

fleet is unsuited for escort work ; secondly, it is unsuited to oppose submarines ; thirdly, submarines are pre-eminently suited to attack merchant ships, and fourthly, they can also attack all kinds of warships from battleships downwards. The truth is that to-day battleships are only maintained because other naval powers possess them, and not because in themselves they are useful to keep open the ocean highroads. This being so, and also on account of their expense, they are losing their utility, and so the general tendency is to reduce them in size. This tendency is likely to lead to a reconsideration of the whole problem of naval warfare, and, in my own opinion, whilst in the past the battleship has set the pace in naval tactics and fleet organization, all other craft being considered as auxiliaries to her, in future this pace will be set by the submarine—the ideal weapon to keep open or to close the ocean highroads. We shall then have submarines and auxiliaries, in place of battleships and auxiliaries, and the submarine auxiliaries, like the present battleship auxiliaries, will consist of two main classes of vessels, those which are suited for pro- and anti-submarine work. These vessels may still contain a battleship class, ships of some 10,000 tons, and not as to-day of 35,000 tons—mother ships to the smaller surface craft, but small enough to be able to refit in any fair-sized dockyard, and cheap enough to be built in numbers if required.

There is another reason why the Saurian battleship is doomed, and this is that she offers a considerable if not an easy target for air attack. First, it must be remembered that great naval battles do not take place in the middle of the ocean. I cannot think of any which have been fought, if not out of sight of land, anyhow within a few hours' sail or steam, as the case may be, of the shore. Secondly, a fleet at sea will never be able by means of its aircraft carriers to compete with land aerodromes. To every one machine it can put into the air it may be attacked by ten or twenty machines ; consequently, only when fighting in home

waters, or near the shores of a friendly country, can it expect to obtain adequate air protection and offensive power.

The deduction to be drawn from the powers of these two new weapons, the submarine and the aeroplane, is : That as distant overseas expeditions will become increasingly dangerous, fleets of surface craft will more and more be restricted to defensive operations in home waters, and consequently will lose their offensive value. This means that surface naval warfare, except in home waters, will gradually be eliminated, and naval battles will only be fought between maritime powers which are contiguous, such as France and Great Britain, or Italy and France, and that as these battles will not solve the submarine problem they are likely to grow less and less profitable, the main operations of future naval warfare being trade attack and protection.

At the Washington Disarmament Conference this form of naval warfare was banned because it could not be restricted. Great Britain proposed the abolition of the submarine, but France objected. The British, who had suffered most from submarine attack during the war, saw quite clearly that this weapon had undermined the economic foundations of England's naval sea wall. It had placed in the hands of her future enemies a powerful economic weapon which could directly attack their overseas trade. For instance, if in a war with France, or the United States, either of these countries obtained submarine control of our trade routes for a few weeks, we should be starved into submission. Similarly, of the Mediterranean countries—Spain, Italy, or Turkey, could make the Mediterranean so dangerous for our trade that this route as a commercial channel would be blocked. Silently the submarine will exert even a greater influence on our foreign policy than surface craft have done in the past, for every year our overseas trade is becoming more and more vital to our existence. The submarine is, in fact, forcing us willy-nilly to think in terms of the maintenance of peace.

The ultimate elimination of naval warfare depends, however, on the elimination of land warfare, for as a form of war it is subsidiary to it. Man is a terrestrial animal and not an aquatic one, his interests are on the land, the seas being merely public highways between certain nations and countries. When his land disputes are settled his sea disputes are likely to follow suit. As his land disputes are largely economic, because his civilization is economic, consequently sea warfare has definitely taken an economic form, and is now undermining British naval hegemony, just as mechanization and all that it entails will in the end, so I think, frustrate the establishment of a military hegemony of any one nation over this earth.

The Restriction of Armoured Warfare

In this changing world nothing attains perfection except death, and one thing is certain, namely, that in its day the present projectile cycle in tactics will reach its end, and become as unprofitable as the cycles which have preceded it.

In contemplating a war between armoured forces, first it must be accepted that such a war is only possible between two or more great industrial powers. Secondly, that as the whole world is becoming more and more interdependent, if wars are to continue it is to the advantage of every nation that their duration should be short. Here we are presented with two important strategical factors; the one is that great military operations will take place in highly populated and developed areas, and that consequently great battles in mountainous and forest countries are unlikely; the other is that neutral powers will from the very opening of hostilities bring pressure to bear to terminate the war whether this pressure is expressed through public opinion or exercised through economic sanction.

As regards the first of these two probabilities, it should be remembered that nearly all the great decisive

battles of the past have been fought in open country, the reason being that in such areas communications abound, and the areas themselves being generally highly developed offer economic targets to the attacker. Mountain and forest warfare have always constituted subsidiary operations of an extremely difficult nature, because mountainous and wooded districts favour the defence. In the future, the difficulties hitherto patent to these areas are likely to be greatly reduced, because mechanized armies will be able to avoid them, and by overrunning the rich plain lands, and by attacking industrial and political centres they will bring such pressure to bear, that the war is likely to be terminated before their garrisons can make their influence felt. It follows, therefore, that the nation which can put into the field, not necessarily the largest but the most powerful mechanized army, and which can from the moment hostilities are declared maintain forward movement, need pay little attention to areas unsuited to mechanized arms which lie within the enemy's frontier.

If money were unlimited, then the greatest industrial nation, supposing it to be imbued with a militarist spirit, would as far as land power is concerned have the world at its feet ; for it must be realized that military movement will be so rapid that one or other of the belligerents will be overrun and disarmed before neutral powers can come to the support of either. If, in 1914, Germany had been able to overrun France in three weeks, the neutral world and the allies of France could have brought little pressure to bear on Germany.

Money, however, is never unlimited, not even in the most prosperous times, and as I have already stated, mechanization is likely to prove extremely costly. To-day a medium tank costs about £10,000 and an efficient light tank about £2,000, but when international competition in tanks begins, improvement will follow improvement, and the price of machines will consequently rise. No nation is likely to be in the position to build and maintain more than a compara-

tively small mechanized army, for improvements in construction will be so rapid that each new batch of machines produced will be, as is the case in naval construction, in some respects obsolete the moment the machines are "launched." Further still, the cost of fighting machines is only one item in the general cost. At sea, the British navy would be next to useless if it were not that it is based on an elaborate network of coaling stations, oil depots, defended harbours and coastal fortresses. The same will have to be constructed on land for mechanized armies, and as they cannot be built in potential enemy countries, they will be dotted here and there within the national frontiers, forming pivots of manœuvre and protected centres for refuelling which will prove of enormous value in war.

From these considerations the following deductions may be made: The tendency in military evolution towards increased mobility, which is becoming paramount, will find its reaction in attempts to defeat this mobility by means of permanent and field fortifications. This reaction logically follows the constant tactical factor, for protective defensive power is the answer to protected offensive power. Whilst armoured cross-country machines aim at developing mobility through armour, anti-tank defences will strive to destroy the protection armour affords by gun fire, and simultaneously provide a defensive strategical area which will constitute a powerful base of operations for friendly mechanized forces. The cost of the defence will react on the cost of the offence; consequently mechanized armies will be comparatively small, and the smaller they are the more valuable they will become. Normally they will not seek battle in a hostile defended area, rather they will attempt to entice their enemy's mechanized troops into their own defended area. In any case they will not attempt to rush a defended area, the fortifications of which will probably consist of a large number of Martello towers, or small anti-tank works sunk in uncrossable moats and protected by wire fields of land mines. These

works, like medieval castles, will protect all the main avenues of approach, and will link up topographical obstacles, such as mountains, rivers and woods, supplemented by plantations and inundations.

If these general deductions are in any way correct, then it will be seen that besides the armoured forces and the motor-car guerillas, on account of the increasing defensive character of war, large numbers of garrison troops will be required to man the defended areas, to occupy the hostile ones once they have been overrun, and to assist in their reduction. Thus the pendulum of war swings back, and we return to the foot soldier, not infantry trained to attack, but trained to defend. Not infantry armed with rifles and bayonets, but engineers equipped with anti-tank weapons. Finally we arrive at this somewhat perplexing conclusion: As the defensive gains on the offensive, as it always has after some new offensive weapon has been invented, and eventually "bunkers" this weapon until a still more powerful one replaces it, military operations will become slower and slower, until battles between mechanized armies are likely to grow as static as they were between the enormous muscular armies of the World War.

The Problem of Air Power

Should mobile armour be eventually checkmated by static armour, for this is the situation we have now arrived at, seeing that air power cannot be so checked, it would appear that a possible solution to the above stalemate is to be found in the aeroplane.

This is the solution put forward by most Air Forces, not as the answer of a problematical difficulty which may face us fifty years hence, but of the actual difficulty which faces us to-day. Their opinion is as follows: All military power is finally dependent on the civil will. It is the nation and not its army which makes war, consequently as the movement of air forces cannot to any great extent be restricted by armies and navies,

the civil population can now be directly attacked and terrorized into submission. This argument is based on the experiences of the World War, which showed the enormous power of aircraft to terrorize capital cities, and to impede work in industrial areas. It is here that I see the horns of the Morning Star glowing through this gloomy fire-shot kingdom of Mars. Here I see a return to the Medieval Devil—the terror of a world unseen but well furnished by the imagination of terror-stricken man.

It is true that in the World War terrorization of the civil will was possible, and that had the war continued the attack on the civil will might have proved fully effective; but, when this argument is put forward, it is frequently forgotten that its effectiveness mainly depended on the static nature of the war. Fronts being entrenched, the whole of the ground organization of the respective air forces behind the entrenched fronts was immune from all forms of attack except by aircraft.

Now, if I am right in supposing that we are to-day entering a mobile period of war, then this static condition will no longer hold good. True, aircraft, when in the air, will be almost as little affected by mechanized armies as by existing ones, but aircraft on the ground, and all that aircraft require—workshops, depots, manufactories, etc., will be at the mercy of hostile armoured machines and motor guerillas; further still, unless these machines are halted, the civil will can be even more effectively attacked by tanks and armed motor-cars than by airships and aeroplanes. An unopposed mechanized army could easily overrun France or Germany in a few days, and not only terrorize the civil population but occupy their political and industrial centres, which is a far more effective way of enforcing peace than by slaughter and destruction. Obviously, therefore, they will be opposed, and as present-day armies will not be able to halt them, they will be opposed by their like, and this will mean that it is unlikely any nation will be in a position

to maintain so powerful an air force that it can afford to support its mechanized army and simultaneously launch hundreds of machines at its enemy's cities, for large numbers will be required if this form of attack is to take full and rapid effect. Just as the cost of the British navy limits the size of her army, so will the cost of continental armies seriously limit the size of their air forces in the future.

There is still another reason which supports this argument, though a less potent one. Because the civil will can so easily be struck has already given rise to international legislation prohibiting such attacks. Though such restrictions of war are a frail protection, they undoubtedly do create a sentiment against air attacks, which at the opening of a great war, when neutral opinion is still in the balance, will have a marked influence on the behaviour of belligerents. So much so is this likely to be the case, that I doubt whether, during the earlier period of another war, any nation will risk bombing its enemy's industrial centres and cities for fear of being branded an international criminal. We may conclude, therefore, that, because aircraft *can* attack the civil will, fear of such attacks will definitely restrict the outbreak of war; and because such attacks are contrary to international agreement, when war is declared, belligerents will hesitate to indulge in them until excuses can be found to justify them.

As a war proceeds, it is almost certain, seeing how interdependent the world is becoming economically, that one nation after another will be sucked into the vortex of war, as happened in the last war. Neutral opinion as the arbiter of the rules and laws of war will vanish, and as no moral restraint will be left, civil centres will undoubtedly be bombed if only to bring the war to an end. Whether lethal gases, or vesicant chemicals, or high explosives are used is immaterial, but what is material is that nations will make the most strenuous efforts to protect themselves, and as these aerial bombardments are not likely to take place

until the war is well advanced, and until the stalemate between the opposing mechanized armies provides an excuse for this form of attack, they may find ample time wherein to protect themselves against them.

Here we are faced by yet another dilemma, namely : If the above considerations should restrict air attack on cities, until all the greater Powers have been sucked into the war, air defence may become strong enough to frustrate air attack. Are we destined then to be confronted by a complete stalemate, which can lead to peace only through sheer exhaustion? I do not think so, if it is realized that the secret of future air power lies in wireless control, that is, in electrical science. The air must wed the ether if air power is to dominate in war ; and when this union is consummated, as I will now show, the offensive may become so powerful and so difficult to counter, that ultimately nations may decide that the game of war is not worth the candle.

Heroism and Mechanism

The intellectual tendency of the age in which we live is definitely ranged against war, for though this tendency is in no way critical and will not become a great controlling force until it is critical, its scepticism is growing, and, to those who think, increasingly is it becoming apparent that war can no longer settle international problems as it used to do, even if only temporally so. Its physical tendency is mechanical, every day sees some new machine invented, and its ethical tendency is to reduce suffering. On the battlefield men still die in agony, but *no one wishes them to die suffering* ; further, friend and foe do their utmost to prevent it. The Red Cross is the common bond between antagonists, it is the symbol of the new and better chivalry of war. If this ethical tendency is carried to its ultimate conclusion it must end in the elimination of the causes of suffering, that is not only war itself but the causes of war, and as the physical

tendency is the handmaid of the moral will, for machines are largely made to extend and economize man's natural powers and so strengthen rather than exhaust them, these two spheres of human activity should always be closely related.

In spite of the fact that the moral will of the masses of mankind is definitely ranged against war, the slightest provocation will upset the balance between heart and head, and replace it by an irrational emotional outburst, and particularly so in a democracy where daily the emotions and animal instincts are pandered to by press and government. This being so, is there not something in war which defies moral sentiment and intellectual balance, a glamour which blinds the reason, and an urge which whenever a nation considers itself slighted or threatened is apt to sweep it off its feet. To the coldly rational this may be called madness, but when strong emotions surge over a people the rational plays but a small part, and frequently only that of a mute. It may be a foolish act for a man who cannot swim to plunge into a river and attempt to save a drowning fellow, but by universal consent it is an heroic act, and among the masses of a nation heroism is and always has been a stronger stimulant than reason. Also, it may be a foolish act for a nation to stake its all in a war in spite of the fact that it realizes that even should it prove victorious economically its people will be ruined, nevertheless it may be a sublime act, rising in sublimity as the odds against it are increased.

Does she? It is because fighting one's country's battles is so heroic an occupation that the glow of war remains unextinguished in the heart of man, and above all in the heart of woman. She instinctively feels that the soldier is the protector of her home and of her children, as well as of her country. She sees in him a high-souled man, a warrior who is willing to abandon all that comfort means, to march many a weary mile, to suffer from hunger, cold and heat, and face danger and death, all for a few pence a day. It is because of his heroism

that she offers him her love, and these two have ennobled war in spite of its horrors and disasters. Eliminate heroism and not only does war lose its soul, but it becomes to a great extent a senseless thing, and perhaps, like the Roman Empire, with this loss Western civilization will become a senseless thing also.

In the ancient days, the days when Homer wrote the *Iliad*, the heroism of war stood forth in all its brightness, it glittered upon brazen armour, and glimmered from brass-tipped spears. Then battle-fields shone with the glint of polished metal ; but they were not battles like the battles of to-day, they were quite different, for they were waged between heroic souls. The gathering of the Grecian clans constituted audiences rather than armies. They did not fight much, but they watched with intense excitement their heroes and their champions fight, just as to-day we might watch two pugilists. Hero met hero in individual combat, and on the skill and courage of each depended the victory or defeat of their respective sides. It was a curious form of war, for the soldiers themselves were but civilians, watching two champions fight it out, just as to-day the civilian population of two countries at war will watch their armies engage in battle. But then all glory fell to one man, the fighting leader, the man who was not only chief among his men, but who fought their battles for them. Such a leader must have set beating many a woman's heart, and by so doing have glorified war.

In war, as we have seen, the first great change came with the invention of gunpowder, and the second with the introduction of steam-power. The first to a large extent abolished chivalry and democratized war. The prowess of the individual was merged into the determination of the mass. Leaders became commanders, and by degrees disappeared from the actual battlefield to control their men from the rear. Steam-power increased the size of armies, and in naval battles it separated the contending fleets by miles. Whilst as recently as the American Civil War ships more often

than not depended on their rams, to-day they depend on guns which can sink a vessel at twenty thousand yards' range. Physical heroism has almost vanished from the naval battle, and moral heroism has been restricted to the few, because in battle the majority of a ship's crew sees nothing, and is little more than a human link between two pieces of metal—the shell and the gun—or the bunkers and the boiler.

In the recent World War the outstanding difficulty on land was the human element—man and his limitations. Attempts, and many of them most successful, were made to overcome this difficulty by invention. Guns were ranged electrically, aeroplanes gave to a commander far distant sight, and wireless telegraphy and telephony enabled the general to flash his ideas, even his voice, over unknown distances and to unknown recipients. Yet as the war proceeded it became obvious that, though the means of controlling a battle left little to be desired, the instrument would not respond: it was human, it possessed a soul, it could be terrified, it was apt to halt and not obey. Man, in fact, was an incumbrance on the battlefield; if only he could be replaced by a "Robot" which would automatically respond to the general's will, this supreme difficulty would be overcome; fear would be eliminated, and incidentally with it heroism. The method of fighting would become perfect, and absolutely diabolical. Such, I believe, to be the central idea in the mechanical theory of war.

The Robot Cycle

Mechanization, as I have already pointed out, means not only the restriction of armies and a reduced frequency in wars, but on account of its influence upon human emotions it may well mean the elimination of war altogether. To-day we are seeking to eliminate danger by armour—by tanks and kindred machines. But why halt here? Man is still a fearful creature, whether armoured or unarmoured. Weapons give

blows, but men receive them, why not eliminate the fighting soldier altogether?

As in religion the constant factor has been fear, and in economics, greed, so in war the constant tactical factor has been the elimination of danger. It matters not what period of war we have examined, we have watched tactical evolution revolve round this constant. The idea of the elimination of danger was born with war itself. Not long ago, on the battlefield, man faced man in mortal combat; to-day, hundreds of paces, sometimes thousands, separate the combatants, and this separation is the child of this idea. The elimination of danger carries with it the elimination of war, since war without danger is an absurdity. Conversely, the accentuation of danger, until it embraces civilian and soldier alike, carries with it a similar conclusion. It is a case of extremes meeting, for universal danger becomes as absurd a means of lethal argument as no danger at all.

To-day the tendencies for these extremes to seek union would appear to be well established. We know that by means of a wireless apparatus we can control an unpiloted aeroplane, or an unmanned coastal motor boat. We know that if an entire frontier were mined, or if all the bridges over a river were prepared for demolition, by pressing a button an etheric wave can be despatched to each mine, or charge, which will explode them simultaneously. What have we done? We have eliminated men and have replaced them by a machine which will electrically respond to the will of *one man*, irrespective of distance, and all but irrespective of time. What we have done is to link up the brain of the general direct to a vast number of weapons, in place of linking it to the weapons through a multitude of intermediary human brains. If it is possible to control a motor boat by a wireless wave, it is possible to control a tank or a thousand tanks, an aeroplane or a thousand aeroplanes.

To-day should two hundred aeroplanes be despatched to bomb a city, each would be controlled by at least two men—here is the weak link. To hit the city they must fly over it; in other words assault it.

The city may be so strongly protected by anti-aircraft defences that the weak link will snap. The human element, the men in the machines, will not face the danger, any more than the infantryman to-day will face the machine-gun bullets of the defences. Why assault? Why not in place hark back to our old friend the constant tactical factor, which whispers—"eliminate the danger." Why not send forward over that city two hundred unmanned and partially armoured aeroplanes wirelessly controlled by, I will suppose, ten occupied ones flying at a distance from them, or at a high altitude above them? Each of these two hundred machines would be nothing more than a flying projectile—a true aerial torpedo—which will explode on impact with the ground, or be exploded by a wireless wave released by the airman directing them. Here the picture of the defence changes, for in place of shooting down human beings, the defender with his guns will bring down upon his city vast nerveless projectiles—in place of protecting the city each hit scored will throw it into panic. Or should a gas be used which will throw its inhabitants into a deep sleep, or incapacitate them in some way without permanent injury, except for accidental casualties, war will become bloodless and non-destructive. It will have developed into a contest between two wills and the sciences which fortify them. It will have passed out of its physical stage and have become purely intellectual—a contest of brains in place of bodies.

Such possibilities are not purely fantastic, for if in the next hundred years the rate of scientific progress of the last hundred is maintained there is no saying what inventions may not appear. It is not beyond the realms of possibility to imagine that a general may be seated in some farmstead in Kent, or in a flat in London, and yet be fighting a manless battle in Central Asia in which the civil population is the target. Victory will depend on his will as fully as the defeat of Amalek depended upon Moses holding up his arms.* And should he grow weary, the battle may be lost, for his

weapons are brainless and heartless—they have no fear. Heroism, the one virtue of war, will be gone. They shatter and are shattered, they give blows but feel them not; they know neither mercy nor pity; they are soulless and unheroic as they destroy each other without pain. Heroism will be dead; war will become as ridiculous a solution to human quarrels, as the burning of witches eventually became to the extermination of witchcraft. It will exterminate itself, for it will have lost its glamour. Its nobility will have gone. No warrior will be killed, no woman will weep for a soldier slain. The soullessness of war as well as its universal terror will have brought war within sight of its end.

What is the answer to this form of attack? Frankly I do not know. There may be an answer, and if wars are to continue there certainly will be an answer; but not one which will place all the great cities underground, for this is really unthinkable. Personally, I am inclined to hold the opinion, that anyhow for a long period, that is, as long as our present civilization lasts, wars will at some time in the future be relegated to the dustheap of things which have failed, and which have outgrown their utility.

For thousands of years man unconsciously has been working towards this end, in other words, willy-nilly, he has been compelled by the costly process of trial and error to travel along the path of the constant tactical factor. The stone axe gave way to the primitive bow because man feared to be struck by the axe, the bow to the musket because man feared the arrow, the musket to the rifle, and so on. Obviously this progress has not been consistent, because it has depended upon the caprices of civilization, and man is far from being a logical animal. Now, however, the secret of weapon evolution, one of the many forms of general evolution, is known, consequently it is almost a certainty that it will be more and more closely followed; and once it is followed, the logical process of the elimination of danger on the battlefield will, so it seems to me, proceed to its logical end—the elimination of war itself.

EPILOGUE

ALEXANDER'S EMPIRE

"These are the spells by which to re-assume,
An empire o'er the disentangled doom."—SHELLEY.

The Empire of Right

THE empire of Alexander the Great was built on war and was destroyed by war ; what was physical in it perished, what was spiritual lived on, maintaining its essence yet changing its form as it swept upwards through the ages. "The world is not intended to be disposed in evil order ; 'in a multitude of rulers there is evil, therefore let there be one prince,' " had said his master Aristotle, and Aristotle's pupil in his Herculean labours had attempted to realize this ideal. Others innumerable have followed in his footsteps, because the intellectual is master of the physical, and to the man of intellect anarchy is abhorrent because it unchains the beast in humankind.

Isaiah had cried : "Nation shall not lift up sword against Nation, neither shall they learn war any more," and Mazzini, yet another prophet, has said : "Mankind must be one, even as God is one—one in organization as it is already one in principle. It is indispensable that there be some centre to which the collective inspiration of mankind may ascend, thence to descend again in the form of Law—a power strong in unity." The Catholic Church attempted to establish such a unity, and investing the intellectual control of man in a spiritual hierarchy it ultimately failed because this hierarchy was human. Rationalism

liberated the intellect and by creating modern democracy invested the labour of man not in a hierarchy but in a mobocracy, and it too is failing because it also is human. "If there were a nation of gods," said Rousseau, "they might be governed by a democracy: but so perfect a government will not agree with men."¹

What are we then to do? The Church and the people have been tried out, and both have failed as has also every system of government which may be fitted in between these two extremes. Yet as Kant says, it would appear that there must be a solution, "that it is the irresistible will of nature that right shall at last get the supremacy," and that "what one here fails to do will be accomplished in the long run, although perhaps with much inconvenience to us."² Is not then the answer to this question really this: We are impatient, we are struggling for something which is the most tremendous thing in the world, something which we do not really understand, which we at present can only see as a reflection, as a distant shadow, as a hope, and which we desire to seize suddenly, here and now, as if it were a material thing.

Is not the Empire of Right nothing more than correct living, of living not in a state of nature as do the animals, but according to what we call the laws of nature, which in the human world are as all-embracing as the state of nature is in the animal. If animals cannot find food they die, if they cannot mate their species becomes extinct, if they overbreed they must struggle against each other, and if they interbreed they degenerate.

Because modern man is so obsessed by his sense of superiority that he has made it a law unto himself, he firmly believes that he can master nature and set her aside. So entranced has he become by his wormings into the husk of nature, that he has forgotten that he himself is but a living atom of this husk, and that his supreme problem is not to discover the composition of material or electrical atoms, but the workings of his own soul, that immaterial something which makes him

¹ *Social Contract*, iii, Chap. iv.

² *Perpetual Peace*, p. 155.

a living creature and the highest manifestation of nature. So self-satisfied has he become with his own infallibility, that in place of self-examination he spends his life examining others, and to improve them he is always trotting out some well-worn ideal in place of eliminating the imperfections in himself. When man expends as much energy in creating a science of correct living as he has expended on the exploration of the material world, then his present alchemical way of living will give place to a scientific way. "The life of the law," said Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, "has not been logic; it has been experience," that is the ever-changing relationships between man and man; so also must the laws of correct living be based upon experience between the inner man, the man of nature, and the outer man, the man of civilization. "Science, in its right mind, does not sit on Olympus, but walks the dusty ways of life, eager to learn from the humble earthworm no less than from the rolling planets. When all these briefs are filled, the voice of virtue is heard."¹ Lacking the humility and modesty of the true scientist, our moral, social and political philosophers will not descend from Olympus, hence the modern world is gyrating in Tartarus, and the voice of virtue is not heard.

To the most inferior intellect it must be apparent that Western civilization is not an empire of right, but an empire of anarchy; that besides this civilization there are many others, and that within each there are a thousand and one cults and discords. To suggest world unity is an absurdity, to abolish war is an equal foolishness; but to tackle the diseases of peace is something concrete, something which can be grasped, and something which may lead to the all-desired end.

And what are these diseases? One and all are due to a lack of balance between what is animal, human and spiritual in man. Man possessing a threefold nature, consequently lives in a threefold world, a world of force, reason and justice, which is never at any one moment what it was at the last moment, or

¹ Charles A. Beard in *Current History*, vol. xxxiii, No. 6, p. 805.

what it will be at the next moment. It is a living world and not a dead world, consequently no fixed system will, or can, control it. It is because the Roman world became rigid, that is soulless, that it broke up, and it is because Western civilization is growing rigid that it is breaking up. Rome, as I have shown, had no precedent to guide her civilization. The Republic and the Empire were the first great practical experiments in a world federation established upon the abolition of war, and these experiments failed to solve the problem. Are not we of this modern age carrying out experiments of an identical nature, and yet if we willed it could not we do something better than copy Rome?

When a nation, or a civilization, turns from the offensive to the defensive it shows that it is either losing power or is satiated. This is not only true in the physical sphere but in the moral sphere. When Rome ceased to expand she began to contract, because once her conquest over others ceased she failed to turn her offensive against herself, and carry out a war of purification. The forces within her rebelled, and the heroism, which had carried her to the Nile, the Euphrates, the Danube, and the Rhine, growing rigid was shattered by the heroism of the Coliseum. Had she been only more humble and more modest she would have discovered that the might of her legions could not protect her against inward rottenness.

In her case, centralization of force, military and financial, established peace for a period, just as a similar centralization is to-day establishing peace in Russia; but in both cases it is peace at a price—slavery, not necessarily physical, but moral and intellectual. Order is only a means to an end, and peace in itself is no blessing if it is purely mechanical. A rigid order, or a machine-like peace, destroys all heroism. Better to live in a jungle of savage animals, where life is a perpetual danger, than become a cog in some vast soulless machine. Better be an animal with the freedom of the animal than a caged bird. To attempt to establish the Empire of Right by force, or through

compulsion, before the ingredients of such an empire exist, is to attempt the impossible ; for the Empire of Right can only be established on freedom under control, that is the right of man to fathom the mysteries of nature and direct his own destiny according to her laws in the physical, moral and intellectual kingdoms which united constitute the empire of his life.

The Kingdom of Force

Nature manifests to us through force, and it is only through changes in force, or rather in the relationship between forces, or aspects of one force, that we are able to discover her secrets and so regulate our lives. It is because nature exerts force without regard to human consequences that we say that she is blind. When we discover the cause of these exertions we begin to discover the mechanism which controls them, and by discovering it can learn how to direct force intelligently. It is in this direction that lies the secret of human progress, for man through his freedom of choice can use force creatively or destructively, but to abolish force is out of the question, for man himself is nothing more than force conscious of itself.

When we talk of the abolition of war we are talking of an absurdity, for we can abolish nothing, we can only change it, and have the right to do so directly we understand how to do so. The cessation of war will depend upon the necessity that wars should cease, and not on human predilections. Wars will continue just as long as man fails to evolve a social order in which warfare will have become unnecessary. Though the Roman Empire restricted war it did not abolish war, for what it did was to endow the State with so strong a force that at the cost of reason and justice revolt could for a period be suppressed, but only for a period, for its ultimate liberation was as violent as the suppression had been severe.

When military force falls into disrepute, it does not necessarily follow that it has lost its utility ; what is

much more likely is that it has been misapplied. The more powerful grow the instruments of war the more careful must be their direction and control. As I have pointed out, the trouble to-day is not to be sought in the nature of the weapons used, but in the political authority and in the generalship which make use of them. It is only necessary to turn to the last war and examine its grand strategy, that is the relationship between policy and war, to discover the impotence of democratic governments and professional soldiers to wage war economically. Because of their ignorance and stupidity war is considered a curse, and under their direction it is a curse, but because this is so it does not render the restriction of war any the more easy. For example, indigestion cannot be cured by abolishing the cook and her kitchen ; but it may be cured by replacing her by another cook and by scrapping some of her worn-out pots and pans.

The curse of modern armies is not their cost but their size. Just as a man physically can only wield a certain weight, so intellectually a general can only control a certain number of men. Though this control may be vastly extended by scientific invention, it does not alter the appetite of his men, or the mathematical certainty that 1,000,000 men will require ten times the supplies needed by 100,000. Wars to-day have degenerated into the locust type, that is to say they are not won by skill at arms but by maintenance of cook-house requirements. Potatoes quite as much as rifle bullets decide campaigns, and though there is nothing new in the economic attack, when it becomes the superior means of winning a war generalship vanishes and is replaced by quarter-mastership.

When kings fought kings they waged their battles in a kingly way, they took the field and led their men, and suffered, if not equal, considerable hardships with them. But when democratic masses take the field, not only does the personal heroism of the general-in-chief vanish, but as his army is a political and not an autocratic instrument, he himself, however able he

may be, is controlled by a cabinet, or committee, of men who frequently do not know one end of a rifle from the other. The result is that battles are not only waged by armies of colossal size, but are normally controlled by governments of colossal military ineptitude ; consequently, whether short or long, they are seldom works of art, for not even the greatest genius can work artistically if he finds himself sandwiched between gross stupidity and gross numbers.

The net result is that war is losing its utility without overcoming its necessity. Once surgery killed as many people as it cured, but as the grossness of the art did not lessen the number of cases which demanded treatment, so the grossness of democratic warfare will not in itself eradicate the social diseases which generate wars. Its effects will obviously be the reverse ; for failing to eradicate the diseases these will continue to ravage the social order and lead to further wars and further failures until a general anarchy is established in which democratic civilization and democratic armies will founder, disappear and eventually be replaced by more suitable instruments of culture and of force.

"The problem of the formation of the state," says Kant, "hard as it may sound, is not insoluble, even for a race of devils, granted that they have intelligence. It may be put thus :

'Given a multitude of rational beings who, in a body, require general laws for their own preservation, but each of whom, as an individual, is secretly inclined to exempt himself from this restraint : how are we to order their affairs and how establish for them a constitution such that, although their private dispositions may be really antagonistic, they may yet so act as a check upon one another, that, in their public relations, the effect is the same as if they had no such evil sentiments.'

He considers that such a problem must be capable of solution. "For it deals, not with the moral reforma-

tion of mankind, but, only with the mechanism of nature. . . . A good political constitution, however, is not to be expected as a result of progress in morality ; but rather, conversely, the good moral condition of a nation is to be looked for, as one of the first fruits of such a condition."¹

Here, it seems to me, is presented to us the key of the whole problem of peace and war. Peace is rotten because it is established on what is supposed to be morality in place of upon reason. What it is really established upon is popular emotions. Since the French Revolution, practically every social and political reform of importance has been carried forward on a wave of emotion. For instance, to-day, the franchise rests on the emotion that all men are equal ; obviously this is not a rational conception. Again, taxation is founded not on a rational but on an emotional basis, namely, that the successful must support the unsuccessful, the rich the poor, the strong the weak.

It is this form of social order and of civilization, which has rendered war irrational by founding it on the emotions of unthinking men. In an economic age it should be obvious to all that trade disputes cannot be settled by war, and in the waging of them victor and vanquished must suffer alike, and that victory is unremunerative unless it is profitable. But so strong are the emotions of nations that all reason is drowned in panic. They are swept off their feet by the most irrational arguments, and the more irrational they are the more firmly do they believe in them.

As long as force is directed by the emotions it must remain anarchic, that is out of control and lawless. Only by applying reason to force can we learn to control it, that is use it rightly, and to use it rightly is to use it justly, that is for the good of mankind. By reason wars may possibly be eliminated, by emotions they can only be accentuated, until after "much inconvenience," as Kant says, their accentuation will compel reason to take command.

¹ *Perpetual Peace*, pp. 153-155.

The Kingdom of Reason

Whilst the emotions are closely allied to the instincts which represent the animal side of man's nature, reason is his one great human qualification, that quality which separates him from the beasts of the field, enabling him to compel them to obedience and utility. Though man cannot annihilate the emotions without annihilating himself, for they are an essential part of his being, through his reason he can control them. When every man is a law unto himself physical anarchy is the order of the day, so also when the emotions are laws unto themselves moral anarchy is the state resulting. This is the condition of the modern world, a world in which reason having largely subjugated the forces of nature, but having failed to subjugate the emotions in man, has established a highly mechanical and artificial civilization endowed with an anarchic spirit, an enchained devil which is unceasingly seeking liberation through smashing up the machine. The trouble to-day is that reason, in the form of physical enquiry, has far outstripped reason in the form of moral enquiry, with the result that civilization is at war within itself. Two great armies of human beings are ranged one against the other, not labour opposed to capital, or the proletariat opposed to the bourgeoisie, but emotionalism opposed to reason, and not until these forces can be balanced and brought into equilibrium can a foundation of peace be established.

If the Empire of Right, that is of correct living, is worth gaining, then force which is so largely the outward expression of the emotions must be rationalized, that is reasonably used ; and as the ways of living are always changing, the applications of force must change also. To-day, the main expression of force in Western civilization is in nature economic. Work and not faith is the impulse of the age, and as faith has been thrown out of gear by rationalism, and as work has been de-individualized, that is bereft of the interest of

the worker in his work, outside the wages he earns, the emotions can find no nesting place. They are like a man on a desert island searching for a mate.

It is obvious in an economic age that peace and not war is the medium in which work can find its fullest expression. But it is not so obvious that peace, unless it begets happiness and interest in life, endowing living with an object which is not purely material, is nothing more than warfare of the soul. A man who cannot express himself, that is give to the world what he feels is best in himself, will give to the world what is worst, or else sink into a senseless apathy. He feels that he is not a machine, but a living spirit. Once when he believed in God he was contented, or far more so than now, for in religion his emotions could express themselves. To-day it is truly pathetic to watch the soul of man wandering through a desert of football fields, race-meetings, cinemas, etc., seeking a mate which will bring true happiness and contentment into his life, and not merely a drug to drowse his idle moments.

It is not only that work is so uninteresting, but that leisure is such a blank ; and to me it seems that the filling of this blank is one of the greatest problems which confronts us. The old emotional religion which filled in this blank by bringing God down to man must be replaced by an intellectual religion which will bring man up to God, not the mere mechanism of nature but that wonder, mystery and beauty which is to be discovered in her very being. When men can be brought to enjoy life intellectually, as they now enjoy it physically, a new world will be revealed to them, not a world of action, but a world of thought, not a world of might, but a world of right.

Rationally the inner problem of war is the problem of the inner man, not of the conflict over things but of the conflict between ideas, and to me it appears fatuous to attempt to abolish international conflicts as long as the present national discontentedness continues. To set aside emotionalism altogether is of course absurd, but to rely on it as the sole instrument of adjustment is

equally so. What the civilized world demands to-day is scepticism ; doubt in its seeming perfection and its infallibility. Self-examination will reveal that much which passes for self-interest is nothing more than unrealized self-destruction. What is the use of attempting to abolish international conflicts and yet do little or nothing to restrict national discontentedness ? What is the good of building up a federated world of diseased nations ? It is like building a house of rotten bricks, a house which will fall to pieces before even its building is finished. Charity begins at home and so does world federation. What is required to-day is not to abolish war but to place it on a reasonable footing. Disarmament is a misnomer, for it is unreasonable, what is reasonable is a limitation of armaments. To suggest the establishment of an all-powerful international police force to control the existing world order, is to ask the moon to stop agitating the oceans. Because we can walk about in most civilized countries without being sand-bagged or bludgeoned at every street corner is due not so much to our being protected by a few individuals called policemen but that public opinion is against bludgeoning. Even to attain this state of order immense sums of money have to be spent. For instance, in the United States, no less a sum than \$1,120,000,000 is yearly required to maintain law and order and establish justice, a sum equal to about a quarter of the total expenditure of the Federal Government, "including the army and navy and the service of the public debt." Out of this sum \$3,900,000 are paid for armoured-car service, \$1,000,000 "for the installation of tear-gas devices in banks, and \$311,000 for bullet-proof glass."¹ Seeing that the United States is not exactly a barbaric country, I wonder what would be the cost of an international police force which could maintain the peace of the world ?

The fact is that all such suggestions are irrational, because however logical they may appear to-day they

¹ *The Times*, August 22, 1931.

are all based on the fallacy that what is required is to maintain the *status quo*. If we would only recognize that the only right man possesses is to think, and when possible to think correctly, by degrees we should learn how to live correctly. To live correctly is to adapt oneself to changing conditions, and to avoid becoming rigid and mechanical. If things do not work as they should work, obviously there is something wrong, but it does not therefore follow that the whole mechanism elaborated must be scrapped and replaced by something yet untested, for more frequently than not failure to work correctly is due to maladjustment which correct thinking can set right.

When the machinery of nationalism collapsed during the World War two forces were liberated, on the one side the emotional, in the form of the League of Nations, and on the other the economic, in the form of the Russian Revolution. The first was the recoil of an economic collapse and the second of a moral collapse, and to-day reason is ground to powder between these opposing ideals. Russia setting out to destroy the diseases of Western civilization, which were mainly due to a lack of balance between emotionalism and reason, has temporarily solved this problem by depriving the individual of the right to think, except in one direction, which means that thinking having become a secretion of the State will in time cease to be the vivifying sap of Russian culture. At present all is energy and expectation, but when these give place to actuality, and the myth of a heaven upon earth un-masks itself, and is found to be a mere mechanical process of regulating work and proportioning wealth, it would seem that the same diseases will manifest in the Russian system as in the system it broke away from.

Freedom is the only road along which correct thinking can profitably travel, for it is through the opposition of ideas that correct living is evolved. Correct thinking means reasoning things out, weighing out each idea in the scales of the conditions surrounding it, which in

their turn keep freedom within logical bounds. A man who thinks anything anyhow without reference to conditions, probabilities or possibilities, is not a free thinker but a chance thinker, he is no more than a gambler in ideas.

As the recoil of the moral collapse in Russia has led to a mechanical order founded on a rigid logic, so in Western civilization has a reverse process taken form. Europe wants peace within herself, this is her supreme problem, and not world peace which is something greater and further distant. To attain this peace she needs federation. What common interest is there between her many peoples? Trade! Free trade from its tariff walls and its political shackles, and commercially one nation will merge in another, and economically Europe will be federated. This will not abolish war, but it will abolish a cause of war, and above all that particular cause which has become unprofitable. Other causes will remain, such as over-population within Europe and without Europe. In their turn they must be solved rationally and not emotionally. Thus, it would be folly to lay an interdict upon union between the sexes in order to diminish the birth-rate; yet it would be reasonable to teach the people that correct breeding is an important item in correct living, and that correct thinking on this subject is the first step. That the Empire of Right demands not only an adjustment between population and economic conditions of food and work, but a continual improvement in the stock. It is in fact a common-sense empire, and common sense is nothing more than thought and action adapted to circumstances.

The Kingdom of Justice

The Kingdom of Justice is the Kingdom of balanced forces, it is not a state but a transformation, an unceasing adjustment of force by reason according to the interests of mankind. Man is a living creature and is never standing still, consequently the relationships

between men are changeful. If change leads to competition, that is separation, discord results; if to co-operation—unification, and the result is harmony. Both are essential ingredients in the evolution of human society; the one spurring on the other, and when justly balanced, that is not to the advantage of the majority or the minority of mankind, but of the whole, true justice emerges.

What is just is not necessarily what is absolutely right, but what in the circumstances is wise, a condition which does not only fit a static moment but a changing period. Could this period be extended to all eternity, absolute justice would result; but to man, the finitely-minded, this is not possible, consequently the path of justice is a dual path, a choice between two evils, a lesser and a greater, and it is the wise man who unhesitatingly chooses the first.

A true democracy, in distinction to a mobocracy or a demogogy, is an order in which the general good replaces the immediate advantages of any one section or class. As the law, if justly administered, is no respecter of persons, so a just government is no respecter of classes, it considers all, and it panders to none. Majority rule is a rule by competition, it is, therefore, essentially a war-like system of government which splits a nation into two hostile camps. Under such a system a nation lives in a state of war, and it is this state which not only generates national rebellions but foreign wars; for when political competition at home becomes so intense as to be unbearable, relief is frequently sought in focussing internal discontent upon external danger. One of the most powerful instruments of democratic governments is the creation of a foreign enemy who by threatening the nation will compel it to maintain internal tranquillity. Were it possible to abolish foreign wars, then under the existing form of democracy rebellions and revolutions must replace them; for their abolition does not eradicate the germ of war, it simply restricts its breeding ground to within the nations. This is what has

happened since the close of the World War ; for, as I have shown, before its outbreak it was fear of German hegemony which stabilized peace, and once this fear was eliminated the world was swept by national rebellions.

The object of all true government is economy of force, that is its correct use, in the physical, intellectual and moral spheres of life, a just balance within and between them, as they exist in the nation and in the world ; the governing ideal being not the self-interest of any one nation, people, or class, but the general interest of the whole and of prosperity. What will lead to the contentment of the present generation and what is likely to lead to the improvement of the next, that is to a more perfect state of contentment, are the two problems which cannot with impunity be divorced, and any separation of them must inevitably lead to discord, to rebellions and to wars, because such a separation is unjust.

Bearing the future in mind, and that the future should be more contented, and happier than the present, the watchword is freedom, personal, social, national and international, and the more this freedom expands the more united will the world become. Freedom does not mean licence, but *not being under the necessity of restraint*. Free is derived from the Sanskrit *pri*, to love, and through the Gothic word *frijon*, also meaning to love, is allied to the word, friend. Freedom is friendship, a combination of self-interest and self-sacrifice. In freedom is to be discovered the value of living and not merely of existing, the value of conquering and not merely of acquiring, of doing and not merely of accepting, and above all in knowing in place of remaining ignorant.

The present age, the age of scientific invention, has largely freed the peoples of the world from isolation. The steamship, the locomotive, the aeroplane, the telegraph and the radio are daily contracting space and squeezing out the ignorance inseparable from isolation, which is a form of imprisonment. But it has not

broken into the moral dungeon in which the heart of man lies chained.

Unravelling the mysteries of nature is wonderful, but unravelling the mysteries of the heart of man is equally wonderful. Life is full of unrealized heroism, of moral mountains which await to be scaled, of moral deserts which await to be rendered fertile and of intellectual wonders which await to be revealed. There are as many secrets of the soul as of the body, possibly more, which demand heroic effort to discover and to solve. When we think of the world a hundred or a thousand years hence we think of the world of to-day, multiplied a hundred- or a thousand-fold, forgetting that such a multiplication will multiply its diseases with its perfections.

In a perfect world there can be no hospitals, no law courts, no schools, no armies and no churches ; for in a perfect world there can be no sickness, no crime, no ignorance, no strife, and no doubt. Such a world is unattainable, but this is no reason why it should not be striven after ; for the more we strive the nearer shall we approach it. We know that in space we can never penetrate to infinity, but this does not prevent us inventing telescopes, and yearly penetrating deeper and deeper into this mystery.

It seems to me then that the problem of war is one of a large number of closely correlated problems none of which can be solved separately, but all of which will slowly be solved together as the forces which underlie them are brought under control of the will of man and justly regulated according to human needs. To concentrate solely on the problem of war and its elimination, and to leave other problems like race-deterioration, over-population and government which weighs out power in terms of human tonnage, to solve themselves, is not to solve but to misunderstand the entire problem, and through misunderstanding it to aggravate it.

Though Alexander set out to conquer the world, and did conquer the greater part of the known world of his

day, substituting the rule of one prince for that of several princes, no sooner was he dead than his empire died with him, yet his dream of a unified world lived on. To-day it is no longer one prince who is needed, but instead one controlling idea: An ever-expanding physical, intellectual and moral unity; a realization of freedom in all its many forms, a ceaseless battle with ignorance and anarchy, an unending appeal to courage and heroism, and the subjection of fear and greed.

The moral equivalent of war is to be found by carrying the energy of physical warfare into the moral sphere, and attacking the diseases of discord at their root. In this war our weapons are those of the reason, and victory is the establishment of justice. Thus, and thus only, so it seems to me, can the Empire of Right be founded, an empire in which the human in man will little by little tame the animal within him, and through this transformation transfigure man himself.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE MORE IMPORTANT EVENTS MENTIONED IN THIS BOOK

CLASSICAL AGE

(1100 B.C. to 410 A.D.)

GRECIAN PERIOD—to 323 B.C.

Twelfth century B.C. Classical Grand Cycle of War begins.

Sixth century B.C. Population of Attica outgrows its food stocks ; Salonian legislation and expansion policy of Themistokles (514-449 B.C.).

Fifth century B.C. Greece gains control of the corn centres ; influence of economics on war.

490-480 B.C. Graeco-Persian wars.

457-404 B.C. Peloponnesian wars.

400 B.C. Sicilian origins of artillery.

386 B.C. Peace of Antalcidas.

350 B.C. Artillery introduced into Greece from Syracuse.

334 B.C. Alexander the Great sets out to conquer Persia.

323 B.C. Alexander the Great aims at creating a World State.

HELLENISTIC PERIOD—to 200 B.C.

284-221 B.C. Heron invents war engines.

207 B.C. Battle of Mantinea in which war engines play a leading part.

200 B.C. Agesistratus states that war engines had a range of 800 yards.

318

THE DRAGON'S TEETH

200 B.C.

Dionysius, an Alexandrian, invents a poly-bolos or arrow-throwing machine-gun.

EARLY ROMAN PERIOD—to 53 B.C.

214 B.C.

Siege of Syracuse. Archimedes defends the city and invents many types of war engines.

202 B.C.

Battle of Zama.

146 B.C.

Destruction of Carthage.

90 B.C.

Lucius Marcius Philippus estimates that there are not more than 2,000 wealthy families in Italy.

53 B.C.

Defeat of Crassus by the Parthians at Carrhae.

LATE ROMAN PERIOD—to 410 A.D.

63 B.C.-14 A.D. Augustus organizes an imperial police force.
Second century. Rome becomes the central exchange of the Empire and accumulates gold.

Third century. Gold gravitates from Rome to the Eastern exchanges.

243-313

Rise of the cavalry arm under Diocletian.

378

Battle of Adrianople, the horse soldier is supreme.

410, April 24

Alaric sacks Rome.

CHRISTIAN AGE

(410 A.D. to Present Day)

PAPAL PERIOD—to 1450

483-565

During reign of Justinian population of Europe decreases by 100,000,000.

632

Death of Mahomet

650

Christian Grand Cycle of War begins.

732

Battle of Tours, Arabs defeated by Charles Martel.

779

Charlemagne forbids the export of armour.

- 814 Charlemagne's soldiers completely armoured.
- 1057 Pavia and Milan raise infantry citizen forces.
- 1076 Pope Gregory VII defeats Henry IV by magic.
- 1095 Pope Urban II proclaims the First Crusade.
- 1134 Heretics burned in Languedoc.
- 1150-1250 Growth of trade in Europe.
- 1198 Papacy reaches its zenith under Pope Innocent III.
- 1241 The Great Khan defeated at the battle of Leignitz.
- 1268 Battle of Tagliacozzo, influence of heavy armour.
- 1300 Papal power rapidly declines.
- 1305 Papacy consents to the taxation of the clergy.
- 1314 Jacques de Molay, Grand Master of the Templars, burnt at the stake.
- 1346 Battle of Crécy, influence of arrows on cavalry.
- 1422 Siege of Carolstein, bacteriological weapons used in the form of corpses and manure.
- 1423 Battle of Zagonara, armour renders fighting bloodless.
- 1450 Battle of Formigny, gunpowder comes to the fore.

PERIOD OF RELIGIOUS REVOLT—to 1648

- 1453 Fall of Constantinople.
- 1467 Battle of Castracaro, no single soldier killed.
- 1469-1527 Machievelli and his modern outlook upon war.
- 1476 Battle of Morat, Charles the Bold makes use of 6,000 hand guns.
- 1494 Charles VIII of France conquers Italy "with a piece of chalk." The back-bone of his army is artillery.

- 1498 Vasco da Gama rounds the Cape and dislocates the economic foundations of Europe.
- 1512 Battle of Ravenna, field artillery forges ahead.
- 1513 Battle of Flodden Field followed by decline of the English military caste.
- 1525 Battle of Pavia, the arquebus forges ahead.
- 1545 The silver mines of Potosi are discovered.
- 1560-1641 The Duke of Sully and his "Grand Design."
- 1562-1609 Period of the wars of religion.
- 1567-1625 Maurice of Nassau father of modern military organization.
- 1594-1632 Gustavus Adolphus reorganizes the three arms.
- 1598 Alberico Gentili publishes his *De Jure Belli*.
- 1618-1648 Period of the Thirty Years War, supremacy of cavalry.
- 1625 Grotius publishes his *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*.
- 1626 Monro considers gunpowder a devilish invention.
- 1647 Daggers first used as bayonets.
- 1648 Peace of Westphalia removes religion as a cause of war.

PERIOD OF MONARCHAL ABSOLUTISM—to 1757

- 1649 Charles I of England executed, attack on the divine right of kings.
- 1649-1652 The Fronde in France.
- 1652 The Dutch wars open in which Cromwell gains command of the sea.
- 1687 Socket bayonet introduced by Vauban.
- 1688-1689 Revolution in England.
- 1692 William Penn (1644-1718) and the League of Peace.
- 1697 Pike abolished by English and Germans.
- 1702-1714 War of the Spanish Succession.

- 1703 Pike abolished by the French.
 1710 Common lands in England begin to be enclosed by the State.
 1713 Abbé de Saint Pierre's (1658-1743) Project of Perpetual Peace.
 1740-1748 War of the Austrian Succession.
 1747 Battle of Lauffeld, Marshal Saxe resuscitates light infantry.
 1756 Petition of Free-traders to the House of Commons.
 1756 Seven Years War begins, increasing value of artillery.
 1756 Battle of Lowositz, growing power of artillery.
 1756 British National Debt, £74,575,000.
 1757 Battle of Rossbach, preparation handed over to artillery.

PERIOD OF INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION—to 1849

- 1757 Clive wins the battle of Plassey and releases gold wherewith the industrial revolution is financed.
 1760 Industrial revolution sets in with the invention of the flying shuttle.
 1761 Jean Jacques Rousseau publishes his essay on *Lasting Peace*.
 1764 Hargraves invents the spinning-jenny.
 1768 Watt perfects the steam engine.
 1775-1783 War of the American Rebellion.
 1776 Adam Smith publishes his *Wealth of Nations*.
 1776 Declaration of American Independence.
 1779 Crompton invents the spinning mule.
 1785 Cartwright patents the power-loom.
 1787 Madison rejects force as an instrument of peace policy.
 1789 The French Revolution begins.

- 1792 Battle of Valmy, the birth of the French nation.
- 1792-1815 Period of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, increasing value of light infantry.
- 1793 Execution of Louis XVI.
- 1795 Immanuel Kant publishes his essay on *Perpetual Peace*.
- 1803-1805 Sir John Moore's Light Infantry camp at Shorncliffe.
- 1806 Battle of Jena, feudalism overthrown in central Europe.
- 1809 Battle of Aspern, after which Napoleon increases his artillery.
- 1810 Battle of Busaco, a fine example of Wellington's tactics.
- 1812 Lethal gas suggested as a weapon of war.
- 1814 Percussion-caps invented.
- 1815 British national debt, £861,000,000.
- 1824 Cylindro-conoidal bullet invented.
- 1830 England by now highly industrialized, and European nations begin to turn to industry.
- 1836 Baron de Jomini suggests the reintroduction of body armour.
- 1839 Percussion musket issued to British infantry.

MERCANTILE PERIOD—to 1913

- 1850 Projectile Cycle begins.
- 1850-1860 Introduction of iron ships.
- 1854 Crimean war declared.
- 1857 India Mutiny breaks out ; the beginning of the national movement in Asia.
- 1859 Darwin publishes his *Origin of Species* influence on German social philosophy.
- 1861-1865 Period of the Civil War in America.


- 1862, March 8 The *Merrimac* meets the *Monitor*, first armoured battle at sea.
- 1863 Cavalry lose offensive power, the charge is all but dead.
- 1864 • Use of gas-shell suggested in America.
- 1864 Mr. B. W. Richardson suggests rendering war less brutal by means of chemical attack.
- 1866 Austro-Prussian War.
- 1870-1914 Period of vast increase in population of Europe.
- 1870-1871 Franco-Prussian War, an economic turning point in European history.
- 1870 Battle of Sedan, essentially an artillery battle.
- 1871-1914 Period of Economic warfare.
- 1871 France pays Germany £200,000,000 as war indemnity.
- 1897 Russia occupies Port Arthur.
- 1897 M. Bloch publishes his book *The War of the Future* ; he relates war to economics.
- 1899-1902 The South African War, power of the magazine rifle proved overwhelming.
- 1902 Preference suggested in Great Britain.
- 1904-1905 Period of Russo-Japanese War.
- 1904 Battles of the Yalu and of Liao-Yang, envelopment alone succeeds.
- 1908 Since 1898 European war budgets increased by £100,000,000. Between 1908 and 1914 they increased by another £100,000,000.
- 1911 Agadir incident.

PERIOD OF THE ECONOMIC REVOLUTION—to 1931

- 1914, July and August World War declared in names of hegemony and nationality.
- 1915, April 22 First German gas attack.

- 1916, Sept. 15 Tanks first used by British.
- 1917 German submarine peril, in answer to Allies' blockade. Between February, 1917, and October, 1918, 13,914,500 tons of shipping sunk.
- 1917 Russian Revolution begins.
- 1917 Third Battle of Ypres, shell-fire reaches its zenith.
- 1917, Nov. 20 Battle of Cambrai proves the superiority of the tank.
- 1918, Aug. 8 Battle of Amiens won by tanks.
- 1918, Sept. 27 President Wilson decides that peace terms must be to the common interest of all parties.
- 1918, Nov. 5 Allies submit armistice terms to Germany.
- 1918 Statesmen and soldiers return to pre-war ideals.
- 1919 France stands for a peace of vengeance.
- 1919 Establishment of the League of Nations.
- 1919 British Government urge cancellation of war debts.
- 1921 Reparation Commission assess Germany's indebtedness at £6,600,000,000.
- 1921 Washington Disarmament Conference assembles.
- 1922 New armament race begins.
- 1923 The French occupy the Ruhr and attempt to establish an independent Rhineland.
- 1924 Dawes Committee readjust reparations.
- 1925 Locarno Treaties signed.
- 1926 Germany enters the League of Nations.
- 1927 World Economic Conference suggests drastic modification of tariffs.
- 1928 Pact of Paris signed by 56 nations.
- 1928 Europe borrows \$672,000,000 from U.S.A.
- 1929 Young Plan modifies reparations.
- 1929 Russian Five-Year Plan begun.

- 1929 M. Briand outlines an European Union.
1929 The Economic crisis sets in.
1929 U.S.A. lends Europe only \$156,000,000.
1930, Jan. London Naval Conference held and cruiser
problem settled.
1930, March Conference for Concerted Economic Action
fails.
1930, May French Government issue memorandum on
a federal union of European nations.
1930, June Final evacuation of the Rhine.
1930, Sept. 14 Adolph Hitler gains 7,000,000 votes.
1931, March 21 Germany outlines plan for customs union
with Austria.
1931, June 30 France objects to Hoover debt proposals.
1931, Sept. 21 Great Britain abandons the gold standard.



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
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
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